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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relationships between the privatisation of the electricity 
supply industry and workers' collectivism in two countries, United Kingdom and 
Argentina. Drawing upon mobilisation theory, the thesis understands the 
process of privatisation as a key counter-mobilising force of the last cycle of 
state and capital counter-mobilisation against organised labour. Thus, the 
research aims at identifying why and how privatisation contributed to hinder 
workers' collectivism and how ESI trade unions responded to that challenge. 
Concomitantly, it intends to test the utility of mobilisation theory for such 
purpose. 
At empirical level, the thesis carries out a comparative study of the anti- 
privatisation campaigns in United Kingdom and Argentina, the mobilisation of 
money resources to prevent trade unions from mobilising workers against the 
sale of the industry, the effects upon labour of the fragmentation and 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, and the impact of all these events on 
the organisational strength of trade unions and the social processes involved in 
the collective definition of interests. 
At theoretical level, the research intends to evaluate the potential contribution of 
applying mobilisation theory in a cross-national comparison through a research 
design, which unfolds at micro, meso and macro-analytical levels, and the place 
of agency type variables within this conceptual framework. 
Overall, the thesis substantiates, on the one side, the case for Privatisation as a 
counter-mobilising force as it reduces the opportunity for trade unions to act and 
promotes division, competition and sectionalism on the workers' side; but it also 
points to the role of leadership and the processes of decision-making to explain 
the concrete responses essayed by trade unions in this particular context. On 
the other side, it proves that the cross-national comparison and the scope of the 
analysis contributed to put in evidence the relevance of various mediating 
8 
factors in the explanation of variability in the opportunity-to-act, in the empirical 
forms taken by counter-mobilisation and in the (re-)sources of power mobilised 
defensively by unions, while agency type factors were paramount to explain 
variability at national lavel between unions facing similar opportunity structures 
and similar counter-mobilising policies. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
The thesis has two main objectives. On the one side, it aims to explore, 
empirically, the relationships between privatisation and workers' collectivism. 
On the other side, it intends to test the utility of mobilisation theory for such 
purpose. As for the former, the research focuses on the privatisation of the 
electricity supply industry (ESI) in two countries, United Kingdom (UK) and 
Argentina: that is, how it conditioned trade unions' ability to act and how ESI 
unions have effectively responded to the privatisation challenge. As for the 
latter, due to differences in the national contexts, the comparative approach 
compels the analysis to pay attention to intermediate variables that influence 
the empirical manifestation of the categories of mobilisation theory; in turn, the 
scope of the study means to incorporate multiple levels of analysis, whereas 
most works have confined the theory to the micro-level. 
The research, thus, arose at the crossroads of a variety of literature. It 
comprised studies on the rationale and the driving-forces behind the 
development of privatisation worldwide, particularly, about the privatisation 
programmes in UK and Argentina; the relationships between privatisation and 
organised labour; and, lastly, the use of mobilisation theory in the field of labour 
studies. The coming chapters will review these strands of the literature, when 
appropriate. Still, a few introductory remarks are necessary to situate the 
research. 
From a mobilisation perspective, the main deficit of the vast mainstream 
literature on privatisation worldwide is their tendency to approach privatisation 
as a technical response' 
Ito 
an economic problem (Dinerstein 2001). 
Nevertheless, many scholars have stressed ' that privatisations were not 
technically inevitable, but politically driven as part of a wider strategy to 
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overcome obstacles to capital accumulation (Cook & Murphy 2002; Dinerstein 
2001; Thwaites Rey 1994). In this sense, privatisation is at the heart of a 
particular phase of capitalist counter-mobilisation. Indeed, for mobilisation 
theory privatisation may be viewed as a counter-mobilising force in itself, and 
hence, highly disruptive for organised labour. Chapters 4 and 5 will discuss this 
perspective, concomitantly justifying the empirical focus of the thesis. 
As for the relationships between privatisation and labour, scholars mostly 
concentrate on the impact of privatisation on job loss, industrial relations issues 
and collective bargaining (136ez-Camargo 2002; Cook & Murphy 2002; Coiling & 
Ferner 1995; de Luca 1998; Ferner & Coiling 1991; 1993a; 1993b; O'Connell 
Davidson 1993; Murillo 2001; Ogden 1993; Pendleton & Winterton 1993; 
Pripstein Posusney & Cook 2002; Riethof 2002; Van der Hoeven & Sziraczki 
1997; Wallis 2000; among many others). Chapter 3 will address this literature, 
insofar as it relates to the aims of this research. This thesis, instead, aims to 
study how this type of changes (and others) conditions workers collectivism, a 
topic rather neglected in the literature. 
Lastly, mobilisation theory, as promoted by Kelly (1998), has been mainly used 
in the field of labour studies to analyse and conceptualise union revitalisation. In 
this research line, mobilisation theory plays different roles. In the main, it 
contributes, together with insights from other theoretical frameworks, to 
conceptualise partial aspects of the process of union revitalisation, In this vein, 
it is loosely applied to analyse the structure of opportunities afforded by the 
state and the institutional environment, the politics of coalition building and the 
key role of union strategies (Baccaro, Harman & Turner 2003; Frege & Kelly 
2003,2004; Heery, Kelly & Waddington 2003; Heery et al. 2003; Kelly 2005). In 
the cases in which it is strictly applied, the focus shifts to discrete events; for 
instance, organising campaigns (Kelly & Badigannavar 2003), or struggles 
around the statutory recognition process (Moore 2004). Besides this strand, the 
categories offered by mobilisation theory have also prompted a variety of 
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82001; Green et al. 2000; Metochi 2002), injustice (Atzeni 2003; Brown 
Johnson & Jarley 2004) and mobilisation (Atzeni 2005). 
Almost all these works share a preference, particularly, when they heavily draw 
on mobilisation theory, for micro-analytical levels. This suggests that, as Gall 
(2000a) stressed in his review of the book Rethinking Industrial Relations, there 
is still a lack of intellectual engagement, at meso- and macro-analytical levels, 
with the theoretical framework developed by Kelly. This research is intended, 
partly, as a contribution to balance this situation. 
The core idea of the research is, thus, that a focus on the consequences of 
privatisation on organised labour is appropriated to link both levels of the 
mobilisation theory as outlined by Kelly (1998): the long-run account of the 
alternating periods of workers' mobilisation and capital counter-mobilisation and 
the set of explanatory categories for the analysis of collective action in the 
medium- and short-run (opportunity-to-act, mobilisation, organisation, interest 
definition, collective action). The research conceptualises privatisation, as not 
only part but also in itself, a process of counter-mobilisation, which decreased 
the opportunity for trade unions to engage in collective action. And it links 
variability in trade unions' strategies in a context of capital and state counter- 
mobilisation, not only with differences in the opportunity structure, but also with 
union organisational capabilities and the dynamics of interest definition. 
The most basic empirical research questions directing the enquiry may be 
sketched as follows: 
Why and how did privatisation hinder workers' collectivism? What were the 
dimensions targeted by state and capital counter-mobilising policies during and 
after the process of privatisation? How have ESI unions responded to 
privatisation? What are the pain sources explaining variability in unions' 
responses between and within countries? What sort of resources did trade 
unions mobilise, to counteract privatisation and its consequences? 
17 
Concerning theory: 
What is the potential contribution of a cross-national comparison to the 
development of mobilisation theory? What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of mobilisation theory when it is applied in a research design, 
which unfolds at micro, meso and macro-analytical levels? What is the place of 
agency type variables within this conceptual framework? What is the 
contribution of mobilisation theory to the understanding of comparative 
privatisation? What are the limits of the mobilisation perspective? 
Outline of the thesis 
The argument of the thesis unfolds by gradually building the theoretical and 
empirical foundations (chapters 2 to 6), which frames the case-studies research 
(chapters 7 to 9). 
Chapter 2 discusses mobilisation theory. While the chapter recognises its 
potential for the study of workers' collectivism, it states that the micro-level 
framework adopted by Kelly to account for interest definition is inadequate to 
analyse how ESI privatisation conditioned trade unions' ability to act. Thus, 
when setting up the analytical framework of the research, the chapter puts 
forward an alternative approach to the category interest, which stresses the 
collective interactions by which workers process their multiple needs into 
specific demands and strategies. Concurrently, the discussion underlines the 
importance of the categories opportunity-to-act (or opportunity structure) and 
organisation for explaining workers collectivism, and shows how they are 
understood and used in the study. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology, whose design combines a case-study 
approach and the comparative method, and justifies the selection of the 
empirical field. 
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In the chapters 4 and 5, the aim is to explain why the process of privatisation 
was, arguably, one of the most salient aspects of the latest cycle of capital 
counter-mobilisation. After illustrating the various meanings of the term 
privatisation, chapter 4 provides a set of arguments to assert its counter- 
mobilising content against labour. By exploring the driving-forces and rationales 
of their respective programmes, chapter 5 compares the contextual conditions 
of privatisation in UK and Argentina; in this way, it highlights how far contextual 
variability contributed to shape differently the opportunity structures of ESI trade 
unions in both countries. 
Then, chapter 6 analyses, comparatively, how national industrial relations 
institutions, as intermediate variables, constrained differently trade union 
resources of power, affecting by this manner the opportunity structure and the 
forms taken by state and capital counter-mobilisation during the process of 
privatisation. 
The remaining chapters of the thesis explore the relationships between 
privatisation and workers' collectivism through an empirical analysis of certain 
counter-mobilising contents of ESI privatisation, their impact on the mobilising 
capacity of ESI unions and their strategies. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the anti-privatisation campaigns held by ESI unions, 
paying particular attention to the category opportunity-to-act to which those 
campaigns were directed. However, as changes in the opportunity structure 
cannot explain by themselves the strategic choices of the actors, the analysis 
turns, then, to union organisational features, leadership styles and decision- 
making processes. Chapters 8 and 9 address two crucial aspects of the 
counter-mobilising content of privatisation: firstly, by analysing how money 
incentives were mobilised to prevent workers' collectivism; secondly, by 
considering how the fragmentation of collective bargaining brought about 
changes in workers' capacity to engage in collective actions. Lastly, chapter 10 
19 :" 
examines the impact of privatisation upon the organisational structures and 
processes of decision-making of ESI unions, pointing to how the growth of 
sectionalism and the decline of workers' participation in decision-making has 
threaten the mobilising capacity of organised labour since privatisation. 
The thesis closes with a summary of the main arguments and findings of the 
research. 
20 
Chapter 2 
Developing the Analytical Framework 
Mobilisation theory, as adapted by John Kelly for the field of industrial relations, 
following the insights developed within the social movements and collective 
action traditions, appears as a powerful framework to analyse workers' 
collectivism (Kelly 1998). Drawing upon long-waves theory too, his formula 
combines a long-run account of the alternating periods of workers mobilisation 
and capital counter-mobilisation, with a set of explanatory categories for the 
analysis of collective action in the medium- and short-run (opportunity-to-act, 
mobilisation, organisation, interest, collective action). Thus, it suits, in principle, 
the empirical aim of the research: to analyse how ESI privati sation conditioned 
trade unions' ability to act by targeting vital dimensions of workers' collectivism. 
However, any theoretical transposition entails a call for prudence, for theories 
often have birthmarks. Besides, the comparative framework in which 
mobilisation theory is applied adds complexity to the whole theoretical 
endavour. Thus, after explaining why mobilisation theory is more appropriate for 
this study than standard comparative approaches, the following sections will, 
first, address certain birthmarks of mobilisation theory; second, ponder their 
potential shortcomings for answering the research questions; and third, argue 
that some of these birthmarks underpin the micro-level framework adopted by 
Kelly to account for the category interest. Then, the analytical framework of the 
research is outlined, on, the base of the elements of Kelly's model, which are 
most relevant for the aims of the thesis, but following an alternative approach to 
interest definition, which emphasises collective dimensions rather than 
individual experiences and subjective perceptions. 
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Mobilisation theory in comparative perspective 
There exists a shared understanding about the advantages of comparison for 
the practice of sociology that highlights its role in promoting deprovincialisation, 
and revealing both the systematic nature of variations and broad similarities, 
which facilitate the identification of what is generally true about a number of 
cases (Crow 1997). In this view, it is also stressed, as Durkheim put it, that'only 
comparison affords explanation' (Durkheim 1970: 41). In turn, comparative 
historical analysis has been recently defined as comprising three specific 
emphases: 'a concern with causal analysis, the exploration of temporal 
processes, and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison' 
(Mahoney & Ruescherneyer 2003: 15). 
Within the field of industrial relations, Hyman has praised the comparative 
approach on similar basis (Hyman 1994c). For him, cross-national comparison 
forces the observer to address critically what is narrowly accepted as 
unproblematic within the individual national context, that is, what is otherwise 
taken for granted is shown to be contingent and, perhaps, exceptional. As a 
result, always according to Hyman, the researcher is compelled to revise the 
assumptions about the nature and meaning of the key institutions of industrial 
relations (companies, trade-unions, employers associations, collective 
bargaining, labour law, and so forth). Thus, comparison would offer. a more 
rigorous test for causal explanations developed in individual countries by forcing 
the researcher to refine the explanatory propositions in order to make them 
genuinely applicable as general -rather than single- context theories. 
Hence, it is not surprising the early appeal of the comparative method for the 
field of industrial relations studies, and more recently, within the research 
agenda of human resources management. 
Originally, conventional comparative approaches in the field tended to focus on 
the formal institutions and legal structures of either the industrial relations 
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system -6 ia Dunlop (1958) - or the collective bargaining system -d la Clegg 
(1976). The aims of the researchers in those studies were, usually, the 
construction of typologies, the contrast of diverse systems of regulation or the 
understanding of the basic relations between the actors. Still, during the 1980s, 
authors like Adams (1981) and Sisson (1987) sought to develop the collective 
bargaining approach in an international comparative perspective by focusing in 
the role of employers as a key variable to explain divergences. 
The 1990s, in turn, would renew the interest of the debates about the likelihood 
of convergence or divergence in the evolution of the national industrial relations 
systems, famously developed, firstly, by the book Industrialisation and the 
Industrial Man (Kerr et al. 1960), but this time, as a consequence of forces 
unleashed by globalisation, mainly, the increased international competition and 
the new production technologies (Bamber & Lansbury 1993; Bamber, Lansbury 
& Wiles 2004; Bean 1994; Eaton 2000). 
However, despite advocacies of convergence, most comparative studies ended 
up painting a picture of continuing diversity in the national systems of industrial 
regulation, while at the same time, recognised common challenges due to the 
introduction of new product and informational technologies, industrial 
restructuring, and managerial pressures towards flexibilisation and 
decentralisation (Bamber, Lansbury & Wiles 2004; Ferner & Hyman 1998; 
Locke & Thelen 1995; Ruysseveldt 1995). The MIT project, for instance, was a 
key force within this trend of research. Scholars like Thomas Kochan and Harry 
Katz played an important role by stressing the relevance of the strategic choices 
of the different actors to understand how the global forces interact with national 
situations (Katz 1997; Katz & Kochan 2004; Kochan, Katz & McKersie 1987). 
Besides, the role of nationally specific institutional factors to explain persistent 
variation in industrial relations across countries was also typically emphasised 
by those criticising the convergence thesis. Lastly, the literature, which started 
to pay attention to the international diffusion - of employment and human 
resources management policies due to 'the, global expansion of MNCs, 
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accentuated the role of, not only legal and institutional aspects, but also 
different cultural frameworks (Ferner 1997). 
Yet, several scholars began to feel uneasy about the development of the 
comparative approach in the field. For instance, Richard Locke and Kathleen 
Thelen developed an early and convincing critique of the conventional 
approach. 
For Locke and Thelen, the explanatory power of the conventional model is 
undermined by three basic assumptions. Firstly, conventional comparative 
analyses often portray external pressures as "equally pervasive or intense to all 
national economies" (Locke & Thelen 1995: 340). Secondly, these scholars 
argued that "traditional analyses often obscure stark differences in starting 
points and hence the significance of the changes for the various national 
industrial relations systems" (idem). Finally, they underlined that traditional 
studies assume that same practices have "the same meaning or valence across 
the various countries" (idem). By contrast, drawing upon institutionalist and 
political constructionist analyses, Locke and Thelen put forward an alternative, 
more contextualised approach, to explain "why the same international forces 
have set in motion fundamentally different substantive conflicts in different 
contexts" (Locke & Thelen 1995: 343). Their main finding was that the specific 
interaction between institutions and actors' identities, particularly traditional 
trade union identities, is key to understand cross-national variations. 
Others scholars, instead, have attempted to replace the conventional cross- 
national comparative approach with a more international perspective to account 
for how globalising forces work and affect the relationships between capital and 
labour nationally (Bamber & Lansbury 1993; Bamber, Lansbury & Wiles 2004; 
Bean 1994; Eaton 2000). However, these studies have failed to overcome the 
conventional approach, in which, characteristically, the institutions and practices 
of two or more countries are described and systematically analysed. At most, 
some aspects are isolated and analysed transnationally within this trend - for 
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instance the role of the European Work Councils, the impact of the EU social 
mandates or the influence of corporate international management; but none of 
those studies really free themselves from the country-by-country approach at 
key points of the argument (see Easton 2000, chapter 5, for example). 
In short, this introduction, though schematically, helps to understand why the 
conventional approaches are inappropriate for a thesis whose aim is not to 
construct typologies, contrast systems of regulation or address basic relations 
between actors, but to focus on the dynamics of unions' responses to change. 
This is, precisely, the main focus of mobilisation theory. Indeed, a systematic 
comparison following a mobilising perspective, unlike other recent comparative 
studies on union' strategies, in which the mobilisation theory is only loosely 
applied (Frege & Kelly 2003,2004; Frege, Heery & Turner 2004), allows for the 
different stages of mobilisation to be conceptualised and studied within specific 
contexts. 
Thus, if it could be argued that this study does follow, in part, the conventional 
approach insofar it examines a similar development, that is, the privatisation of 
ESI, the explanation of variation in the national responses following mobilisation 
theory goes beyond the analysis of the alternative institutional arrangements, 
and hence, surpasses the conventional model. Indeed, like the contextualised 
comparisons advanced by Locke and Thelen (1995), mobilisation theory also 
gives place to the mediating role played by institutions - through the categories 
oPPortunity-to-act and organisation. Yet, it puts forward a more sophisticated 
apparatus to account for trade union's agency - through the categories 
organisation and interest, which is, precisely, one of the main objectives of this 
research. In this sense, mobilisation theory outperforms too, Locke and 
Thelen's emphasis on actors' identities. 
In sum, given the focus of mobilisation theory on the dynamics of collective 
action, it reveals itself as an appropriate kamework to account for trade unions' 
responses to change. As a result, it is fruitful-to 'develop the model in a 
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comparative perspective, as whether the advantages of comparison are still 
advocated by scholars from very different fields of social research, the 
conventional comparative approach in the field of industrial relations and human 
resources management has lost its previous appeal for those scholars 
interested in the analysis of trade union's agency. Yet, the theoretical 
development of mobilisation theory for a comparative study requires an 
appropriate methodological design. This latter aspect is to be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
Contentious collective action and social movements: theoretical 
insights and theoretical birthmarks 
Collective action and social movement traditions are rich in theoretical 
elaborations. A full account of this wealth is not only out of the reach of this 
chapter, but also pointless for the purpose of this study. Instead, the 
examination of some controversial views, shared by these trends of thought, is 
crucial to ponder the prospects for a successful theoretical transposition to the 
field of labour studies. 
The basic questions are what these theoretical traditions stand for, whether they 
focus on identical or dissimilar objects of study, and what connotations have the 
answers to those questions for the study of unionised workers. 
In general, modern theories of contentious collective action and social 
movements have intended to bridge the gap between accounts of structural 
change and explanations of collective action (Klandermans et al. 1988). By 
1980s, a common research agenda emerged as the outcome of consecutive 
reactions to structuralism (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001). It comprised four 
main areas of interest: resource mobilisation, the political processes, the 
repertoires of contention, and claim framing. Yet, two main concerns permeated 
this agenda as a whole: why individuals join contentious collective action and 
what the social-psychological processes involved are. 
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The story behind this development is complex. It includes, at least, two 
processes. 
On the one side, the colonisation of the social sciences by individualistic 
assumptions taken from neoclassical models of economic thought. As Tarrow 
complains, "in the trace of microeconomics, the problem for collective action 
came to be not how classes struggle and state rules, but how collective action is 
even possible among individuals guided by narrow self-interest" (Tarrow 1994: 
15). Then, having in mind those individual and rationalistic assumptions, Tarrow 
goes on, within this theoretical tradition, "political scientists and sociologists 
have begun their analysis of social movements from the puzzle that collective 
action is difficult to bring about [despite] in so many situations and against so 
many odds, collective action does occur, often on the part of people with few 
resources and little permanent power" (Tarrow 1994: 7). 
On the other side, it comprises a theoretical endeavour opposing this trend, 
which looks for social-psychological mechanisms, instead of individual rational 
calculations, but keeps assuming the problem of collective action as one of 
aggregation. Ironically, in so doing, scholars retrieved during 1980s the 
traditional notions within the field until 1960s and 1970s, when macro political 
and structural accounts of social movements, particularly, resource mobilisation 
theory, but also the so-called 'political process' analysis (McAdam, Tarrow & 
Tilly 2001), came to replace older social-psychological conceptions and push 
back individualistic assumptions (McAdam 1988). 
Indeed, some formulations combined theoretically both perspectives. 
Characteristically, Klandermans (1984: 584) made the explicit case for the 
renewal of social-psychological approaches upon expectancy-value theory, a 
typical rational-choice framework, which posits the problem in terms of costs 
and benefits. This renewal, irrespective. of whether or not still keeping 
rationalistic assumptions, buttressed "the contention that what is at issue is not 
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merely the presence or absence of grievances, but the manner in which 
grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of those 
interpretations" (Snow et al. 1986: 466). This conclusion prompted cascade of 
models to address this problem, in tandem with different terms to describe the 
shared meanings that inspire collective action (McAdam 1988; Garrison 1992; 
Klandermans 1984; Snow et al. 1986; Snow & Benford 1988). 
What, then, about the object of study of these intellectual schools? Certainly, 
despite an obvious overlap, there is a difference of scope. While some scholars 
group under the heading contentious collective action, any form of action held 
by a group of individuals based on common purposes against elites, opponents, 
authorities, and so forth; the social movement tradition, specifically, has 
narrowed their concerns to the kind of collective challenges that arose during 
1960s and 1970s, mainly, in Western Europe and United States (USA). 
In the former case, theory building rests on a violent abstraction that reduces 
the importance of the enduring social relationships that structure intera 
, 
ction. 
This is to isolate behavioural regularities, or to look for similar mechanisms and 
processes behind different forms of contention - social movements, revolutions, 
strike waves, nationalism, or otherwise. As for the subjective aspect, different 
structural constraints tend to be homogenised, reduced and classified under the 
general term 'grievance'. The truism that people must experience subjectively a 
grievance first, in order to act is reinforced, and starts to dominate the research 
agenda. 
In the latter case, the same concern has spread widely as well, but not at the 
expense of historical perspectives and social structures. However, while 
collective action traditions does include organised labour, the mainstream of 
social movement approaches focuses on social movements, other than labour; 
particularly, those emerging within the countercultural and emancipatory 
currents in the 1960s, but also 1970s (Rucht 1988). Theory-building within this 
trend grounded in the study of the students and civil rights movements first, the 
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environmental and women's movements then, and finally the peace, anti- 
nuclear, neighbourhood movement and the like (Kiandermans & Tarrow 1988; 
Klandermans 1988; Rucht 1988). It was not organised labour, then, the soil 
where most social mobilisation frameworks developed, tending to assimilate 
since then "other forms of contention to prevailing explanations of social 
movements" (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001: 14). Indeed, many scholars 
explicitly separated trade unions from the 'new' movements due to what they 
saw as their salient features: formal and bureaucratic organisation, hierarchical 
structures, and top-down management (Waterman 1998). The 
institutionalisation of the interactions between workers and employers along 
with the routinisation of conflict patterns were among the factors calling for 
demarcation between 'old' and 'new' movements. In the research agenda of this 
trend, given the type of objects under study, the very process of building an 
organisation and engaging in collective action often overlaps theoretically, 
damaging their appeal for the field of labour studies. Typically, the starting point 
is individual subjectivity (awareness of grievances), and then, through 
organisation to collective action. 
Summarising, individualistic and social-psychological standpoints to explain 
collective action, and, either violent abstraction from social structures and 
historical circumstances, or indifference with regard to the specificities of the 
institutions and dynamics of the labour movement, are all risky birthmarks of 
social mobilisation theories when attempting their transposition to the field of 
labour studies. Then, it is time to analyse as to whether any of those birthmarks 
infiltrated Kelly's endeavour. 
Interest definition according to Kelly 
Kelly states that "the fulcrum of the model is interests and the ways in which 
people ... come to define them" (Kelly 1998: 25); thus, it 
is worth explaining why 
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this research does not follow this crucial part of his model when approaching 
the problem of interest definition. 
Kelly offers a balanced theoretical framework to study workers' collectivism by 
taking insights from different sources. Crude versions of the aforementioned 
birthmarks will neither be found in his theoretical presentation nor in his 
empirical work. In accordance to his own Marxist background, and having as 
starting point Tilly's (1978) aged but exceptional discussion of mobilisation 
theory, the institutions and dynamics of the labour movement, and the enduring 
social relationships that structure interaction, are his prime concerned. 
Additional proofs of his rejection of individualistic and rational-choice 
assumptions are his discussion of long-wave theory and the work of Mancur 
Olson (1971). 
Still, my argument is that, in fact, Kelly's framework to account for interest 
definition rests on individualistic assumptions, and hence, it is not adequate for 
the object of study of this thesis. Although Kelly rebalances the argument by 
engaging in worthy discussions of some social processes involved, a 
methodological risk remains. The latter becomes apparent when the origin of 
collective action is continually portrayed as an aggregation of individuals (Kelly 
1998: 24,27,29,31,33,34), and concomitantly, socio-psychological 
mechanisms overshadow other factors in Kelly's theoretical presentation. 
Gradually, ideational motives and individual dimensions, essentially, the notion 
of injustice, seem to prevail upon other levels of analysis. And this impression is 
reinforced by the comparatively little attention paid to the remaining categories 
of social mobilisation. 
In addition, his book unfolds a linear discussion of the process of mobilisation, 
frequent in social movement studies: that is, from injustice to attribution to 
collective organisation to mobilisation. However, this discussion is more 
appropriate for the exploration of the rise of new social movements than for the 
analysis of the dynamics of organised labour. In the former case, this 
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progression parallels, to some extent, the empirical development of the 
organisation of previously disorganised - or at best, loosely organised - people, 
who share a common concern or grievance, but not a structural antagonism due 
to capitalist production. That is the reason why, underlying that enquiry is, often, 
a counter comparison, explicitly or not, with the realm of class movements. In 
the latter case, the very existence of a structural antagonism at the root, and the 
plethora of organisations and institutions in which it is expressed, urge for a 
starting-point other than individual perceptions of injustice. Moreover, in cases 
like those of this study, in which well-established organisations have been 
involved in a long history of interactions with employers and governmental 
institutions, it is recommended a strong focus upon collectivities and power 
relations rather than on individual subjectivity. 
The point is not that such an approach explains nothing; it may always be 
possible to manufacture an individualistic explanation of most social events. 
Indeed, insofar as Kelly focuses on the development of a collective 
consciousness, which transcends the aggregation of individual interests, this 
standpoint might be most suitable. But these assumptions are not appropriate to 
our object, that is, the effects of privatisation upon trade unions' ability to act, 
particularly, through collective action. This means that it is not what happened 
to individuals and their perceptions what crucially limited - or not - trade unions' 
power. Indeed, as ESI unions are very well established and workers are 
habituated in this industry into relying upon them, it is fair 
-to 
say that there is a 
strong sense already of a collective identity. Thus, the methodological 
preference here is to start from the irreducibility of collective action and trade 
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union' power to an aggregation of individuals' properties, the preponderance of 
social processes enacted by people but independent of them, and the existence 
of real workers and institutions acting within discrete social relations governed 
by a systemic logic (Fracchia & Lewontin 2005). Thus, in order to explain 
workers' collective responses to privatisation, it will be pursued a contextual 
analysis of the impact of the latter upon the opportunity-to-act, trade unions' 
organisational features, and the social processes by which the interaction'of the 
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multiple dimensions of workers' interests unfolds, and concrete demands and 
courses of collective action crystallise. 
The analytical framework: power relations and organised tabour 
Mobilisation theory helps us to understand how workers (and their 
organisations) deal (or fail to deal) with multiple interests, define collective 
demands, mobilise organisational and power resources, and translate them into 
collective actions according to the opportunity-to-act. Its advantage rests on its 
flexibility: it identifies factors, which are critical to the presence or absence of 
collective action, and for that reason, makes theoretically informed explanations 
of specific empirical outcomes possible. Its actual outline is contingent on 
whether one stresses individual and social-psychological variables, or 
understands it, as a theoretical enquiry about power relations. If the latter, 
scholars, working in these traditions, approach the analysis of power and power 
relations through the categories mobilisation and opportunity-to-act, and so 
does Kelly. 
The categories mobilisation and opportunity-to-act were developed by 
theoretical efforts directed to overcome social-psychological explanations of 
collective action (McAdam 1988: 1ý5). In the case of resource mobilisation 
theory, by underlying that grievances are ubiquitous in society, and hence, it is 
the availability of resources the crucial dimension to explain collective action, 
that is, the degree of mobilisation (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy & Zald 1977). In the 
political process approach, by emphasising that "the answer should be 
searched in the variations in political structures and the workings of the political 
process" (Tarrow 1994: 18), that is, in the political opportunity structure 
(Eisinger 1973). 
Mobilisation, then, refers to the amount and degree of collective control, not 
only upon the resources needed for action (Tilly 1978: 7, Kelly 1998: 25), but 
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also upon social processes, interactions and practices that enable it. However, 
it is, up to certain extent, a function and a qualification of the other categories of 
mobilisation theory. In other words, it is, for instance, a function of the 
opportunity to increase the amount or control or both upon resources as well as 
a qualification of the ability to make them available for collective action. 
Likewise, the category organisation is of main importance when analysing a 
process of mobilisation - particularly, in the field of labour studies, as has been 
shown by the extensive debates about bureaucratisation (Kelly 1988), for 
organisational features often shape workers' ability to exercise collective power. 
But also, because an organisation may be needed to frame workers' 
willing ness-to-act. Indeed, the ability to exercise collective power is intimately 
linked to whether or not collective social processes, which allow the interplay of 
workers' multi-faceted interests, find a place within a workplace or an 
organisation. 
Etzioni (1968) and Tilly (1978) argued that any process of mobilisation entails, 
by definition, demobilisation; that is, a decline in either assets or control over 
resources - and social processes, interactions, practices - by other actors. 
Particularly, within 'the field of industrial relations, Kelly shows that these 
conflicting movements tend to be cyclical; and that these cycles "are a normal 
and familiar feature of capitalist economies [in which] employers and the state 
typically embark on a wide ranging series of counter-mobilizations against 
organised labour to restore both their profitability and their control of the labour 
process" (Kelly 1998: 128). In these phases, "both the organization and 
mobilization of workers are eroded and the ideologies of the labour movement 
are subjected to assault from a variety of sources" (Kelly 1998: 130). 
Accordingly, a decline of workers' collectivism is to be expected - or at least of 
its most visible expressions, since counter-mobilisation strategies often target 
its crucial dimensions: the opportunity-to-act, workers' organisations and the 
social processes of interest definition. As a result, in such a cycle, workers' 
mobilisation can only be defensive; initially, to oppose the attack, later on, if the 
assault could not be stopped, to break the state of demobilisation brought about 
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by it. The important point is that in both cases, mobilisation depends upon the 
aforementioned categories: opportunity-to-act, organisation, and interest. 
As chapter 4 shall discuss, privatisation is arguably the most salient aspect of 
one of those cycles of counter-mobilisation. Hence, this study privileges as 
starting point, the impact of ESI privatisation upon, first, the opportunity-to-act, 
and second, workers' organisation and interest definition, to evaluate then the 
prospects of mobilisation. 
Opportunity-to-act "concerns the [power] relationship between a group and the 
world around it" (Tilly 1978: 7), whereas organisation and interest refer to the 
internal structure of a group. Organisation relates to aspects that affect the 
capacity for collective action; interest definition to subjective and structural 
causal powers that, through the mediation of certain social processes, compel 
workers to act (Isaac 1987; Lukes 2005; Sayer 1992). 
Accordingly, if one accepts that privatisation has been, not only part, but also in 
itself, a process of counter-mobilisation, first, it should have entailed a decline of 
workers' collectivism, and second, it should have severely decreased the 
opportunity for trade unions to engage in collective action. Yet, variability in 
trade unions' strategies within this context, particularly, when these strategies 
included collective action should be explained by not only differences in the 
opportunity structure, but also differences in organisation and the dynamics by 
which workers process their interests and define their strategies. 
So far, the discussion referred to the notion of power freely. Hence, it is time to 
sketch the understanding of power applied here, prior to examining in detail, the 
notions of opportunity-to-act, organisation and interest in order to demarcate the 
empirical enquiry of this research. 
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A definition of the concept of power 
Most categories of mobilisation theory concerns power relations (Kelly 1998; 
Tilly 1978); yet, disagreements over the notion of power abound. Lukes, in the 
re-edition of his classic study, expresses it bluntly: "There are endless debates 
... which show no sign of imminent resolution, and there is not even agreement 
about whether all this disagreement matters" (Lukes 2005: 61). Hence, this 
section avoids engaging in these endless debates; instead, it makes, briefly, the 
positive case for the use of Jeffrey Isaac's (1987) realist perspective of power, 
and Steven Lukes'(2005) three-dimensional view. 
On the one side, the realist view defines "social power as those capacities to act 
possessed by social agents in virtue of enduring relations in which they 
participate" (Isaac 1987: 80). In this manner, while it locates agency at the heart 
of power - as its exercise, it crucially "places power at the center of agency, as 
a property of human agents that makes their activity possible" (Isaac 1987: 76). 
Thus, power is defined as a permanent capacity to act root in the social 
structure, that is, a necessary property independent of its exercise in particular 
occasions and its contingent effects. It refers to the things an agent may or 
might do. This approach is relevant, for it is this understanding of power what 
underlies the notion of opportunity structure. 
On the other side, the three-dimensional view also stresses that power is a 
capacity not only its exercise, but focuses on power as domination, particularly, 
in its third-dimension, incorporating "into the analysis of power relations the 
question of control over the agenda of politics and the ways in which 
potential 
-issues 
are kept out of the political process" (Lukes 2005: 25). It 
examines how willing compliance to domination is secured (Lukes 2005: 7,10, 
110), and engages in a straight defence of power as "concealment of people's 
greal interests... (Lukes 2005: 12). The analysis of power relations to address 
changes in the opportunity structure due to privatisation will be based in this 
three-dimensional understanding of power. 
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Opportunity-to-act 
Opportunity-to-act "concerns the relationship between a group and the world 
around it" (Tilly 1978: 7). In the field of industrial relations, it is a category that 
must go beyond the sphere of interactions between workers and management, 
leading to the analysis of power relations in a wider field of enquiry, which 
comprises the study of governmental policies and capitalists' strategies; thus, it 
is a critical dimension when analysing a process of state and capital counter- 
mobilisation. While, as stated above, at its base lays a realist understanding of 
power as capacity, opportunity-to-act intends an examination of the contextual 
conditions that constrain its exercise. It refers, analytically, to the relations of 
power as they are historically determined by the general balance of forces 
between contenders at industrial and political level, and the policies and actions 
performed by employers and the state (Kelly 1998: 37), and includes the 
consideration of union's sources and resources of power as discussed below. 
The empirical analysis of power relations within the field of labour studies, has 
already rested on analytical models developed upon the three dimensions 
discussed by Lukes (2005): a) the capacity of a party in conflict with another to 
persuade or force the other to adopt a course of action other than the one it 
originally intended; b) the capacity of a party to control the agenda of 
interactions such as meetings, and determine which issues are kept in or off the 
agenda in the face of opposition; c) the capacity of a party to secure assent to 
its objectives by another group because of the successful diffusion of a 
hegemonic ideology. Those labour scholars, who applied this model, have 
stressed its usefulness to evaluate power relations given its relative simplicity, 
relational character, and its focus on behavioural outcomes (Batstone et al. 
1978; Frege & Kelly 2004; Kelly & Heery 1994. But see Edwards 2006, for a 
recent critique). 
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In turn, the literature about union power oscillates between the overlapping 
notions of sources and resources of power (Batstone 1988; Kelly & Heery 1994; 
Martin 1992,1999; Varman & Bhatnagar 1999). It is possible to argue that the 
notion of sources of power concerns the structural determinant of power 
(Varman & Bhatnagar 1999); whereas resources of power refers to assets, 
money, legislation, rules, support, allies, organisational resources, an actor may 
mobilise to achieve an aim (Kelly & Heery 1994). However, this distinction is far 
from obvious in most cases. 
Nevertheless, Batstone underlines three sources of power, as analytically 
important for the field of labour studies: the ability to disrupt production, the 
state of the labour market and the scope of political influence (Batstone 1988: 
223). While privatisation affected all these sources, its principal and immediate 
impact was on the scope of trade union's political influence, and therefore, on 
the political resources of power mobilised by trade unions: statutory 
requirements regarding the industrial relations in the public industries, legal 
frameworks, national energy policies, relationship with political parties, 
frequency of contacts with governments and other potential allies, among 
others. 
Kelly and Heery incline to use the notion of power resources, and offer a 
classification (Kelly & Heery 1994). In this classification, some resources are 
organisational, which are to be discussed below. Others resources, instead, 
correspond to union' external relationships with management, government, 
other unions, and the general public, all aspects which were influenced, or 
distorted by privatisation. Concerning management, Kelly and Heery highlight 
the importance for union activities of first, agreement and support from 
management, and second, procedural and other collective agreements reached 
between the union and the employer. As to the government, key aspects are its 
intervention in disputes and conflicts, basically, the legislation. Lastly, Kelly and 
Heery draw attention to two sources of support: other trade unions and their 
members, and the public opinion. 
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Beyond the usefulness of this demarcation, the point is the relationship between 
the impact of privatisation upon trade unions' (re-)sources of power, and hence, 
on their opportunity-to-act colledtively. 
To conclude this section, if Tilly (1978) is right, competition decreases workers 
chance to gain and control power resources collectively and therefore, it 
reduces the opportunity for collective action to arise. Furthermore, he maintains 
that while competition is detrimental for workers' mobilisation, it would enhance 
the opportunity of capital's counter-mobilisation, for it increases its chances to 
accumulate and control assets. Lebowitz (2003) gives fresh support to this view 
by identifying competition with capital's logic of accumulation. He argues that 
when workers' actions are framed under the logic of competition, they express 
the dynamic force of the political economy of capital, and therefore, are self- 
defeating for the working class as a whole. Trade unions are, in this argument, 
an instance of combination that reduces competition between individual 
workers, and therefore, an expression of the political economy of the working 
class, whereas competition among them, for instance, may recreate capital 
logic at new levels. As this study illuminates, these insights are important, since 
privatisation indirectly fostered competition within trade union ranks, on the one 
side, as privatisation spurred inter-union competition; on the other side, as it 
promoted changes, which favoured the growth of sectionalism. 
The organisation of workers 
While opportunity-to-act alludes to external relationships, the category 
organisation "refers to the structure of a group, and in particular those aspects 
which affect its capacity for collective action" (Kelly 1998: 25). Thus, it is 
narrowly related with the ability of workers to combine and mobilise resources to 
impose defensive or offensive sanctions upon the employer. 
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Batstone (1988) identified three main factors, which affect the organisational 
strength and the extent of union influence: membership/density, scope of 
representation (or inclusiveness - Kelly 1998) and organisational sophistication. 
Labour scholars have often seen certain degree of membership/density as a 
basic aspect, as a kind of necessary but not sufficient condition for mobilisation 
and collective action. It is taken as a sign of workers' identification with the 
union, and perhaps, even of potential support. It is assumed to heighten the 
representative role of unions' officials in negotiations and make threats of 
industrial action, and sanctions, more convincing. Besides, an increase, or 
decrease, in membership has direct consequences upon the financial resources 
of a trade union. 
Scope of representation has similar implications, though, it adds a subtle 
distinction. While a trade union might cover close to the entire constituency, it 
might still mean just a small proportion of the whole workforce of a given 
industry or workplace. The corollary of this distinction is that, even a high 
density might not be enough when a key group remains unorganised, or simply 
organised by others. Thus, membership density, scope of representation and 
the dynamics of the labour process combine in diverse ways, increasing or 
decreasing trade union' ability to act. 
Finally, organisational sophistication is expected to be adequate to union's 
scope and inclusiveness. According to Batstone (1988), a proper organisational 
structure has to allow strategy, co-ordination, representation of sectional 
interests and organisational resources to plan action. Key to evaluate 
organisational sophistication would be the balance between centralisation and 
decentralisation of power within trade unions (Kelly 1998), which is often related 
to spatial dimensions as well as interactions between full time officers, shop 
stewards, lay representatives and activists. 
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As secondary organisers, trade unions' structures are often constrained by 
industrial structures, ownership, and bargaining arrangements (Muller-Jentsch 
1985; Offe & Wiesenthal 1985). For that reason, privatisation challenged and 
posed trenchant pressures upon these three factors - directly or indirectly. 
Thus, the study needs to explore how trade unions responded to the privatising 
context in which, for instance, job loss cuts not only into membership but also 
through redundancy packages into skills, knowledge and expertise of the 
officialdom; outsourcing and personal contracts reduced the scope of 
representation; and fragmentation in ownership and bargaining structures 
seems to have made strategy, co-ordination, representation of sectional 
interests, and distribution of organisational resources more difficult. 
Interest definition 
As with the category power, controversies around the notion of interest abound, 
and hence, any theoretical and methodological choice will often be contentious. 
It is what Walter Gallie has called an "essentially contested concept [which] 
inevitably involve[s] endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their 
users" (quoted by Lukes 2005: 30). Additionally, as Lukes recognises: "to 
engage in such disputes is itself to engage in politics" (Lukes 2005: 30). Then, 
the best seems to be that the analysis accepts diversity and political 
connotations, explains the rationality of the choice, and once more, avoids 
engaging in hopeless debates. 
In this regard, Kelly criticises the prevalent casual empiricism within labour, 
studies, expressed in the tendency to identify workers' interests with the' 
contents of collective bargaining, concluding that, in this field, a "rigorous 
analytical treatment of interests is quite simply non-existent* (Kelly 1998: 6). In 
fact, discussions have always oscillated between either taking wants or 
preferences as the only realm worth of examination (Armstrong et al. 1981) or 
deducing objective interests from agent structural position disregarding their 
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actual pursuit or recognition by the agent (Edwards 1986). Indeed, Edwards 
suggested years ago to simply abandon any reference to interests, and to rely, 
instead, on the analysis of how objective conditions encourage among workers 
the growth of some preferences and not others (Edwards 1986: 28). 
Yet, Kelly has insisted in the utility of the category interest, insofar as it is 
anchored in a theory of exploitation, and in the recognition of multiple levels of 
analysis along with the complexity of workers' interests under capitalism (Kelly 
1998: 8). These latter qualifications are relevant as if ignored, there is no way to 
sort out the paradoxes alluded to by scholars: if the conceptualisation is 
reduced to bargaining what happen when a reduction in its contents occurred 
(Kelly 1998: 4); if the focus rests, exclusively, on what workers do rather than 
what they say, how is to be conceptualised the gap between both levels 
(Edwards 1986); if it is just stressed that demands are contingent products of 
social construction how to avoid losing sight of the structural antagonism as a 
crucial determinant of class identities under capitalism (Issac 1987: 103). But as 
stated above, in Rethinking Industrial Relations, Kelly overstresses the links 
between individual subjectivity - the individual perception of injustice - and 
interest definition. On the contrary, in this study the emphasis will be on the 
social processes by which collective demands and ways of action are defined. 
This standpoint lays in the conviction that Kelly's discussion seems a too narrow 
platform to explore the responses to privatisation policies of well-established 
organisations of workers. 
This is, after all, a rather conventional approach in the field. Labour scholars 
(Edwards 1986, Hyman 1975,1989; Kelly 1998, Offe & Wiesenthal 1985, 
Pizzorno 1978) have traditionally argued that the empirical manifestation of 
workers' interests, is constantly trapped between workers' collective and 
particular needs due to the fragmentation, subordination and exploitation of the 
working-class; hence, that workers' interests can only be advanced, insofar they 
are up to certain extent collectively reworked. In short, they have insisted that 
workers' expressed interests are socially constructed through a set of social 
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practices. This is true, however, with the caveat that under the heading interest, 
most labour scholars refer to concrete demands (and mostly, the contents of 
bargaining) and methods to pursuing them (actions, policies and strategies). 
The essential point is, however, that it is possible to argue that demands (not 
only those of collective bargaining) and ways of action are brought about by the 
social processes in which multiple and sometimes conflicting interests are 
collectively dealt with. 
In the main, two social processes have been identified as vital for spurring the 
collective reworking of conflicting and diverse interests in order to define 
demands and courses of action: a dialogical democracy (Offe & Wiesenthal 
1985; Smith 2001; Hyman 1989) and an appropriate leadership (Batstone et al. 
1978; Darlington 2001; Fantasia 1986). 
A dialogical democracy implies effective, democratic and participatory channels 
of communication, debate and collective decision beyond the usual electoral 
procedures (Gall 2003; Hyman 1989; Kelly 1998; Offe & Wiesenthal 1985). It 
can be assessed, empirically, on the one side, by the type and frequency of 
meetings, ballots, assemblies, that forms the mechanisms of debate and 
decision-making of the organisation. On the other side, through a qualitative 
analysis of the flow and type of information used as inputs in this process, and 
how the latter, typically, unfolds. 
Concerning leadership, several scholars have shown how leaders and activists 
play a crucial role in the process of collectivisation (Barker et al. 2001; Fosh 
1993; Darlington 2001; Gall 2003; Kelly 1998; Smith 2001). As Darlington 
summarises these leaders "help to construct a sense of grievance amongst 
workers, attributing blame onto employers and/or the state rather than to 
uncontrollable economic forces or events. Second, they promote a sense of 
group or social identity, which encourages workers to become aware to their 
common interests in opposition of those of employers. Third, they urge workers 
to engage in collective action, a process of persuasion that is assumed to be 
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essential because of the costs of such action and of the experience of many 
people with its different forms and consequences. Fourth, they legitimate such 
collective action in the face of employers' counter-mobilising arguments that it is 
illegitimate" (Darlington 2001: 2). 
In sum, the aim of explaining how trade unions came to define concrete 
demands and strategies in the face of privatisation requires to study the social 
processes by which workers mediate the opportunity structure. This includes 
the analysis of the impact of privatisation upon the decision-making process and 
workers' participation, the analysis of the mediating role of the different 
leadership styles, and whether trade unions choices softened or reinforced the 
negatives of the opportunity structure. 
Conclusion 
Mobilisation theory comes out, in principle, as a powerful instrument to study 
how the privatisation conditioned woikers' collectivism and how trade unions 
responded to this challenge. The main advantage of mobilisation theory would 
rest on its scope and flexibility. On the one side, it offers a cyclical and long-run 
account of capital and labour conflicting movements. On the other side, it 
identifies certain dimensions, which are critical to the presence or absence of 
collective action, and for that reason, make theoretically informed explanations 
of specific empirical outcomes possible. It provides too, a set of categories to 
this endeavour: opportunity-to-act, mobilisation, collective action, organisation, 
interest. 
The chapter discusses the operationalisation of each of these categories. It 
advances an understanding of opportunity structure in terms of power relations 
and identifies crucial aspects of the category organisation. It also explains why, 
the framework developed by Kelly to discuss the category interest seems a too 
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narrow platform to explore the responses to privatisation policies of well- 
established organisations of workers, involved in a long history of interactions 
with governments and managers. Thus, the chapter suggests a different, 
though quite conventional approach, whose focus is on social processes such 
as leadership and decision-making. 
Summarising, the long-run perspective of mobilisation theory permits to 
postulate that ESI privatisation programmes were counter-mobilisation events, 
as shall be discussed in detail in chapter 4. Hence, that they were processes 
that affected the dimensions of workers' collectivism as a whole: the opportunity 
for trade unions to engage in collective action, their organisations and the social 
interactions by which interests, demands and ways of action are defined. But, in 
this context of tough external conditions, variability in trade unions' strategies 
should be explained for mobilisation theory too, partly, by variability in the 
categories organisation and interest, as defined above. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Strategies and Methodology 
Although, personal choices, opportunities and preferences have an important 
role in shaping the methodological design of any research, the appropriateness 
of the strategies and methods adopted has to be evaluated taking into account 
the object of study, the availability or the possibility to produce data, and its 
temporal feasibility (Oyen 1990). Thus, it is possible to claim that research 
strategies and methods are justified and strengthened if: (a) they are consistent 
with the aims of the research and the object under study; (b) they are related to 
a specific methodological tradition in the field of study under consideration; (c) 
they are feasible in terms of data availability; and (d) they are scientific and 
rigorous in terms of data collection and analysis. 
The case-study approach and the comparative method were the two strategies 
chosen to carry out the research. Hence, in what follows, and bearing in mind 
the aforementioned criteria, it is necessary to consider whether or not they are 
pertinent to the research project. 
a) the aims of the research and the object of the study 
As already stated, the empirical aim of this research is to study the relationships 
between privatisation and workers' collectivism. Why privatisation? Because as 
shall be discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the sale of public companies has been a 
key aspect of the last cycle of state and capital countermobilisation. This implies 
to study 'how' and 'why' ESI privatisation conditioned trade unions' ability to 
engage in collective action; but also, to study trade unions' concrete responses. 
The theoretical objective is to test the potential of mobilisation theory to carry 
out such task within a comparative perspective. Thus, a case-study method 
appears as appropriate, for the research is driven by explanatory questions and 
a focus on a small number of cases from UK and Argentina in order to gather 
detailed qualitative data. 
Why these two countries? From late 1970s until mid-1990s, these two countries 
experienced far-reaching processes of employer and state counter-mobilisation 
against labour, whose main distinguishing feature was the privatisation of public 
enterprises, arguably, the greatest privatising processes ever witnessed in 
America and Western Europe. This feature may give us a positive basis for 
comparison, for both countries experienced along the same period, the decline 
of the most visible forms of worker collectivism. Yet, there are important 
differences too, which provide basis for testing mobilisation theory in different 
contexts. These differences not only include their institutional backgrounds, in 
terms of politics and industrial relations, but also their world market position and 
the policy forces driving privatisation. While UK is a G8 economy and 
recognised as a privatising pioneer, Argentina has an altogether different 
position in the world economic order, and has undertaken privatisation later and 
in different circumstances, for this policy was largely the outcome of external 
pressures from international aid donors and banking agencies, such as World 
Bank (VVB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Dinerstein 2001; 
Thwaites Rey 1994,2003). 
Why electricity? There have been huge differences between privatised 
enterprises in terms of activity, size, market exposure, profitability or otherwise; 
still, there is a set of activities that shares some basic features which allows a 
common approach, the so-called 'natural monopolies, that is the major public 
utilities. Following Ernst (1994) the rationale of grouping utilities (gas, electricity 
and water) rests on four defining features: essentialness, inelasticity of demand 
properties, natural monopoly provision and externalities. Electricity emerges as 
a good test-case because it is a 'network' industry with similar characteristics in 
both countries. ESI involves five vertically related stages of production, supply 
of energy inputs, generation, transmission, distribution, and supply to final 
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customers. The structure of ESI determines a natural monopoly in the 
transportation activities of transmission and distribution, but not in generation or 
retail supply, and the need for very close vertical coordination, especially, 
between generation and transmission. The industry was in both countries 
divided in several firms producing divergences from company to company. This 
led to the end of common collective bargaining arrangements. Besides, in both 
countries, the ESI was hit by significant workforce's reductions, and hence, 
passed through an initial tension between pressures to cost-cutting (clearly 
visible in the rate of job loss) and establish a high-quality, customer oriented 
service based around employee skills and commitment (Coiling & Ferner 1991, 
1993a, 1993b, 1995; Duarte 2001). Also, in both countries, the public sector 
legacy in ESI, had contributed to a relatively high level of unionisation; thus, 
private managers had to face strong trade unions. Lastly, new structures of 
public regulation for ESI were put in place in UK and Argentina, as a 
consequence of privatisation. 
As for the potentiality of the case-study approach, even though, there are 
alternative ways to examine the interaction of variables, it has proved to be 
appropriate to explore how complex variables interact with each other, (Ferner 
1988). It seems particularly suitable for researching open, systems of social 
relationships in which variables are to be considered as reacting upon each 
other. As for the comparative dimension of the methodological design, the 
objective of looking at the relationships between privatisation and worker 
collectivism, taking as a general framework the explanatory variables developed 
by mobilisation theory (Kelly 1998; Tilly 1978), matches most of Poole's (1986) 
criteria for conducting comparative studies in the field of industrial relations: to 
concentrate on the effects brought about by social structures and processes, to 
carry out a multidisciplinary approach, to focus on explanatory variables instead 
of descriptive ones, and to introduce a historical perspective. Indeed, most 
studies applying mobilisation theory have a narrow focus and almost all are 
based on a single country, hence, the value of comparison in extending (or 
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limiting) the generality of mobilisation theory, that is, in enabling the pinning 
down of a range of intermediate variables and their diverse impact. 
b) methodological traditions in industrial relations 
Both strategies, the case-study approach and the comparative method, have 
been widely used in labour and industrial relations studies. On the one side, 
there is a huge tradition of case study research in these fields. It ranges from 
the classical ethnographic case studies (Batstone et al. 1977,1978, Beynon 
1984; Edwards & Scullion 1982) to the common use of this approach to 
analyse, for instance, the effects of privatisations upon industrial relations and 
labour conditions (O'Connell Davidson 1993; Pendleton & Winterton 1993) and 
test and advance general or theoretical propositions (Crouch 1994; Darlington 
2001; Gall 2003; Kelly & Willman 2004; Smith 2001). On the other side, the role 
of comparative studies in the development of the discipline of industrial relations 
is also a well-established fact. Scholars have often underlined the capabilities of 
comparative studies for the acquisition of a greater insight into one own country 
and the development of explanatory theory (Bamber & Lansbury 1993; Bamber, 
Lansbury & Wiles 2004; Bean 1994; Ferner 1988; Hyman 1994c), and have 
usually attempted to combine both approaches (Clegg 1976; Edwards 1986; 
Hyman and Ferner 1994). 
As Hammersley and Gomm (2000) remind us that there is not a standard way 
of applying the label case-study, it is important to specify some of its critical 
features. These authors consider that a case-study approach broadly 
distinguishes itself by focusing in a small number of cases, gathering a large 
amount of detailed qualitative rather than quantitative data of each, and 
studying preferably ongoing processes. This research matches all these criteria. 
Regarding theory, while they formally recognise exceptions, these scholars 
point out a lack of concern with theoretical and empirical geheralisations. But 
this is not inevitably the case. Yin (1994), for instance, offers a different though 
similar picture. He also understands a case-study as an empirical enquiry of 
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contemporary phenomena, but, in which, context become explanatory 
meaningful and the researcher has not control over the events. This author 
stresses the desirability of theory development as a previous step of any case- 
study in order to guide data collection and analysis. Also according to Yin 
(1994), there is another factor, which increases the appeal of this approach. 
That is, what sort of research question the researcher seeks to address. When 
explanatory questions such as 'how' and 'why' are the driving forces of the 
enquiry, case study emerges as an advantageous strategy. 
Comparison, in turn, is a classical approach of socio-historical research that 
puts into play both convergence and divergence analyses to identify patterns of 
similarities and diversity (Hyman 1994a; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003; 
Oyen 1990; Ragin 1994; Teune 1990). Notwithstanding, it is argued that within 
the range of qualitative methods, "the distinctiveness of the comparative 
approach is clearest in studies that focus on diversity" (Ragin 1994: 105). Some 
authors suggest that, nowadays, this research strategy has become even more 
important in the current period of increasing internationalisation (Bamber & 
Lansbury 1993); and in this way, the globalisation of problems and processes is 
identified as a driving force towards comparative studies (Oyen 1990). 
Privatisation has become a global process, which has posed similar problems 
though in highly different institutional contexts, to the ability of workers to act 
collectively. 
Contrary to the vacillation referred above on the theoretical potential of case- 
study research, the basic features of the comparative method "make it a good 
strategy for advancing theory. These features include its use of flexible frames, 
its explicit focus on the causes of diversity, and its emphasis on the systematic 
analysis of similarities and differences in the effort to specify how diversity is 
patterned" (Ragin 1994: 111). Hence, to place a set of case-studies within a 
comparative perspective may help to balance any misgiving about the 
contribution of the research design to theory development. Additionally, when 
pursuing qualitative comparisons, this strategy usually demands a limited 
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number of cases in order to achieve familiarity, for knowledge of cases is 
conceived a goal in itself in mainstream academic practice. 
c) and d) data availability and collection 
With regard to the last two aspects, data availability and collection, being 
privatisation a recent phenomenon, access to data benefits from the use of 
multiple sources of mainly qualitative evidence, basically, documentation, 
archival records and interviews. Yet, a better examination of these aspects, 
availability, collection and analysis of data, demands the presentation of the 
details of the methodological design. 
Methodological design 
The methodological design of the research comprised a systematic analysis 
and comparison of empirical evidence taken from five case studies (the impact 
of privatisation upon and the responses to it of five trade unions), and two 
countries (three of them were from UK and two from Argentina) (Table 1). 
Chapters 7 to 10 organise findings according to certain relevant topics with 
regards trade unions' choices, the counter-mobilising factors embedded in the 
process of privatisation and the impact of the later on organisational and agency 
type variables. 
Table 1: Detail of case-studies 
Country Trade Unions Membership Membership today 
before 
privafisatio 
United Kingdom EETPU** 36000 20000 
(AEEU-AMICUS)*** energy and utility sector 
EPEA** 
(EMA - PROSPECT)*** 
NALGO** 34000 14000 
(UNISON)*** nastwaterlelectricity 
g-entina Luz y Fuerza Capital 22000 4000 (only ESI) r fLuz y Fuerza Mar del Plata 4000 3000 (o0y ESI) 
Approximate figures ot memt)ersnip in tbi oniy. 
** Names at the time of privatisation. 
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*** Change in names due to mergers and amalgamations. 
This design permitted comparison at two levels: international and national. For, 
to anticipate the argument of later chapters, if the impact of privatisation upon 
the opportunity-to-act and the organisational features of trade unions are 
relevant to understand variability in unions' strategies, a methodological design 
should allow variation in the opportunity structures and the organisational 
domain. As well, it is argued that in a context of reduced opportunities for trade 
unions to engage in collective action, the characteristics of the internal 
processes of decision-making and leadership style may also contribute to 
explain strategic variability. Then, it is necessary to have the chance to narrow 
differences in both, the opportunity-to-act and union organisational structures, in 
order to compare different courses of action taken by trade unions under similar 
conditions. 
In this sense, it is assumed that variability in the opportunity structure stems, 
mostly, from differences in two key intermediate variables: industrial and market 
factors, and industrial relations institutions. It is also assumed that broader 
differences in national politics are embedded in the dynamics of the latter. 
Then, following a well established practice within cross-national comparative 
studies, the design holds the industry factor constant (Bean 1994; Ferner 1988). 
Hence, the research focused on the privatisation of one industry, which, in turn, 
allows a better appreciation of change in market and industrial structures due to 
privatisation. National variability in the degree of fragmentation, restructuring, 
and boundaries redefinition of the ESI, and the forms and intensity of capital 
competition, concentration and integration, are, in this regard, crucial, for those 
industrial and market factors have a determining effect on trade unions' (re- 
)sources of power. A comparative study of the process of privatisation of the 
industry and of the immediate evolutionary aftermath may highlight variations, 
which influence differently the dynamics of counter-mobilisation and the very 
possibility of workers collectivism. 
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Similarly, divergences in the British and the Argentinean industrial relations 
systems are to be analysed, insofar as they affect patterns of power resources 
allocation. In particular, the research paid attention to factors, which have 
determined dissimilar correlations between the political and industrial 
dimensions of trade unions' (re-)sources of power. 
As for the data collection, it comprised interviews and archival documents. The 
principal targets of the interviews were trade union officials, who experienced 
the process of privatisation, in particular, national and regional/branch union 
officials with negotiating and political responsibilities but also workplace 
representatives. In Argentina, given the organisational structures of trade 
unions, there are not regional officials. This choice pursued a balance between 
different levels of officialdom and between different unions. The rationale for the 
selection of interviewees for the higher levels was their first-hand knowledge 
about the process of privatisation. All national and regional/branch union 
officials had at the moment of privatisation negotiating and political 
responsibilities. Concerning workplace representatives, interviews looked for 
information on the recent evolutions of collective bargaining, grievances and 
conflicts, workplace structures of representation, rank-and-file participation, 
mechanism of decision-making at shop-floor level, and so forth. 
As the aim of the research is how privatisation impacted upon trade union ability 
to engage in collective action, the design did not attempt to limit the enquiry to 
geographical boundaries or a particular firm. On the contrary, to survey diversity 
has been a positive insight and a finding in itself. 
A total of 53 interviews were carried out: 47 in-depth unstructured and semi- 
structured interviews, conditional on the research objecuves and the status of 
the informants, and six focus groups with workplace representatives. When 
possible, the interviewee received via email a brief with information about the 
research objectives and the expectations of the interviewer. In the case of the' 
focus groups, this brief was sent to the person in charge of organising the 
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meeting. In Argentina, however, e-mail communications among union officials 
are limited to higher positions, so that, this procedure was not always followed. 
An interview guide about relevant issues was prepared for each interview. All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed, except for one focus group. In this 
case, field notes were taken. The focus groups were organised with the 
assistance of national trade union officials. The purpose of them was to collect 
data of the social interactions among lay reps from both the same and different 
trade unions, and between lay reps and other groups, like regional and national 
officials, supervisors and managers, taking advantage of a more relaxed 
atmosphere. The information elicited from these meetings was of a high-quality, 
given the details provided about critical events, which were of use to understand 
wider social processes. 
The distribution of the 53 interviews was as follows: 
Table 2: Distribution of interviews among trade unions 
2.1. United Kinadom 
Trade union No interviews National officer Regional/branch Lay reps Focus roups 
officer groups people 
Amicus 9 4 2 3 2 7 
Prospect 8 5 3 
Unison 9 4 3 2 1 5 
Total 26 13 8 5 3 12 
2.2. Araentina 
Trade Union n" interview Union Officers Lay reps 
- 
Focus Groups 
groups people 
Luz y Fuerza CF 10 5 _ 5 1 8 
Luz y Fuerza MDP 11 6 5 2 9 
Total 21 11 10 3 17 
Selection of respondents intended to balance the representation of different 
market segments. In the case of UK, in order to control regional peculiarities, 
the research design limited interviews of regional officer and lay reps to the 
London region and the Midlands. In both countries, access to lower levels of the 
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officialdom was often negotiated through contacts with officers at unions' 
headquarters. 
The information collected by this technique was complemented by data taken 
from primary and secondary sources. Indeed, the profuse use of historical and 
written documentation is a distinctive feature of the thesis. Nowadays, 
mainstream research on human resources management and industrial relations 
tends to focus on interviews and questionnaires, and to downplay the historical 
materials built around issues such as privatisation. On the contrary, in this work, 
given the historical perspective adopted by the research. both methods of data 
collection were of equal importance and supported each other. Typically, 
interviews enriched by the information collected from primary sources. Besides, 
in mainstrearn research, data triangulation is usually carried out by interviewing 
people, who are expected to hold different views about a given topic. An 
alternative to this procedure is to use qualitatively different sources. In this 
sense, written materials have proved to be useful no only to check data 
reliability but also to fill information gaps. 
The survey, the critique and the analysis of primary sources are very time- 
consuming tasks. As a result, the organisation of the fieldwork to survey primary 
sources related to different privatisation processes and five trade unions was a 
crucial challenge. The vast array of documentation produced during the period 
by public authorities, trade unions and other relevant actors compels the 
researcher to be selective. In this sense, the first methodological decision 
regarding data collection was to prioritise trade unions' sources, for the two axis 
of the research were how privatisation conditioned trade unions' ability to act 
and how ESI unions effectively responded to that challenge. However, given the 
role of the Argentinean government in the process of dismantling the institutions 
of industrial relations in the public sector before privatisation (see chapter 6), 
the survey, in this case, was extended to relevant documentation produced by 
the Ministerio de Economla (CampaAo & Caruso 1991; Campatlo et al. 1991: 
54 
Daireaux et al. 1990; Ministerio de Econornia 1990a, 1990b, 1990c) and the 
Ministerio de Trabajo (Ministerio de Trabajo 1990). 
Nevertheless, the main sources of the research were trade unions' journals, 
annual reports (the so-called Memoria y Balance in Argentina) and conference 
reports (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Main Primary Sources 
Trade Union Main sources 
EETPU - Contact Uournal) 
- Shop Stewards Quarterly Review 
- Biennial Delegate Conferences 
- National Conferences for the ESI 
AEEU - AEEU aournal) 
- Annual Reports 
Amicus -Annual Reports 
EPEA - EPE Electrical Power Engineer 
0ournal) 
- Privatisation news (occasional 
newsletter) 
- Agenda of the Delegate Conferences 
- Annual Reports 
EMA - EMA Newsletter 
-Annual Reports 
Prospect - Annual Reports 
NALGO - NALGO News Uournal) 
- Focus gournal) 
- Annual Reports 
- Electricity Branch Circulars 1989-90. 
Unison - Conferences of the Energy Service 
Group 
-Annual Reports 
TUC -Annual Reports Luz y Fuerza CF - Dinamis aournal) 
I- Memoria y Balance (Annual Reports) 
Luz y Fuerza MDP 8 de Octubre 0ournal) 
I Memoria y Balance (Annual Reports) 
In each case study, the bottom year taken as the starting point of the survey 
was the year in which the privatisation plan was announced. Then, the 
chronological reading contributed to the identification of changes in trade 
unions' policies, critical events and the different phases of trade unions' 
strategies. Besides, trade unions' journals and. reports referred to - and even 
published - relevant written materials, which addressed_, , 
privatisation issues, and 
in this way, oriented the fieldwork towards particular documents. For that 
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reason, this survey of primary sources put an important amount of effort in 
localising specific publications and documentation (for instance: EPEA 1986; 
FATLyF 1992; FUSE 1987; LyF MDP 1994b, 1997,1998; NALGO 1988c, 
1989a, 1989b; NOP 1989,1991; TUC 1989b; Unison 1996b, among others). 
The accuracy and objectiveness of the primary sources collected during the 
fieldwork were constant concerns. Documents are often difficult to interpret and 
demand a high level of scrutiny. Still, primary sources usually offer new input 
into historical questions and this research was not the exception. While most 
interviewees were able to give detailed information about certain events and 
topics, the same respondents tended to ignore other dimensions of the process 
of trade unions' strategies in the face of privatisation. Written sources 
contributed, in this regards, to regain balance in the analysis. For instance, 
aspects like the different forms taken by the politics of money (see chapter 8). 
the contradictory evolution of the structures of collective bargaining (see chapter 
9) or the scope and timing of unions' organisational change (see chapter 10) 
could have hardly been studied in absence of written evidence. Instead, 
interviews were essential to obtain information about other facets like inter- 
unions tensions within single table bargaining (see chapter 9) or the rise of 
sectionalism (see chapter 10). Yet, as a stylistic strategy, the narrative of the 
findings was supported, whenever possible, with quotations taken from 
interviews. The purpose was to elicit a more attractive expository writing. 
A critical problem was where and how to obtain these sources. Two paths were 
followed. On the one side, the search started by visiting well-known repositories 
of primary sources about the history of trade unions. On the other side, 
interviewees were questioned about the type of documentation kept by the 
organisation they belonged to. In fact, the way to carry out the fieldwork with 
regards the survey of written documents was different in both countries. 
In UK, interviewees manifested that their trade unions do not have a policy on 
documentation storage. Besides, partly due to the process of mergers 
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underwent by ESI unions, past records were lost or given to public institutions. 
In this regards, the most important collections of trade unions' documents are 
the Trades Union Congress Library Collections at the London Metropolitan 
University and the Modern Records Centre at the University of Warwick. Thus, it 
is possible to find in these places, particularly in the former, complete 
collections of trade unions' journals, annual reports and other relevant 
documentation. 
Instead, in Argentina, both trade unions have collections of the journals 
published by the organisation and other relevant sources in their headquarters. 
Thus, access to their archives was negotiated simultaneously with access to 
carry out interviews with union officials. Besides this, the libraries of Ministerio 
de Economia and Ministerio de Trabajo were two important repositories of 
official documentation. Particularly the former, where primary sources - not used 
before by scholars but critical to study how the government designed its policies 
against public unions to ease the process of privatisation - were found during 
the survey (see chapters 6,7 and 9). 
In sum, the written materials collected were crucial to achieve accuracy in the 
historical reconstruction of the process of privatisation and how trade unions 
responded to it. As stated above, they were of main importance to date 
particular changes in trade unions' policies and to identify certain patterns, for 
instance, in the evolution of collective bargaining or the counter-mobilisation 
strategies. In short, these materials were essential for the research, as they 
provided accuracy where interviews offered diffuse information. 
Quantitative data has been collected and processed when appropriate. Some 
trade union resources affected by privatisation are measurable. For instance, if 
we focus on organisational resources, variables such as membership, union 
density, or number of lay reps and union officers, are quantifiable and apt for 
being analysed along time series. This is also the case about monetary 
resources. The same can be said about some kind of collective actions. Strikes, 
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overtime bans, go-slows, works-to-rule, petitions or collective appeals are 
suitable for quantification. In fact, there have been these types of quantitative 
data the basis of the debate on trade unions' power decline. But, if several trade 
unions resources may be translated into quantifiable variables, their use and 
mobilisation are not. Thus, quantitative data was often subordinated to 
qualitative one. Furthermore, as it was impossible to obtain similar and 
complete series of data, its use has been very limited, and of secondary 
importance. 
The data analysis was organised according to the categories of mobilisation 
theory, and carried out using the programme NVivo 2.0. a qualitative research 
software. Given its flexibility, this programme facilitated the exploration and 
interpretation of diverse and complex qualitative data. Interviews and archival 
documents were coded and grouped by variables, topics, countries and 
organisations, which in turn eased the search for patterns, the revision of coded 
texts, the comparative task, and the writing-up of the analytical chapters. While 
coding developed, primarily, through a deductive approach in accordance to the 
pre-existing mobilisation categories, new areas of problems and categories 
emerged out of the data collected. 
Scope and limits 
Any methodological design, which takes as a research strategy the case-study 
approach, may face concerns about the generalisation of findings. An author 
like Stake (2000) has restricted the scope of case-study research to illuminate 
the particular in depth, and in its uniqueness. Simons (1996) downplays this 
aspect by arguing that the tension between what is particular, and what is 
patterned and regular, undergoes any social research. She has pointed out the 
paradox of case study research: its strength to generate both unique and 
universal understanding by an in-depth focus and a holistic perspective. Yet, 
58 
Simons maintains that the advantage of a case study approach would, still, 
remain in dealing with uniqueness and particularities. 
By contrast, other scholars stress that a case study approach does not preclude 
generalisation; but beyond this elemental agreement, very different positions 
arise. Generally, those who support a classic view of social science, in which 
research aims to generalise findings to diverse populations and times, often 
insist on the needs of a proper design, from sampling in multi-case studies to 
appropriate thick descriptions for further comparisons. Yin (1994) opposes this 
view and suggests another understanding based on what he calls 'analytical 
generalisation'. From this point of view, research designs should not pursue a 
sampling logic. A case study approach must avoid statistical generalisation. It is 
in relation with previous theoretical developments and rival theories that findings 
should be considered. Finally, some scholars have questioned the traditional 
meaning of generalisation (Lincoln & Guba 2000; Schofield 2000). Thus, they 
put their efforts in reworking the notion of generalisation in order to enhance the 
chance of speaking beyond the immediate concerns of their case studies. 
In short, generalisation remains a problematic area for any methodology built 
upon a case-study strategy. For this reason, the research neither pursues 
straightforward generalisations from empirical findings nor pretends to establish 
universal patterns. Indeed, following the insights of the ontological 
understanding advanced by critical realism (Ackroyd & Fleetwood 2000; 
Edwards 2005; Fleetwood 1999; Roberts 1999,2001; Sayer 1992), our 
approach start by positing serious reservations about the chance to identify 
regular patterns of events in contexts of openness. Yet, what the design does 
attempt is to test the potential of mobilisation theory to offer comparative and 
theoretically informed explanations of trade unions' ability to engage in 
collective action in social contexts characterised by a counter-mobilisation 
wave. In short, while the enquiry recognises the complexities of generalisation, 
it also recognise that to ask how far the findings are likely to apply in other 
circumstances is a task that needs to be undertaken. 
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Another potential source of concern relates to the rationale for a comparative 
analysis. Mobilisation theory, as rethought by Kelly to be applied to organised 
labour, is still in its infancy. As already mentioned, Gall (2000) stressed the lack 
of intellectual engagement with the theoretical framework develop by Kelly, 
especially at meso- and macro-analytical levels. This is still the case, for the 
theory has often been applied to short-time events (Atzeni 2005; Brown 
Johnson & Jarley 2004; Darlington 2001; Gall 2000; Kelly & Badigannavar 
2003; Kelly & Willman 2004; Moore 2004). This gap, together with the surprising 
scarcity of studies about how privatisation conditioned trade union strategic 
capacity, combined to reinforce the case for investigation of mobilisation theory 
in a comparative context marked by state and capital counter-mobilisation. 
Indeed, once meso- and macro-levels are incorporated into the analysis, 
diversity in industrial and institutional intermediate variables, which partly 
determine the opportunity-to-act and the allocation of power resources proves 
to be promising insights to evaluate the potential of mobilisation theory. 
Likewise, variability in leadership styles, decision-making dynamics and types of 
organisation serve the purpose of examining how far workers collectivism 
depends, in the midst of adverse external conditions, on organisational 
processes and capabilities. In this sense, the virtue of comparing dissimilar 
cases, as regards the institutional context, is that any patterns of similarity that 
might be found are likely to exhibit processes with a high degree of generality in 
relation to workers' (de)mobilisation around privatisation. 
Conclusion 
To assess the adequacy of the methodology, this chapter discussed the 
research strategies and methodological design, and some areas of potential 
concern, which stems from these choices. Yet, and before closing this chapter, 
it seems necessary to add a few words with regard to why there was no 
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triangulation through use of management interviews and, more importantly, 
about ethical considerations. 
Concerning the former, pragmatic concerns discouraged triangulation through 
managerial testimonies. Given the complexity of maintaining the balance of 
respondents at local and higher levels across two countries plus the need for 
arch ive/documenta ry work to reconstruct the historical process since 
privatisation, a managerial dimension was deemed to be unmanageable. And 
more importantly, would managerial views be essential to test judgments and 
process, which are mostly internal to the unions under scrutiny? Undoubtedly, 
they could have added useful information as they have been, after all, key 
actors in translating the consequences of privatisation into impacts on trade 
unions. Yet, what managers actually think today about the impact of 
privatisation on trade unions' ability to engage in collective action seems to add 
little to a better understanding of workers' mobilisation capacity. As the research 
focuses on the process of privatisation, insofar as it affected trade unions, 
interviews with union officials, lay reps and primary sources were considered to 
suffice. 
Regarding ethical concerns about the impact of this study on the research 
subjects; their interests have been protected, firstly, by guaranteeing anonymity 
for the interviewees. Besides, every individual received written or oral detailed 
explanations of the aims of the research as to allow them to decline to assist the 
investigation. 
61 
Chapter 4 
Privatisation as Counter-Mobilisation 
Chapter 2 set the analytical framework of the research from a mobilisation 
perspective. This theoretical starting-point has some advantages. It posits any 
shift in labour-capital relations in historical perspective, and in this sense, 
overcomes the a-historical character of most studies of union organisations 
(Kelly & Heery 1994: 23). It provides a model for the long-run as well as a 
related theory of collective action for the short-run (mobilisation theory and its 
pool of categories). Furthermore, by combining empirical evidence of long 
waves and the categories of mobilisation, it allows the analysis to go beyond the 
scope of workplace and industrial relations institutions in order to explain 
workers' collectivism. In this regard, Kelly's proposal matches Hyman's 
statement: "the phenomena of industrial relations cannot be understood simply 
in their own terms. Industrial relations cannot adequately be comprehended as 
a relatively autonomous 'sub-system' of society upon which political and 
economic forces impinge only exogenously" (Hyman 1994b: 171). 
The analytical framework postulates that the process of privatisation is a 
counter-mobilising force; chapters 4 and 5 intend to substantiate this claim. 
Thus, after illustrating the various meanings of the term privatisation, this 
chapter provides diverse arguments to assert its counter-mobilising content. In 
so doing, it will show, first, that the labour movement had invested in the 
preceding regime, as trade unions considered public ownership vital to 
organised labour gains. Then, drawing on Marxist political economy, it develops 
a theoretical argument about privatisation increasing the scope of operation of 
private capital. After this, from a mobilisation perspective, it will address, 
theoretically and empirically, the relationship between privatisation and 
appropriation of resources. Finally, the literature on the relationships between 
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privatisation and labour, particularly, the detrimental impact of the former on the 
latter, will be reviewed. 
On the meaning and origins of privatisation 
Once one submerges in the literature, unexpectedly, privatisation reveals itself 
as a fuzzy term; it is not a transparent notion and different sort of policies have 
been deployed under this label. As Bishop and Kay pointed out in their 
approach to UK's experience, "since 1979, 'privatization' has become an 
umbrella term covering a number of British government microeconomic policies. 
In addition to the sale of publicly-owned enterprise with which it is normally 
associated, privatization has included policies of deregulation, liberalization and 
franchising" (1989: 643). Such usage focuses on the involvement of market 
forces to ensure greater competition, economic efficiency, and the reduction of 
the role of the state in the regulation, production and provision of goods and 
services; that is, privatisation is associated to deregulation and liberalisation. 
This is the normal usage of the term privatisation in most works (Austin et al. 
1986; Bishop & Kay 1989; Clarke 1993; Heald & Steel 1981; Marsh 1991; 
Wiltshire 1987). While this broad definition might be appropriate as a way of 
depicting a general approach towards economic policy rather than a policy in 
itself, it might be misleading for certain analytical purposes. Thus, another trend 
has stressed that the liquidation of publicly-owned assets, the sale of minority 
public-shares of private enterprises, governmental measures towards 
liberalisation, deregulation of economic activities and the introduction of 
patterns of behaviour taken from the private sector into public sector 
enterprises, cannot be considered as instances of privatisation (Bienen & 
Waterbury 1989; Gupta 2000; Walle 1989). 
For authors like Ramanadham, in turn, privatisation, basically, "represents 
marketization of enterprise operations and can be sought through three options 
- ownership changes, organizational changes and operational changes" 
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(Ramanadham 1993: 2). Such view reduces the concept of privatisation to its 
practical and political meaning, by referring to a wide range of actions taken and 
followed since the end of 1970s by governments to reduce the role of the state 
and to encourage market forces. But, it still comprises many different policies. 
In opposition to broad definitions, then, Rarnamurti confines the term to the 
"divestiture of these enterprises which states owns and operates itself" 
(Ramamurti 1992b: 1), that is, the "sale of all or part of a government's equity in 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to the private sector, or the placing of SOEs 
under private management through leasing and management contracts" 
(Rarnamurti 1992a: 228). Walle expresses the same idea in slightly different 
manner: "the transfer of ownership or control of an enterprise from the 
government to the private sector, with particular reference to assets sales* 
(Walle 1989: 601; also Molz 1990). These narrow definitions of privatisation 
seem to be, analytically, more useful than broader ones. As Walle (1989) has 
stressed, they allow, at least, the distinction between privatisation and 
liberalisation with regard to one essential feature of any economy: the structure 
of relative prices. Following Gupta (2000: 31), it would be even more important 
to make this difference, for the relationship between liberalisation, deregulation 
and privatisation is diverse and there is no one-way model. 
Yet, some scholars claim that in this type of definitions an important ambiguity 
still persists: that the percentage of the equity sold by the state to private 
capitals remains unspecified. Beesley & Littlechild (1988) and Weyman-jones 
(1993), for instance, have stressed that the sale should represent at least 50 
per cent of the shares of the former public enterprises (including mixed 
enterprises); though, they restrict privatisation to this only aspect. On the 
contrary, concession of control is often considered as an aspect of privatisation 
in the narrow definitions so far. 
In short, following broad formulations some studies include into privatisation the 
relaxation or abolition of monopoly powers that prevent private sector firms 
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entering markets before exclusively supplied by the public sector (Wiltshire 
1987). Others, instead, prefer to apply the term market liberalisation (Weyman- 
Jones 1993), when referring to permission and facilitation of competitive new 
entrants to the marketplace. Similarly, deregulation - and not privatisation, 
seems for others to be a better term to speak of the removal or relaxation of 
restrictions on procedures, pricing, and output and investment decisions of both, 
public and private industries. Empirically, however, these aspects usually 
appear together, for it is distinctive of privatisation's programmes to seek market 
liberalisation and deregulation, in an effort to increase competition, reduce the 
state activity, and free market forces at every level. Yet, this is not always the 
case as different combinations of privatisation, liberalisation, and deregulation 
are always possible. This is an important distinction in the case of public 
utilities, where new regulatory institutions and policies are put in place. Through 
denationalisation (Gupta 2000), it is referred the sale of public assets and 
shares, regardless of the proportion sold, and through the term commercialism 
(Ferner 1988), the action of extended the legal norms that regulate private 
sector's activities to state enterprises working on commercial basis, as an 
attempt to find a set of objectives and criteria which act as market proxies in the 
public sector. But, empirically, all these policies have been combined in different 
ways, and even a strict definition of terms will fail to overcome conceptual and 
empirical overlaps. Still, it is worth discriminating between different (or 
potentially different) processes and policies that have been diversely applied, 
moreover, when studying the privatisation of public utilities in a comparative 
perspective, for each of these separate processes might have carried 
consequences for labour that are of a different order and magnitude. 
In summary, despite definitional subtleties, all these reforms are intended to 
reduce the extent of regulated or co-ordinated market activity and, 
concomitantly, to expand opportunities for accumulation. 
As for the origins of privatisation, there are many and diverse explanations, 
which usually consist in some combination of multiple motives. The few who 
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offer a common and general reason for world-wide privatisation emphasise 
either the fiscal deficit (Christiansen 1989: 597; Gupta 2000: 19) or the 
governmental dissatisfaction with the performance of public enterprises (Walle 
1989). But beyond general statements, these explanations often add secondary 
reasons, differentiating between developed countries (DC) and less developed 
countries (LDC) as shall be shown in the next chapter, or find out particular 
objectives following specific circumstances. 
Yet, for the purpose of this thesis, the main deficit of mainstream approaches to 
privatisation is not their lack of a common use of the term, or a share 
understanding of the origins of privatisation, but their tendency to conceive 
privatisation as an administrative measure, that is, as a technical response to 
an economic problem (Dinerstein 2001). As a result, those studies seek to 
evaluate whether or not privatisation - whatever its operational definition - 
achieved the spoken aims. Whether it might be important to find out gaps 
between promises and realisations, this standpoint misses the political and 
counter-mobilising dimensions of privatisation, for Oas the 1997 [WBI Report 
highlights, the current wave of privatization and deregulation is a political 
program, the result of a strategy designed to serve one set of interests as 
opposed to another" (Cook & Murphy 2002: 1). Accordingly. many scholars 
stress that privatisations were not technically inevitable but a strategy, in which, 
the role of institutions like the IMF and the WB, in designing, promoting and 
implementing the programmes, was critical for their worldwide spread (Cook & 
Murphy 2002; Dinerstein 2001; Thwaites Rey 1994; Thwaites Rey 2003). Yet, if 
the picture in UK is free from the direct interference of the international actors 
mentioned above, it is not less true that privatisation has served also in this 
country, certain interests as opposed to others. Indeed, diverse accounts make 
clear that the agenda for privatisation, especially in UK but also elsewhere, was 
partly motivated, overtly and ideologically, to free up markets by rolling back the 
constraining impact of organised labour on the opportunities for private capital, 
as shall be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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An historical argument: privatisation and the politics of the tabour 
movements (1) 
It seems pertinent to begin the substantiation of the counter-mobilising content 
of privatisation by stressing that privatisation came to halt a long term and 
widespread aspiration'of the labour movement for the consolidation of state 
enterprises, at least, in key economic sectors (Cole 1953; Ferner 1988; Kelf- 
Cohen 1958; Weiner 1960). Particularly in the UK, where "TUC resolutions in 
favour of nationalisation go back to the 1890s, when the influence of the 'New 
Unionists' first made itself felt" (Cole 1953: 225), state ownership was seen as a 
victory for the labour movement, which supported the election of a post-war 
Labour government with a radical mandate to establish social provision of key 
services. Then, while nationalisation must be understood as a critical aspect of 
British post-war reconstruction, that even and despite explicit reservations 
Conservative Governments preserved during 1945-79, trade unions' 
commitment to public ownership and nationalisation has a longer and 
independent history (Weiner 1960). In this history, wartimes played a crucial 
role. The I World War completed the conversion of nationalisation in trade 
unions' policy from a liberal to a socialist conception. State ownership became a 
political and industrial objective through which the labour movement hoped to 
defeat exploitation, by means of wining a place in industrial management to 
plan and eliminate wasteful competition, extend democratisation and improve 
workers' living standards. In this context, there was the first call for the 
nationalisation of power supply, in the Jubilee Congress, which took place two 
months before the armistice (Weiner 1960). The same year, 1918, witnessed 
the adoption for the Labour Party of socialist objectives and the incorporation of 
the nationalisation policies of trade unions as part of its programme for war 
reconstruction (Weiner . 
1960). Moreover, in 1924,, nationalisation, in TUC's 
resolutions for 30 years so far, was added for the first time into TUC Standing 
Orders, among the long range economic and social objectives to be sought by 
the trade union movement. The 11 World War, in turn, opened the opportunity-to- 
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act. Considerable national support developed during this new war for the public 
ownership of certain industries and services: %vartime exigencies contributed 
substantially to win public support for labors long-standing contention that only 
by completing the process of national ownership and coordination could 
electricity supply industry be 'tidied up', reorganised, and expanded" (Weiner 
1960: 57). And this was precisely what TUC had already advocated In 1936. 
The elected Labour Party, then, nationalised the electricity industry in 1947. But, 
trade unions had also learnt the lesson of government retreat in the first post- 
war, and worked to make the objective of nationalisation appealing for wider 
public opinion, propagandising it as a good for British society. In this sense, in 
1944, TUC declared for public corporation boards to be appointed by the 
Ministers concerned, supporting in this way the Morrisonian solution of no 
organised interest representation. This was the pattern of nationalisation policy 
and there was neither workers control nor representation of the trade unions as 
such on any body responsible for managing nationalised industries (Cole 1953; 
Pendleton & Winterton 1993). But, the Morrisonian Corporation had, by 
statutory obligation, joint consultation and centralised negotiation procedures 
and institutions with all representative bodies, what strengthened trade unions' 
position and won their support. Although, the Morrisonian model started to be 
put into question by some trade unions by mid-1980s, the commitment to either 
public ownership or its revitalisation through the notion of social ownership was 
firm within the ranks of the British labour movement (EETPU 1987; TUC 1984, 
1986,1988). 
In Argentina, in turn, there was no similar long-term commitment in the labour 
movement, at least, explicitly, to public ownership. Being the composition of the 
working-class, in itself an outcome of migratory trends, its multinational outlook 
rendered governments and the state alien to workers aspirations, mainly, 
because foreign workers were denied political rights, and often repressed 
(FaIc6n & Monserrat 2000; Godio 1987). Distrust of governments Increased the 
appeal within labour ranks of anti-state ideologies such as Anarchism and 
Revolutionary Syndicalism (Del Campo 1986; Suriano 1990). Besides, the 
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labour movement in Argentina never experienced events of exceptional 
governmental controls and takeovers upon industry due to war exigencies, 
which were crucial in UK to shape the evolution of workers demands regarding 
nation aI isation, and make them a practical issue. Gradually, however, by the 
end of 1920s, some key trade unions started to negotiate with governments, 
asking for state intervention through legislation and arbitration in labour 
disputes, and engaging in a sort of incipient political exchange, but still, without 
including public ownership among their objectives (Falc6n & Monserrat 2000). 
The rise of Peronism in mid 1940s would be the turning point. Its programme of 
nationalisation and public ownership of key industries as part of a 
developmental, industrialist and anti-imperialist project found the support of a 
growing Peronised and nationalised labour movement, which appropriated state 
ownership as their own political and nationalistic objective (Cordone 1993). This 
trend continued well after the fall of the government at hands of a military coup 
in 1955, as it is shown by the political programmes of 1962 (Huerta Grande) 
and 1968 (CGT de los Argentinos), backed by trade unions, in which amidst 
acute episodes of open class struggles, radicalised leaderships of the labour 
movement explicitly asked for wide nationalisations as preliminary steps 
towards a national version of socialism (James 1988). The democratic transition 
during 1980s, witnessed strong trade unions' opposition to any attempt to 
privatise state enterprises, and this political demand was included in most of the 
13 national strikes launched by the CGT between 1984 and 1988, though, now 
completely stripped of any revolutionary connotation. LyF CF, for instance, the 
electrical trade union of Buenos Aires, claimed, from its origins in 1943, the 
nationalisation of the industry. This aim was partially fulfilled by the creation of a 
national enterprise, Agua y Energla E16ctrica in 1947, but the main private 
companies continued their operations. In 1961, the government planned, as a 
temporally solution against private monopoly powers, a nearly complete 
nationalisation of the industry but with the intention to re-privatised it soon after. 
However, LyF CF aborted this intention and was even able to obtain a short but 
intense participation in enterprise management between 1973 and 1976, with a 
view in developing workers self-management in the public sector, but, again a 
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military coup eradicated the experience. The collective agreement (CCT) 
negotiated in 1975 by the electrical union was, perhaps, the most advance ever 
in Argentina and Latin America, from the point of view of social protection to 
labour, and considered as a model to imitate for other public unions. In short, 
state control over the industry was the political position of the electrical trade 
union all over the period until its re-privatisation in 1993. 
Consequently, whether under the ideological wisdom of Fabianism, socialism, 
anti-imperialism, nationalism or otherwise, both labour movements favoured 
public ownership, a political aim which was later on reinforced by the good rates 
of pay and good terms and conditions obtained in the state industries. The 
argument is not that nationalisations were brought about by the struggles of the 
labour movement - if this could be a plausible argument for UK, it is clearly not 
for Argentina - but, simply, that nationalisation was amongst, or became part, of 
trade unions' long-term political objectives. It is not surprising, then, that 
privatisation plans were always opposed at the outset by trade unions, though 
not necessarily by direct industrial action, while the private sector 
enthusiastically pushed for their implementation. Thus, privatisation came to 
reverse a well-established preference of organised labour for the extension of 
public ownership. 
A theoretical argument., the enhancement of market discipline (11) 
Marx's critique of the political economy of capital is well-known (Marx 1973, 
1977). He begins from the most simple category to be found in capitalism - the 
commodity, which is placed in the abstract realm of 'capital in general' 
(Rosdolsky 1977), in which capital's development is shown In its specific 
characteristics as a self-valorisation process, and there is no place for surface 
phenomena - like competition among capitals, for instance. Thus, Marx 
considered methodologically necessary to grasp, first, the inner nature of capital 
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in order to understand, then, the behaviour and movement of many capitals 
(Arthur 2004). However, Marx often stressed that capital really exists - 
$necessarily expresses itself - as individual capitals, as capitals in competition: 
"the immanent laws of capitalist production manifest themselves in the external 
movement of the individual capitals, assert themselves as the coercive laws of 
competition" (Marx 1977: 433). For him, competition "is nothing more than the 
way in which the many capitals force the inherent determinants of capital upon 
one another and upon themselves" (Marx 1973: 651). In short, the inner nature 
of capital development needs the action of many capitals acting in their self- 
interest by seeking market advantages and the extraction of surplus value - to 
the extent that left to their own devices, individual capitals will often act to 
secure monopoly or oligopoly positions against its direct competitors. Hence, 
"capital's tendency to increase the workday (extensively and intensively) and to 
increase productivity is manifested through the efforts of individual capitals to 
lower their costs of production relative to other individual capitals in the context 
of competition" (Lebowitz 2003: 82). 
Thus, taking into account the role of privatisation in fostering competition in 
general, and in public utilities in particular, it is possible to conclude, 
theoretically, that privatisation plays a major role in enhancing the power of 
capital vis-6-vis labour. It does not matter, at this level of analysis, whether or 
not, privatisation policies were designed to foster competition; or whether or not, 
strong elements of either monopoly or oligopoly remain (Hall ; and others). The 
crucial point here is that even when competition could have been served better 
by selling the assets differently, or by different regulatory frameworks, the 
decision to privatise enhanced competitive forces and the market discipline. 
Moreover, leading local businessmen were persuaded that government 
supplied services such as, electricity were too expensive because of 
inefficiencies and because of the social goals that they pursued, such as equity 
and employment, and hence, that the lack of competitiveness of government 
providers made private industry uncompetitive too (Beder 2005). 
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To put it differently, while profitability is the leading force of private enterprises, 
this is not exactly the case for state enterprises, whose 'defining characteristic, 
indeed the rationale for their existence, is that they are subject to some form of 
political control" (Ferner 1988: 29). Privatisation frees management from 
political control and interference, and as a result, "the privatized enterprise 
faces an environment of decision-making very different from the highly 
politicized public-sector model, with far-reaching implications for the culture of 
industrial relations" (Colling & Ferner 1995: 493). Public ownership entails a 
potential diversion from a crude development of capital's dynamic due to 
political intervening variables and other state functions (Femer 1988; Saad- 
Filho 2003). It has been stressed that state enterprises are only partially 
affected by the discipline of the market and that their multiple and usually 
contradictory objectives are defined through a political process, which combines 
diverse economic roles - from supporting private industry to implementing 
macroeconomic policies, with tasks related to political legitimation (Ferner 1988: 
30-1; Goldin 1997). And historically, trade unions took advantage from their 
ability to participate of this political process. At their peak, Right thinkers wisely 
alluded to this aspect when arguing in favour of privatisation and other neo- 
liberal policies. 
A theoretic empirical argument., the appropriation of resources (111) 
From the point of view of mobilisation theory, privatisation may be 
conceptualised as constituting in itself a huge process of appropriation of 
resources, and therefore, as well, as a process of counter-mobilisation. Indeed, 
the main features of our epoch, the ongoing process of capital 
internationalisation, the expansion of multinational corporations (MNCs) and the 
retreat of the state from the direct control of production and services, are 
narrowly tight to worldwide privatisations of public property, which entailed a 
massive transfer at a global scale of material resources from the public sphere 
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to the private domain: in short, an enormous and direct concentration of wealth, 
power resources and control over key economic sectors in private hands. That 
is to say, in either Etzioni's (1968) or Tilly's (1978) approach, a process of 
mobilisation; or, more exactly, within Kelly's amalgamation of mobilisation and 
long wave theories: counter-mobilisation. This latter conceptualisation being 
independent of whether privatisation was a direct consequence of lobbying from 
capital or the result of a political decision based more on ideological and macro- 
economic reasons. 
Some figures may be of help to have a better idea about the dimensions of 
these transactions. Table 4 offers data about financial proceeds from 
privatisation between 1990 and 1996 in Latin America, the whole developing 
countries, OECD countries, Argentina and UK: 
Table 4: Proceeds from Privatisation - (US million) 1990-6. 
Region 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1990-6 
All developing countries 12658 24243 26180 23651 21704 21802 25175 155413 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
10961 18723 15560 10487 8198 4615 13919 82417 
Aroentina* 891 1892 2654 3823 746 954 272 11232 
OECD countries" 12988 10168 18722 37930 55119 54429 52949 242305 
United Kingdom 4219 5346 1 7923 8114 4632 5648 2426 38308d 
Source: Manzetti 1999 - taken form Lieberman, Ira & Christopher Kirkness (eds. ) 1998, Privatization and 
Emerging Equity Markets. Washington DC: World Bank and Flemings Securities; Financial Market Trends: 
finance and investment, 82, June 2002, Pads, OECD. 
* These are only cash figures. Debt bonds used in transactions totalled 17 billion U$D in nominal value (as 
they were considered), but their actual market value was 8 billion U$D. 
** Mexico Is not included. 
These figures are even more striking, if it is taken into account, that privatised 
companies have often made immediate gains since public offerings were 
ordinarily underpriced. Although underpricing is also generally found in private 
equity offerings, research has shown that, for instance, in UK and France, 
privatisations involved "an additional discount of around 10 per cent" (OECD 
1995: 9). In Latin America, underpricing was a structural feature of incredible 
dimensions, to which the use of debt bonds in equity swaps was crucial in a 
number of cases (Cook & Kirkpatrick 1995). A detailed study of privatisation in 
Argentina and Brazil has stressed that "by accepting debt-equity instruments as 
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a form of payment ... potential investors could make huge savings since the 
quotation of these equities in the secondary market [during 1990s] was at an all 
time low" (Manzetti 1999: 304). Thus, privatisation opened opportunities for 
private companies and finance capital, in anxious search for profitable areas 
since the economic international crisis of mid 1970s, to invest in undervalued 
businesses, and in the case of public utilities, to appropriate undervalued key 
energetic resources. It is also necessary to note, that Table 4 misses the timing 
of British privatisation process, which started earlier, and predated incoming 
worldwide changes. In this process, Conservative British Government that took 
office in 1979, "embarked on a far-reaching effort that lasted through 1980s and 
during which nearly all state-owned enterprises in the competitive sector were 
privatised" (OECD 1995). Table 5, then, completes the British picture. 
Table 5: Proceeds from privatisation In Britain 1979-90 (E millions) 
Country 1979-83 11984-88 1989-90 1 1977ý ý9O 
United Kingdom 
1 
1535 1 18359 12180 1 ý32074 
source: bcnamis (zuuz) 
Thus, through the appropriation of public resources, privatisation fostered the 
concentration and integration of key economic sectors in private hands. In 
Argentina, for example, nine conglomerates combine, to a diverse degree, 
control upon, mainly, oil, telecommunications, electricity, gas, petrochemicals, 
construction, transportation and banking, asides from other peripheral activities. 
By this strategy, these capitals have gained economic power and flexibility to 
respond to economic difficulties, and a considerable political influence. If this 
sort of concentration and capture of the state is alien to UK, some degree of 
integration in the utility market is not; utility companies like PowerGen and 
British Gas (BG), among others, show the increasing importance in Britain of 
this international economic trend. In short, the appropriation of public assets 
multiplied the power resources in capitals hands, strengthened their negotiating 
position vis-A-vis the parallel fragmentation of labour in a context of growing 
internationalisation of competition, and reduced the power of Governments to 
manage macro-economic and micro-economic variables. 
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An empirical argument: evidence on privatisation as a counter- 
mobilising force (110 
The counter-mobilising effects of privatisation on labour cannot be easily 
isolated from the broader effects of market liberalisation, commercialism, 
deregulation and productive restructuring, which often accompanies 
privatisation programmes (Colling & Ferner 1995; Ferner 1989; Ferner & Colling 
1991; 1993a; 1993b; Riethof 2002; Weyman-Jones 1993). However, scholars, 
worldwide, are generally inclined to associate privatisation with unfavourable 
developments for industrial relations and organised labour (B6ez-Camargo 
2002; Cifarelli 199; Cook & Murphy 2002; Colling & Ferner 1995; Danford, 
Richardson & Upchurch 2002; de Luca 1998; Dinerstein 2001; Duarte 2001; 
Ferner 1989; Ferner & Colling 1991; 1993a; 1993b; O'Connell Davidson 1993; 
Ogden1993; Petras & Vieux 1999; Pripstein Posusney & Cook 2002; Riethof 
2002; Van der Hoeven & Sziraczki 1997; Wallis 2000). This literature sets the 
empirical foundations for an understanding of privatisation as a counter- 
mobilising strategy against the social achievements of the labour movement 
after the 11 World War. Only a few, apart from apologists, most notably Peter 
Fairbrother (1994,1996a, 1996b, 2000), pointed to potentially positive 
outcomes for labour. This scholar advanced the thesis that organisational 
restructuring due to privatisation, and the decentralisation that this occasions, 
would be likely to disrupt bureaucratic controls within unions, stimulating 
mobilisation at local level. Yet, this view has not denied that privatisation, in any 
event, tends to affect negatively pay, terms and conditions of employment. 
In this regard, for example, it is possible to point with relative confidence to the 
likelihood of job loss (and thus membership loss) due to privatisation, whilst 
being more agnostic about the consequences for management-union relations. 
Indeed, some scholars have underlined that privatisation damages workers 
directly through job loss, which often accompanies restructuring, but also 
indirectly, since changes in the economic role of the state weakened corporatist 
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structures (Cook & Murphy 2002; Palomino 2005; Riethof 2002; Thwaites Rey 
2003). Moreover, it is added that decentralisation of bargaining over wages - 
another common outcome of privatisation, terminates with any sort of wage 
indexation by public authorities, forcing trade unions to adapt and shift the focus 
of their activities from the state to employers. In her exhaustive study on 
privatisation on Brazil, Riethof, for instance, concludes that "fragmentation of 
the workforce (dismissal and outsourcing), flexibilization of labour relations and 
transfer of workers to the private sector tend to weaken trade unions' (Riethof 
2002: 232). A similar picture has been drawn for very different countries (de 
Luca 1998; Goldin 1997; Petras & Vieux 1999; Pripstein Posusney & Cook 
2002). In addition to this, state-owned enterprises generally developed a good 
employer policy that brought better terms and conditions for their workforces 
(Pendleton & Winterton 1993). Particularly in Latin America, these firms also 
had a social responsible policy that made possible generous secondary working 
conditions, which included pension funds, disability funds and schooling and 
training for workers and their families (136ez-Camargo 2002; de Luca 1998; 
Margheritis 1999; Pripstein Posusney & Cook 2002; Riethof 2002). Then, 
privatisation jeopardises, to say the least, those benefits by shrinking *the public 
sector in which workers have achieved the highest levels of organisation and 
wages, job security, and decent working conditions' (Cook & Murphy 2002: 2). 
For LDCs, several studies have shown that in order to make public enterprises 
attractive to potential investors, revisions to union rights and collective contracts 
have been usual procedures, and when opposition from combative trade unions 
arose, governments often embarked on selective and exemplar repression 
(136ez-Camargo 2002; de Luca 1998; Goldin 1997; Palomino 2005; Petras & 
Vieux 1999; Pripstein Posusney & Cook 2002; Riethof 2002; Thwaites Rey 
1999; Tomada & Sen6n GonzdIez 1998). 
In broad terms, this general view applies to UK and Argentina. 
Additionally, the privatisation of public utilities in UK has been associated with a 
set of' work practices such as teamwork, employee participation, directed 
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communication channels, corporate culture policies, team briefings, quality 
circles, employee shares ownership plans (ESOP) and joint labour- 
management partnership, directed to dilute the power of trade unions through 
the development of participatory machineries (Arrowsmith 2003; Colling & 
Ferner 1992,1995; Danford, Richardson & Upchurch 2002; Ferner & Colling 
1991,1993a, 1993b; Katz 1997; Pendleton & Winterton 1993). Derecognition, 
mainly when developing new business units, outsourcing, green fields, and so 
forth, has been another threat faced by British trade unions as a result of 
privatisation. 
As for the privatised utilities in Argentina, scholars have shown that changes in 
terms and conditions have adversely affected five main areas: working-time, 
labour practices, payment structures, employment levels, and company-trade 
union relationships (Brinkmann 1999; Cifarelli 1999; Dinerstein 2001; Duarte 
2001; Murillo 2001; Tomada 1999; Tomada & Sen6n Gonz6lez 1998). 
In short, empirical research has offered evidence about the counter-mobilising 
side of the sale of public sector companies from the point of view of labour.. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to back the assertion that privatisation was in 
itself a counter-mobilising action against labour, that is, to provide support to the 
basic foundation upon which the research unfolds. Hence, in order to achieve 
this aim, different arguments have been deployed. - 
After addressing the ambivalent meaning of the term privatisation, the chapter 
embarked in a historical query about the politics of both labour movements, as 
to show that privatisation went against their traditional policies. Nevertheless, as 
the conceptualisation of privatisation as a counter-mobilising factor cannot rest 
only upon historical evidence, further theoretical and empirical arguments were 
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advanced to discuss, from the point of view of the political economy, why 
privatisation enhances the market discipline; and from the point of view of the 
mobilisation theory, the importance of privatisation to the concentration of power 
resources in private hands. Finally, the chapter refers to the empirical research 
that has pointed to the association between the sale of public assets and 
negative consequences for organised labour. 
Nevertheless, the essential theoretical point belongs to Marxist political 
economy and refers to the role of privatisation in fostering competition and the 
logic of market on former public industries. 
Taken the arguments as a whole, the emerging picture is one in which the 
relationship between privatisation and workers' collectivism appears as an 
appealing field for empirical research. But, the study of this relationship in UK 
and Argentina demands to deepen the comparative analysis of privatisation and 
the institutions of industrial relations to survey the sort of intermediate variables, 
which contributed to shape the opportunity structure confronted by trade unions 
in the face of ESI privatisation. Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to this task. 
Then, the following chapter will compare the contextual conditions of 
privatisation by exploring the driving forces and rationales of privatisation in UK 
and Argentina. 
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Chapter 5 
The Driving-forces of Privatisation in UK and Argentina 
The preceding chapter mentioned that there is an extended agreement among 
scholars about the dissimilarity between the driving forces and rationales of 
privatisation in DCs and LDCs (Bienen & Warterbury 1989; Christiansen 1989; 
Cook & Kirkpatrick 1995; Cook & Murphy 2002; Dinerstein 2001; Feinberg 
1986; Fern6ndez Jilberto & Riethof 2002; Gupta 2000; Herrera 1992; Manzetti 
1999; Molz 1990; Nellis & Kikeri 1989; Petras & Vieux 1999; Ramamurti 1992a, 
1992b; Riethof 2002; S6nchez Bajo 2002; Walle 1989). 
For instance, Christiansen states that even though fiscal deficit (and also 
inflation) has been a world-wide driving force towards privatisation, in LDCs 
more serious problems arise due to "growing current account imbalances, 
increasing external debt, unfavourable terms of trade, and raising government 
budgets deficits" (Christiansen 1989: 597). Gupta (2000), in turn, also highlights 
the disparity in context and objectives of DCs' and LDCs' privatisation 
processes. In the former, declining growth rates, rising unemployment, falls in 
investment and rises in inflation led to privatisation in search of faster growth, 
higher efficiency and wider competition. In the latter, instead, the debt crisis was 
the crucial turning point towards privatisation, looking for debt reduction, 
creditworthiness, and access to foreign capital and investments. 
Yet, if the analysis lays stress on the political nature of the global spread of 
privatisation rather than in the dynamic of market forces (Dinerstein 2001; 
Thwaites Rey 1994), it needs to identify political actors, apart from country 
specific economic constraints.. Undoubtedly, the IMF and the WB were the most 
important of those actors, two institutions that became intertwined in the 1980s, 
together with the Right wing governments that backed them, especially, the 
Reagan and the British Conservative administrations (Stiglitz 2002). Indeed, 
79 
Ramamurti (1992a) concluded - through an univariate and multivariate analyses 
of LDCs' privatisations - that privatisation was likely to be pursued by those 
LDCs with high budget deficit, high foreign debt, and high dependence on 
international agencies like, precisely, the WB and the IMF, which were 
responsible for the simultaneous shift in favour of privatisation in LDCs, and 
whose policies were deeply determined by USA and UK. Most scholars agree 
with this view (Cook & Kirkpatrick 1995; Cook & Murphy 2002; Dinerstein 2001; 
Fern6ndez Jilberto & Riethof 2002; Gupta 2000; Manzetti 1999; Petras & Vieux 
1999; Ramamurti 1992a, 1992b; Riethof 2002; Sdnchez Bajo 2002; Thwaites 
Rey 1994; Walle 1989; among many others). 
Then, while it is possible to argue that the first privatisations, as in Chile and 
UK, "were experiments driven by business interests and shaped by a mix of 
neoliberal dogma and, in the case of Britain, pragmatic politicso (Beder 2005), 
they soon became models for countries that followed, due to the direct 
involvement of the international donor community in the implementation of the 
privatisation programmes (particularly in LDCs), not only through the IMF and 
the W13 activities, but also through the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
the Exim-Bank, the US Agency for International Development (AID), and others. 
Thus, the privatisation policy was part of, and in itself, a counter-mobilisation 
wave, that unfolded within the global restructuring pursued by the international 
financial institutions, hegemonic states from DCs and MNCs, in order to place 
market discipline on national economies and public budgets worldwide. To 
different degrees in each country, even in the pioneers, this wave comprised an 
ideological agenda to reduce the role of the state and promote consumer 
choice; an economic attempt to embrace change in the structure of the 
economy, facilitate tough labour policies and curb the power of organised 
labour; a managerial concern to rationalise the internal structures of state- 
owned organisations; a political interest in achieving support for Right wing 
administrations and short-run financial objectives (Pendleton & McDonalds 
1994; Vickers & Wright 1988). 
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However, beyond this general understanding, it is worth comparing how specific 
driving-forces and rationales combined in each of the countries under study 
(UK, a member of the G8, privatising pioneer and key international player; 
Argentina, a peripheral economy, where the external pressures were 
particularly acute), given that different contexts presumably determined different 
opportunity structures for organised labour. 
United Kingdom 
Driving-forces and rationales of privatisation 
The British programme was the first large-scale privatisation process and it 
became a blueprint for other countries (Clark 1993; Marsh 1991); for instance, 
the Argentinean government explicitly followed the British model for certain 
privatisations. Scholars coincide in recognising that the reduction of public 
sector was likely the most salient feature of the political programme of 
Thatcherism. Spite of its 1979 election Manifesto, in which denationalisation 
was supposed to be limited to enterprises recently taken into public ownership, 
at the end of the successive Conservative terms, the public sector had been 
reduced dramatically. However, unlike Argentina, the privatisation programme 
in UK evolved in a piecemeal, incremental way. Launched in October 1979 with 
the sale of 5% of public shares in British Petroleum, at the end of the first term 
(1979-1983) 12 SOEs were partially or fully privatised (1,625 million revenues). 
During the second term (1983-1987) 24 firms were sold in part or in whole 
(10.983 million revenues). Third term (1987-1991) involved 40 operations, 
among them 10 water supplies and 12 regional electricity companies (22.514 
million revenues). Thus, "as October 1993, about two-thirds of the UK's 
nationalized industries and about 940.000 jobs had been transferred to the 
private sector" (Miller 1995: 87). Privatisation continued the following years. 
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The intention of privatising the ESI in England and Wales was announced early 
in 1988. According to Ernst (1994), if the sale of water supply industry was the 
most controversial, the sale of the ESI was government's most complex and 
troublesome. Weyman-Jones (1993) underlines, as well, its complexity 
regarding the regulatory framework. Unlike the case of BG, a proposal for 
radical restructuring of its traditional highly integrated structure was made, 
involving vertical separation between generation and transmission; horizontal 
break-up and liberalisation of generation; a regional structure for distribution 
and retail supply; and phased liberalisation of retail supply. According to these 
reforms, in 1990, the 12 Regional Electricity Companies (distribution) (REC), 
which jointly owned the National Grid Company (transmission) (NGC) were sold 
off. In 1991,60% of shares of National Power and PowerGen (generators) were 
sold off as well. 
Apologists for British privatisation have tended to confine the analysis to either a 
binary opposition between public sector evil and private sector panacea, and a 
list of indicators of the alleged success of privatisation in terms of economic 
efficiency gains. Others have shown a propensity to reduce its driving-force, 
often critically, to the preponderance of some ideological beliefs (Swann 1988). 
However, in order to explain the driving-forces of privatisation in UK, most 
scholars have pointed to governmental objectives (Clark & Pitelis 1993; Marsh 
1991; Saunders & Harris 1994; Wiltshire 1987). In this regard, scholars have 
always listed similar reasons: first, to reduce the involvement of the government 
in the industry to improve efficiency by fostering competition; second, to reduce 
the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) to improve government 
finances; third, to ease problems of public sector pay determination by 
weakening public sector unions; and finally, to widen share ownership, in 
particular through employee share schemes, gaining simultaneously political 
advantages. 
Among those who are inclined to stress the economic aims, only a few 
unconditional supporters of privatisation privilege the governmental claim that 
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such policy was a piece of micro-economics (to foster competition and 
efficiency) rather than one of macro-economics (to achieve fiscal objectives and 
short-term revenues) (Gupta 2000; Wiltshire 1987). Yet, amongst those who 
agree about the preponderance of macro-economic motives, differences of 
emphasis, though slight, persist. For instance, Christiansen (1989) focuses 
exclusively on the monetarist aim of cutting the fiscal drain and reducing the 
public sector deficit, whereas Bienen and Waterbury (1989) stress the search 
for revenues generated from the sale of public assets. 
Moreover, other scholars incorporate into this thesis a political element: 
privatisation would have been a way of reducing PSBR without unpopular 
measures (Clarke 1993; Marsh 1991). The appeal of this view is that it re- 
introduces a political dimension in the origins of privatisation. According to it, in 
a first moment, it would just mean to avoid losing support and votes. But as a 
result of the unexpected public enthusiasm with the sale of British Telecom (BT) 
shares, and two years later, with the sale of BG shares, the Conservative 
government would have ended up developing a positive ideological wisdom, the 
building up of popular capitalism. In the Conservative Party's 1987-election 
manifesto such objective emerges clearly, depicted as the historic 
transformation of British society through the widespread of share ownership; in 
John Moore's words, the birth of a "property-owning democracy'. In this sense, 
Miller following John Moore, adds another side of this policy: "wider share 
ownership has, of course, made renationalization by future labour governments 
virtually impossible" (Miller 1995: 92). 
Allusions to political and ideological rationales among the driving-forces of 
privatisation are also common in the literature. Wiltshire (1987), for example, 
stresses the role played by the ideology of the New Right, and in particular, its 
strong anti-unionism. He underlines that "the Thatcher faction and later the 
Thatcher government have always had a noticeably fierce, antagonistic attitude 
to trade unions, not just to their actions but to their very right to exist' (Wiltshire 
1987: 8). At the beginnings of 1980s, public trade unions, mainly after the winter 
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of discontent of 1978-9, became a main target; hence, Wiltshire emphasizes 
that privatisation was also a powerful anti-union weapon. Many scholars have 
even argued that it was anti-unionism the very driving-force of privatisation in its 
origins. For instance, Bishop and Kay state that "the origins of privatisation lies 
in the desire to diminish the power of public sector trade unions' (Bishop & Kay 
1989: 649), although, later on, this claim is qualified by stressing that it was not 
a factor of much relevance in the further development of privatisation. Marsh 
recognises the same objective with regard to public sector trade unions: 
"privatisation was seen as a mean of reducing their size, bargaining power and 
influence over policy" (Marsh 1991: 472), and he adds that there is little doubt 
this was one of "the chief initial concerns of the Conservative government" 
(Marsh 1991: 472). However, he concludes that contracting-out and anti-union 
legislation had more harmful effects on trade unions than the change in 
ownership (Marsh 1991: 472-73). Whilst Marsh is correct on the point of simple 
changes in ownership, this should not obscure the latterly evident fact that 
change in industrial relations and human resources in the former public 
enterprises has been very substantial since privatisation. By contrast, Saunders 
and Harris (1994) do not reject the point, but argue that to tame the unions was 
not a major reason for privatising. Instead, liberalisation, not privatisation, would 
have been, originally, the strategy designed to cope with the union threat. In 
short, it is relevant that, though unevenly, the link between privatisation and 
anti-unionism in the UK experience is a common reference in the literature (see 
also Bienen & Waterbury 1989; Clark 1993; Ernst 1994; Ferner & Colling 1991; 
Gupta 2000; Pendleton & McDonald 1994; Swann 1988). 
Among the ideological rationales to pursue privatisation, consumerism has also 
been a relevant force. This could be also connected to counter-mobilisation as 
regards industrial relations, for one of the key criticisms of public ownership was 
that it tended to privilege producer concerns over those of consumers (Henney 
1987). Thus, the insinuation of the language of markets and choice was a 
deliberate ploy to weaken the claim of internal stakeholders (employees) over 
external ones (customers). Contrary to the propaganda in favour of popular 
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capitalism, consumerism was part of the privatisation ideological appeal from 
the very beginning. That consumers should be got rid of the perverse dynamism 
of nationalised industries, often run in the interest of those who work in them - 
both managers and workers, was a main argument even before 1979 election. It 
remained a main discursive concern during the first two Conservative's 
governments. Finally, it ended up as an essential component of a more 
powerful discourse, the aforementioned construction of popular capitalism. As 
Saunders and Harris (1994) argue, the idea of popular capitalism involved four 
chief elements: consumer sovereignty, a new popular understanding of 
capitalism, the breaking of 'them' and 'us' identities through employee 
identification with the company's aims and fortune, and the undermining of 
collectivist ideologies. Regarding the latter, for Ernst (1994), privatisation 
occupies a critical place in the challenge to the legitimacy of collectivist 
solutions to economic and social problems, therefore to socialism appeal. Thus, 
Ernst states that privatisation also constituted a political and ideological 
challenge to the very spirit of trade unionism as a channel for defining collective 
demands by processing, collectively, the multiple interests of workers. 
Finally, a matter of debate has been, whether or not, privatisation in Britain was 
part of a master and overall strategy or an element of an incremental and 
tentative policy, therefore, without any particular rationale. Those who 
subscribes to the second option (Bienen & Waterbury 1989; Bishop & Kay 
1989; Clarke 1993; Gupta 2000; Marsh 1991; Saunders & Harris 1994) argue 
that there was not commitment with privatisation in the 1979 election manifesto 
of the Conservative Party; that only during the second and third terms such 
commitment appeared; that such commitment was due to political rather than 
economic reasons; that even those reasons changed substantially over time; 
and lastly, that such evolution imprinted privatisation with inconsistencies and 
contradictions. However, according to Wiltshire, while there seems absurd to 
argue in favour of a secret and omniscient plan, 'no least, because there is not 
evidence of such plan at all, "it should not be thought that the concept is 
haphazard. Behind it lies a careful strategy, guided by a clear and consistent 
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ideology. The destination of the journey is certain even if the route has to be 
plotted after each leg has been completed" (Wiltshire 1987: 14). After all, 
denationalisation, deregulation and liberalisation were old commitments of 
Conservatives - as exemplified by the Selsdon Declaration, the Ridley Plan or 
the lobbying activities at that time of think tanks like the Institute of Economic 
Affairs and its offshoot, the Centre for Policy Studies founded by Margaret 
Thatcher in 1974. In this regard, privatisation appears as the most powerful and 
fast method to achieve such aims. Moreover, the political environment was 
propitious for the New Right in embryo, after the 1976 IMF loan to UK amidst 
the 'sterling crisis' forced the Labour Government to introduce deep cuts in 
public expenditure, which affected the nationalised industries by the 
establishment of tough financial controls (Bertero 2002; Foremen Peck & 
Millward 1994; Heald 1980). This event leading to the publication in 1978 of a 
White Paper on nationalised industries that would be, then, fully implemented 
by the Conservatives (Harrison 1988). 
Argentina 
Driving-forces and rationales of privatisation 
As for the driving forces and rationales of privatisation in Argentina, most 
scholars agree that this policy was the outcome of the international pressure to 
favour external creditors and alleviate the fiscal deficit in the short-term 
(Azpiazu & Basualdo 1999; Azpiazu & Vispo 1994; Basualdo 2001,2006; 
Cifarelli 1999; Dinerstein 2001; Herrera 1992; Margheritis 1999; Rausch 1993; 
Thwaites Rey 1999; 2003). As Rausch puts it "the Argentinean privatisation 
policy has been fiscally driven and has also had a significant role in securing 
external debt as well as increasing its value in the secondary market ... 
improving relations with external creditors" (Rausch 1993: 171). It would be 
difficult to find a discordant voice on this issue within the academy. Indeed, it is 
this international constraint the most critical difference with UK. Consequently, it 
is impossible to find in the Argentinean literature the diversity of opinions about 
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the driving-forces and rationales of privatisation surnmarised for the British case 
in the previous section. 
Thus, within a context characterised by international conditioning, the 
Government launched between 1990 and 1993 a massive and fast privatisation 
programme, technically and financially assisted by the IMF, the WB, BIRF 
(Banco Intemacional de Reconstrucci6n y F6mento) and the IDB, in which debt 
capitalisation mechanisms were widely applied (Alexander & Corti 1993; 
Cifarelli 1999; S6nchez 1991). Over the implementation, the programme was 
backed by a World Bank's Public Enterprise Reform Adjustment Loan (PERAL) 
and a World Bank's Public Enterprise Execution Loan (PEEL); the former to 
finance lay-offs, early retirements and enterprise restructuring; the latter to 
finance technical assistance to develop tailor-made privatisation plans (usually 
provided by the WB itself) (Dinerstein 2001; Rausch 1993,1994; S6nchez Bajo 
2002). 
In four years, Argentina sold 34 companies and let concessions for 19 services 
and 86 areas for petroleum development. According to Alexander & Corti (1993) 
Argentine's privatisation program was one of the broadest and most rapid in the 
Western Hemisphere. By 1993 there had already been 280,509 jobs lost, with a 
cost to the state of 2.035 million dollars in 'voluntary redundancy' packages, 
which were financed with public resources and a PERAL. Most SOEs were 
undervalued and one-third of the amount collected by the Government for 
privatisations, around 18.000 million dollars, corresponded to debt-equity swaps 
(Azpiazu & Vispo 1994; Dinerstein 2001). 
As for the ESI, it underwent significant restructuring prior to privatisation in 
1993. It was split into a series of generation and distribution companies. The 
assets of the former were sold and the latter were given in concession. It was 
divided in several companies. Generation, considered a competitive activity, 
was broken up, into twenty-five business units that were sold' separately to 
private owners. The transmission considered a natural monopoly was given in 
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concession to only one company in a given area. There are twenty-two main 
distribution companies - most under provincial government jurisdiction. 
Distribution considered a natural monopoly as well, was given in concession to 
three largest distributors: EDENOR (Argentina, France and Spain), EDESUR 
(Argentina, Chile, USA) and EDELAP (USA and Argentina), which are largely 
the main companies in this sector. 
Yet, apologists for privatisation, without negating that the external conditioning 
was its crucial driving-force, have often restricted the analysis to either spurious 
comparisons between the public and the private sector or praiseworthy 
accounts of the efficiency gains of isolated privatised enterprises. For them, 
privatisation came to end the chronic incapacity of the state to run efficiently 
economic activities, enhancing in this manner the competitiveness of the 
economy as a whole. This is often shown by studies, whose starting point is the 
inefficiency, inflation and deficit of the public companies, something that they 
intend to prove by comparing the levels of productivity of the companies before 
and after privatisation. Thus, this type of analysis aims to provide support for the 
governmental decision and the political recommendations of the IMF and the 
WB by highlighting the micro-economic rationales of privatisation. 
Margheritis (1999) points also to the need for the government to legitimate the 
privatisation programme by underlining economic efficiency as a prime motive 
of privatisation. Nevertheless, she acknowledges that the real motives were 
gradually incorporated in the official discourse. Consequently, the end of the 
fiscal deficit, or the cancellation of the foreign debt, ended up as the explicit 
official rationales of the sale of public companies by means of a simple 
argument: to transform a source of debt into a source of income. Several 
scholars underline that the government also claimed, strongly, that given the 
lack of public funds and the economic crisis, it was impossible for the state to 
invest in technology to modernise the public services and state industries, and 
consequently, privatisation was presented as the only alternative to improve the 
provision of services and the national economic performance (Margheritis 1999; 
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Thwaites Rey 2003). Thwaites Rey (2003), in turn, has stressed that the 
privatisation programme was also a strategy to open new business 
opportunities to attract foreign investors, which would contribute to explain why 
consumers' interests were so crudely sacrificed for private profitability. But, all 
these arguments are often introduced to complement the main point: that the 
main driving-force towards privatisation was the external pressure in a context 
of acute fiscal deficit. 
As for public trade unions, they were blamed like in UK for maximising salaries 
and benefits for themselves, at the cost of service quality and economic 
efficiency, and more generally, the consumers. Indeed, the need to curb the 
power of public trade unions was a topic included in the agenda of public 
debates of that time. However, the economic crisis, which surrounded the 
implementation of the privatisation programme downplayed the importance of 
the anti-union side of privatisation. Rather, the government launched an open 
attack upon public unions to facilitate its implementation. In this sense, in 
Argentina, union power was a problem to be tackled prior to privatisation as to 
allow the success of the programme. Needless to add that later on, the 
subsequent and negative impact of this policy on unions' power was welcome 
by the government. 
Lastly, it may be worth mentioning that, if neither a proper rationale nor exactly 
a driving-force, the role of the hyperinflation spiral of 1989 is often stressed by 
the literature as an essential condition, for scholars from diverse perspectives 
agree that this crisis helped to overcome resistance within civil society, 
particularly that of trade unions (Dinerstein 2001; Duarte 2001; Hill & Abdala 
1993; Rausch 1993; Rofman & Romero 1997). This event brought forward the 
change of public authorities and paved the way for a wide programme of 
reforms in which privatisation was decisive. Trade unions found themselves 
suddenly trapped. The vast majority of trade unions were openly against 
privatisation, but they did not want to be blamed in front of the population for 
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being responsible of a new hyperinflation crisis, so that most unions declined to 
take industrial action. 
Conclusion 
By reviewing the literature, the chapter confirms the difference between the 
driving-forces and rationales of privatisation for DCs and LDCs. Besides, the 
character of pioneer of Britain amplifies the gap between both experiences. 
While the privatisation programme in UK evolved in a piecemeal, incremental 
way, in Argentina privatisation unfolded with astonishing speed. Moreover, while 
in the former the process was endogenously driven, in the latter, the exogenous 
constraints posed by international financial institutions were crucial. There were 
as well, important contextual differences, mainly, the deep economic crisis 
which conditioned the orientations of the political actors in Argentina, among 
them, the trade unions. 
For organised labour, these differences contributed to shape differently their 
respective opportunity structures. For British ESI unions, privatisation was a 
foreseeable event, and hence, to some extent, they prepared themselves for 
this possibility. When privatisation was finally announced the process took 
enough time as to allow unions to engage in campaigns and lobby. In 
Argentina, privatisation came as a great shock for LyF CF, whereas it was a 
foreseeable event for LyF MDP. This difference proved to have implications for 
their respective strategic choices as analysed in future chapters. 
Lastly, the opportunities for Argentinean trade unions to oppose the programme 
of privatisation was limited by the role played by international financial 
institutions, which exercised all sort of pressures upon the national government 
in the midst of an acute economic crisis, and provided resources and technical 
assistance to implement the recommended policy. 
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Chapter 6 
Comparative Industrial Relations and Mobilisation Theory: 
Trade Union (Re-)Sources of Power in UK and Argentina 
Industrial relations institutions are in themselves shaping forces of the 
opportunity structure, for they have a determining effect on trade unions' (re- 
)sources of power, in both, their political and industrial dimensions. Their 
comparative study highlights variations, which may influence in different ways 
the forms of counter-mobilisation and workers collective action. 
The origins and the underpinnings of the Argentinean and the British systems of 
industrial relations differ deeply. Voluntary regulation instead of legal regulation 
has been the main historical feature of the British system, whereas the opposite 
has been the case in Argentina. This basic divergence has had wider effects, 
especially, upon the workings of collective bargaining, the degree of trade 
unions' political exchange with Governments and employers, and obviously, the 
character of law as a power resource. Consequently, in each system, the 
political and industrial dimensions of trade unions' (re-)sources of power have 
tended to correlate differently. Thus, it is possible to argue that, broadly 
speaking, industrial (re-)sources of power brought trade unions political 
influence in UK, whereas political (re-)sources cemented workplace 
organisation and industrial strength in Argentina. To put it differently, while in 
UK the industrial mobilisation of workers was the key power resource to sit 
employers at the negotiating table, in Argentina the political mobilisation of 
workers was crucial to obtain bargaining legal rights in order to overcome 
alienation and repression at workplace level. However, in both countries, the 
underlying basis of union power in the ESI relates to the political contingency, 
which pervades the public sector - Government concern with smooth supply, 
bureaucratic regulation stimulating micro-political exchange, statutory 
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responsibilities on the ESI to be a 'good employee and so forth. In short, the 
aforementioned difference is less important when studying the specifics of ESI, 
though still meaningful as a determinant of the relationships as a whole 
between the labour movement, the capitalists and the state, that is, the general 
framework in which ESI trade unions operated over the privatisation. 
This chapter aims to analyse similarities and divergences regarding how trade 
unions have combined industrial and political (re-)sources of power in UK and 
Argentina, insofar as this combination relates to patterns of allocation of power 
resources. Five areas will be briefly examined: the basic foundations and 
features of both systems, their effects upon the dynamics of political exchange, 
ESI industrial relations institutions, trade union organisation, and finally, the 
neo-liberal offensive against labour, mainly, the legal aspects that framed the 
context in which privatisation took place. All these areas provide useful insights 
about the intermediate variables, which shape the empirical manifestation of the 
categories opportunity-to-act, organisation and interest definition. 
The chapter starts by looking at the British case; then, Argentina is considered. 
United Kingdom 
The voluntary system 
There has never been in Britain a corpus of positive legal rights for trade union 
activities and collective bargaining. This legal void has constituted the core of 
the voluntary system. Trade unions early enjoyed a range of industrial relations 
'immunities' that allowed them to strike and organise workers without the risk of 
being prosecuted according to common law (Dickens & Hall 1995,2003; Hyman 
2003; Lewis 1986). As there was not any enforceable collective agreement and 
unions were never agents of their members according to the British law, it was 
workers deployment of industrial collective strength what forced employers to 
deal with trade unions; opposite interests were to be reconciled by compromise 
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and accommodation in voluntary agreements (Hyman 2003). Concurrently, 
employers had no obligation to deal with or to recognise unions aside from a 
brief and unhappy experience with statutory trade union recognition in the 
1970s. It is also often noted that extension mechanisms were weak in the UK, 
meaning that agreements tended to be observed only in workplaces formally 
covered by them. In the absence of instruments of this kind, union strength has 
depended almost exclusively on organisation, that is, union density and the 
capacity to mobilise workforces. When density and mobilisation dropped, so did 
the disposition of employers/governments to deal with unions seriously. 
In this framework, while from trade unions' point of view, the role of law was to 
prevent hostile action by employers through courts, or a second best 
alternative, when failing to secure basic standards, it has always been a power 
resource for employers to be mobilised against employees and against unions. 
Besides, the principles of contract that underpin employment law do little to 
address the fundamental imbalance of power in the employment relationship. 
The latter rested upon either strong workplace structures or, mainly in the public 
sector, well developed industrial negotiating machineries, favoured by the 
Keynesian orientation of public policies in the period after the 11 World War. 
In short, labour legislation has a comparatively much weaker influence than in 
other countries, and governments assumed, usually, the role of providing 
assistance to collective bargainers. Within this context, although the attractions 
of the voluntary system diminished for trade unions during 1970s, when this 
orthodoxy began to break down as manifested in changed strategies around 
health and safety at work and lobbying for the national minimum wage (Terry 
2000), free agreements together with informal systems of workplace 
negotiations were the bases of social regulation. 
This is in striking contrast with other systems like that of Argentina. It entails two 
important consequences: an ambiguous unions' orientation to political action, 
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and the chance to restrict the right to take industrial action by redefining 
immunities, and by this mean, to distort a crucial source of union power. 
Trade unions, politics and the public sector In UK 
The voluntary system developed in parallel with a shared anti-interventionist 
understanding of the main actors: employers, trade unions, and Governments. 
Crouch (1979) stresses the general acceptance by the political parties that 
industrial relations should be taken out from political controversy. And although, 
state ownership was a long term political and industrial objective for unions, 
they attempted to channel it through the Labour Party, and prevented 
corporatist biases by supporting Morrison formula of no organised interest 
representation on public corporation boards (Cole 1953; Pendleton & Winterton 
1993). Moreover, whether trade unions have exercised political influence 
through the Labour Party, the relationship between unions and Labour has been 
characterised by a demarcation of functions, which ultimately meant that unions 
rarely have attempted "to interfere with the autonomy of the parliamentary 
leadership in determining general party policy" (Hyman 1994a: 41). 
Still, the dynamics of the Keynesian supply policies, adopted by both 
Conservatives and Labour administrations, increasingly triggered trade unions 
incorporation into decision making, particularly from late 1960s, through 
consultation and tripartite agencies (Marsh 1992; McIlroy 1995; Crouch 1994, 
2003). There have been controversies surrounding the degree of this corporatist 
tendency (Middlemas 1991; McIlroy 1995). Yet, it seems safe to conclude that 
even at its height, the main characteristic of industrial relations in Britain as a 
whole continued to be the low political profile of organised interests, especially, 
on the labour side (Crouch 2003). 
In the public sector, in turn, the tradition of voluntarism and Keynesianism 
united to bring about highly centralised and formal machineries of negotiation 
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and consultation, in accordance to the Whitley philosophy of the post-war 
Labour government's policy towar ds industrial relations (Pendleton & Winterton 
1993). Thus, public ownership allotted unions a specific political lever, as well. 
Two main aspects should be stressed: first, the weak exposure to market forces 
of the public sector, and the rigid procedures and regulations, set the conditions 
for a micro-political exchange at industrial level, which permitted managers to 
fulfil Ministerial objectives, and trade unions to shape decisions and obtain 
benefits for workers. Second, until 1979, at least, unions took advantage in the 
public sector from the sate tradition of 'good employer'. 
Thus, post-war Keynesianism and its commitment to full employment and stable 
product markets helped workers to strengthen their organisations and collective 
bargaining overall. Additionally, the general context of compromise allowed in 
public services that workers benefited from the high level of service provision 
and public spending stemming from the development of a welfare state, 
demand-side policies, and 'good employer' policies, which contributed to 
develop powerful trade unions and centralised machineries of industrial 
relations in the nationalised industries (Crouch 2003; Ferner & Collins 1993a). 
Then, as a whole, the meaning of the post-war settlement for trade unions was 
not as much the benefits of a new level of political exchange as the growth and 
consolidation of their industrial strength; but in the particular case of the public 
sector, it entailed the development of a system of industrial relations, in which 
political contingency and statutory provision meant that unions enjoyed 
comparatively more power resources stemming also from micro-political 
exchange than their private sector counterparts. 
Industrial relations in ESI 
In ESI, trade unions took advantages not only from the peculiarities of the public 
sector but also from the governmental concern with keeping the smooth 
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provision of electricity supply and balancing public expenditures, which coloured 
the political context in which industrial relations developed, though, with 
contradictory effects (Ferner & Coiling 1993a). In this context, unions profited 
from the prevalence of securing supply when these two trends tended to clash. 
Indeed, the nature of electricity supply meant an additional source of union 
power, as conventionally, employee power is seen as enhanced where the 
product is complex and/or perishable and has strategic importance, as in 
electricity par excellence. 
Thus, a far cry from the private sector, the government, through the 1947 and 
1957 Acts, placed on the corporation, as it did with other nationalised industries, 
"a legal obligation to consult and bargain with trade unions" (Wedderburn 1986: 
278) - though some negotiating bodies pre-dated nationalisation (Hannah 
1979). This implied the chance for unions to mobilise statutory resources to 
secure certain procedural aims. But, still union density played a crucial role 
within the industry. 
The negotiating machinery operated at three levels via four specific bodies for 
manual, white-collar, engineer/technical, and managerial staff. While EPEA 
monopolised the representation of engineers at the National Joint Board (NJB), 
several unions disputed the representation of the other bodies; however, before 
privatisation, EETPU and NALGO were the strongest organisations for, 
respectively, manual (National Joint Industrial Council - NJIC) and white-collar 
(National Joint Council - NJC) staff (Ferner & Colling 1993a). 
The machinery assured the power of the full-time national officers, who carried 
out detailed and extensive negotiations of terms and conditions at national level, 
but also assured close relationships between management and unions at all 
levels (Coiling & Ferner 1993a, 1993b). Consultation was kept at three levels 
too, but in joint bodies reuniting all trade unions, and often comprising lengthy 
and extensive processes. These central negotiations and consultations were 
complemented, when appropriate, by arrangements outside the formal 
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machinery, mainly, in the Area Boards, as far as they did not threat central 
authority (Hannah 1982). The strong institutionalisation of industrial relations 
was a vital power resource for trade unions, for it allowed their involvement in 
the running of the industry through consultation and negotiation, and the formal 
procedures of remitting problems and disagreements up to the national levels 
inhibited managerial prerogatives (Ferner & Coiling 1993a). 
Lastly, both management and trade unions, benefited from two essential 
features brought about by this institutional settlement: the low level of conflict 
accompanying the modernisation of the industry, and the neutralisation of 
workplace activism. From the point of view of union leadership, these outcomes 
were functional to keep internal threats to a minimum. 
In brief, not only their industrial strength but also the weak presence of market 
discipline, the negotiating machinery, and the micro-political exchange at the 
industrial level, were major power (re-)sources for ESI unions. 
Trade union organisation in ESI 
In UK several trade unions can operate in one workplace or industry, and this is 
a fundamental difference with the Argentinean system, in which there is a legal 
monopoly of representation. British multi-unionism is often associated to trends 
towards fragmentation and inter-union competition (Davidson 1993; Ogden 
1991,1993). This is suggestive, for mobilisation theory finds in competition a 
negative factor for workers mobilisation. Additionally, multi-unionism implies 
likely differentials in bargaining power among the unions, stemming from the 
role occupied within the labour process by their constituencies. EPEA is the 
case in point in ESI. By organising the engineers and technical staff, the 
organisation benefited from the strategic role of their membership in running the 
power stations, transmission network, and distribution systems; in their hands 
rested the capacity to bring the industry to a halt. 
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As well, unions in ESI organise workers across a wide range of economic 
activities, which results in heterogeneous constituencies, with the partial 
exception of EPEA (Turnbull & Blyton 2004; Waddington 2003). This 
heterogeneity is also important for mobilisation theory as far as interest 
definition and organisational resources are concerned. Recent mergers have 
accentuated this feature. All the cases under study, EETPU, NALGO and 
EPEA, have experienced mergers and amalgamations since privatisation as 
shown in Table 1 (see pages 46-7). In an effort to cope YAth this organisational 
fragmentation, ESI unions established an umbrella organisation, ESTUC 
(Electricity Supply Trade Union Council), which, at the time, led the anti- 
privatisation campaign, the negotiations to modify the Privatisation Bill, and the 
subsequent contacts with the government. But, ESTUC had no constitutional 
power to direct the organising objectives of individual unions, being primarily a 
mechanism for consulting autonomous unions about joint responses to 
employers, at the Electricity Association, and to the government. 
The neo-liberal turn: Thatcherism and the legal offensive 
The macro-economic meaning of Thatcherism was the replacement of 
Keynesianism for a neo-liberal agenda devoted to restore centrality to market 
forces. In this view, by definition, organised labour hampers market dynamics 
by demanding more than the market can afford. Therefore. to curb the power of 
trade unions and reduce to a minimum neo-corporatist forms of stability were 
among conservative political priorities (Crouch 2003). 
Thus, macro-economic political exchange through tripartite bodies was, 
gradually, abolished. Additionally, there was a clear change in state attitudes as 
employer, which stopped its 'good industrial relations' commitment. In its new 
exemplar role, the aim was to encourage employers to recover the managerial 
initiative and pursue flexibility whether at the labour market or the firm level. 
Lastly, the government restraint its support to collective bargaining, and 
especially, encouraged the dismantling of multiýemployer and national 
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arrangements (Crouch 2003; Marsh 1992). Although the coverage of bargaining 
was not dramatically affected, it scope and content changed: a focus on pay 
began to prevail, together with productivity or flexibility deals in return for higher 
wages. 
Labour law played a decisive role in this crusade. A piecemeal legislative 
programme (seven major acts and legislation dealing with specific issues), 
altered the environment of industrial relations interactions, by attacking the 
voluntary system, but without replacing it with legal regulation. Its main thrust 
was to weaken trade union's power, encourage individualism, and enhance 
employer prerogatives (Dickens & Hall 1995,2003; Wedderburn 1986). Two 
aspects of the legislation are of particular interest: the restriction of industrial 
action and the introduction of statutory regulation of trade unions internal affairs. 
Concerning the former, Dickens and Hall (1995) pointed out five different 
strategies: restriction of immunities with regard to particular types of industrial 
action, redefinition of the notion of a trade dispute, introduction of secret ballots 
to enable immunity for industrial action, make unions liable of unlawful industrial 
action, and enlargement of the range of potential litigants as to allow even 
unions members or citizens (deprived of goods or services) to go to court. 
Although, the extent of the practical outcomes of the legislation is arguable, as it 
often operates together with other factors such as, for instance, the business 
cycle or changing class composition, it seems to be little disagreement about its 
overall negative consequences (Gall & McKay 1996; Gennard 1997; Kelly 1998; 
Mcllroy 1999). Generally, the deterrent effects of the employment law were 
associated to the decline of any kind of solidarity action, the educative role of 
certain large and well-documented strike defeats in which labour law was 
applied, and the cautious attitudes of union officials due to "an atmosphere of 
self-imposed restrainf' (Gall & McKay 1996). Moreover, action against 
privatisation was prohibited, for it would be deemed politically motivated, for 
although connected with, it is not wholly, or mainly, about conditions of 
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employment (Mcllroy 1999). Unions' near universal compliance with legislation 
when taking industrial action renders the legal prosecutions even more 
meaningful. They have shown that employers are able, by arguing breaches of 
technicalities, to "reiterate the limits of permissible industrial action; keep unions 
under pressure; engage the energies of officers and officials; divert attention 
from organising effective action; and, where injunctions are granted, dislocate it" 
(Mcllroy 1999: 528-29). The links between changes in legislation with 
mobilisation theory, particularly, its "positive relationship with counter 
mobilisation", have been explicitly highlighted by Mcllroy (1999: 532): "It can 
enhance caution and conservatism and dislocate the processes of mobilisation 
by maximising uncertainty, delay and division'. 
With regard to the regulation of trade unions internal affairs, the aim of the 
legislation was to discourage collectivist behaviour and solidarity and 
disseminate a conception of trade unions as a mere aggregate of individuals 
(Dickens & Hall 1995). Members rights vis-6-vis the trade union organisations, 
were enhanced; but the main area of reform was the gradual implementation of 
fully postal and independently scrutinised ballots to elect union executive 
committees, and presidents and general secretaries, if they had voting rights in 
decision-making. Thus, these reforms, plus the industrial ballots, favoured the 
equalisation of democracy with individual balloting, and changed the character 
of union internal democracy at the expense of participative forms (Dickens & 
Hall 1995; Waddington 2003). These changes were relevant regarding the 
dynamics of leadership and decision-making of the different organisations. 
Particularly, Thatcherism affected the framework of IR within the public sector, 
by implementing financial constraints on the nationalised industries, promoting 
decentralisation, reforming collective bargaining machineries and encouraging a 
more confrontational management style ftmer 1989). 
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Argentina 
The weight of the law in collective bargaining 
Industrial relations institutions in Argentina present a contrasting development. 
The privatisation programme of 1990s faced a system of industrial relations laid 
down in 1940s, in which the law set the mechanism of collective agreements 
and unions compete legally to obtain workers representation. 
The juridification of industrial relations began when Per6n was in charge of the 
Secretary of Labour of the Military Government of 1943-46, and continued over 
his democratic Presidencies (1946-55). Previously, the State seldom 
participated as mediator when conflicts disrupted the few voluntary collective 
agreements between employers and unions, which existed at the time. In 1945, 
the State sanctioned a Labour Law, which regulated trade unions' 
representation by recognising just one organisation able to collectively bargain 
agreements and represent workers, at the workplace or courts, per each 
industrial sector - or economic activity, either nationally or regionally (personerla 
gremiao. In most cases, when there is a regional fragmentation of the 
representation, a national federation gathers the regional or local unions to 
bargain agreements on behalf of them. Until mid-1990s, the main level of 
bargaining had been national, reinforcing in this manner the centralisation of the 
whole system of industrial relations - and generally, comprising whole 
industries or economic activities (Bunel 1991; Gonz6lez 2001; Novick 2000, 
2001). Though rare, some occupational groups have their own organisation. 
White-collar workers are usually organised together with blue-collar. Yet, in 
occasions, upper professional or technical grades may have a separate 
organisation. Extension mechanisms have secured that unions could operate 
with low membership levels; yet, union density was unevenly but usually high in 
key sectors and in the state industries. 
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From the beginning, in every case, the personerla gremial has been given by 
the Ministry of Labour. Consequently, a breach of law, or a Ministerial 
arbitration, has often put trade unions at risk of losing their personerfa gremial. 
In 1946 a national Law (upon a former Decree of 1944) established that public 
authorities had to be present and participate in any collective agreement. it 
empowered, even more, public authorities by legislating arbitration procedures. 
In 1953, a more liberal Law formally recognised the autonomy of unions and 
employers, but two key prerogatives of the Ministry of Labour remained: the 
final approval of the legal status of any agreement (homologaci6n) and the right 
to suggest modifications, or reject, an agreement. In this sense, any agreement 
has always been just a project presented by unions and employers to the public 
authorities. Hence, employers and unions usually ask for official advice when 
they face an issue that might cause its rejection. In 1958, the Minister obtained 
by law the right to force conflicting parts to accept the mediation of public 
authorities (concifiaci6n obligatoria). Over this period, trade unions cannot take 
industrial action of any type, and employers should desist to implement 
decisions, which have led to conflict. For instance. if the employer dismissed 
workers, they ought to be reinstated until the official resolution of the conflict. 
When parties ask the Ministry of Labour for conciliation, the authorities decide 
whether or not to apply it; thus, trade unions have no guarantee of getting a 
conciliaci6n obligatoria to fight back dismissals or other unfavourable situations. 
Due to frequent coups d6tat, the right to bargain was often distorted since 
1955. Yet, the collective agreements shaped the field of industrial relations 
because of a legal disposition by which any agreement remains in place until it 
is formally replaced or repeal (ultra-actividad). 
In sum, up to the 1990s, the bargaining process was centralised, theoretically 
periodic, and heavily dependent on the State. The basic foundation was the 
collective agreement, together with the ability of the union to make employers 
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respect it. Given the features of the system, law and political influence 
intertwined, and became contentious power resources. 
Trade unions, politics and the public sector in Argentina 
Several factors explain the comparatively bigger political involvement of trade 
unions in Argentina, and the development of often unstable forms of 
corporatism and tripartite institutions. 
To some extent, it was embedded in the origins and characteristics of the 
system succinctly described. The role of the State as its promoter and 
guarantor, its direct participation in collective bargaining, and its power to 
weaken or strengthen trade unions through administrative and legal 
prerogatives, rendered political influence within the state a (re-)source of power 
of vital importance. Besides, this institutional design was a component in a 
wider political project to industrialise the country by applying an import- 
substitution model. Most sections of the trade union movement enrolled in this 
project led by the Peronism in mid-1940s, obtaining labour laws, benefits and 
organisational power, unthinkable just a few years earlier, but through political 
rather. than industrial mobilisation. 
Additionally, within this politicised environment, the structure and dynamics of 
collective bargaining meant that unions, employers and governments, agreed 
not only on industrial and productive matters but also on industrial 
macroeconomic policies. Indeed, beyond industrial negotiations, unions aimed 
to influence national economic policy to meet their demands concerning wages 
and levels of employment. Thus, trade unions pressured public authorities as 
much as they pressured capitalists; and frequently, capitalists and trade unions 
jointly pressured governments for industrial policies for the economic sector. 
And typical of Keynesian macroeconomic management, governments needed 
unions to concert industrial peace and social pacts. 
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Finally, due to the constant instability of Argentinean democracy and the 
political proscription of Peronism between 1955 and 1973, trade unions, usually 
through the Central General de Trabajadores (CGT), fulfilled a political role. 
Every government, democratic or military, was forced to negotiate with the CGT 
(or repress it). It has been a common practice that unions with similar political 
orientations gather together in temporary alliances (nucleamientos sindicales). 
These alliances express their support or opposition to governments, seek 
representation in tripartite bodies, dispute the internal alignments of the Peronist 
Party (Partido Justicialista - PJ), and struggle for the leadership of the CGT. 
Within this framework, national strikes played an important role as 
manifestations of political strength. 
As in Britain, unions enjoyed in the nationalised industries specific (re-)sources 
of power, which sterned from the nature of public ownership: the weak exposure 
to market forces of the public sector, high levels of employment, political 
influence, and so forth (Goldin 1997). 
In short, different factors explain the political involvement of trade unions; any 
account ought to incorporate as a vital variable the politicised history and 
features of the system of industrial relations in Argentina, which goes well 
beyond the peculiarities of the public sector activities. 
Industrial relations in ESI 
ESI industrial relations, at the time of privatisation, were partially shaped upon 
the basis set by the collective agreements (CCT) of 1975, in itself, outcomes of 
trade union political mobilisation. A brief historical detour is needed to put the 
case into perspective. 
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From 1964 to 1976, dealing with all, semi-democratic, military and democratic 
governments, ESI unions gradually increased their participation in the running 
of the public enterprises. First, Workers Directors were appointed, then, LyF CF 
the biggest ESI union obtained co-management rights by law for the enterprise 
SEGBA, and lastly, a former General Secretary of LyF CF was assigned as the 
president of the company. It is within this highly politicised environment that the 
CCT 76/75 was negotiated, and ended up as a symbol of the peak of trade 
unions' influence in ESI. In 1976 a new coup 66tat smashed the experience, 
suspended the collective agreement, and fired 265 workers, mainly trade union 
officers, lay representatives and activists (among them the ex-president of the 
enterprise). Between October 1976 and February 1977, a wave of industrial 
action launched by LyF CF to force the Military Government to resume the 
practice of political exchange, ended with the physical disappearance of a group 
of leaders, including the General Secretary of the union, and 570 more 
dismissals. 
Thus, once in democracy, the CCT was renegotiated, most terms and 
conditions of employment recognised, but co-management rights removed. 
Although, the trade union did not recover the degree of control it had, it still 
exerted a great influence in every aspect related to organisation and allocation 
of work, employment levels and recruitment, training and career development, 
and managed to maintain virtually complete job stability. 
In the case of LyF IVIDP, the axis of the industrial relations was the CCT 36/75 
another highly protected agreement, dealt in the same year by the national 
federation, FATLyF, on behalf of the 14 unions, which organised workers in the 
company Agua y Energfa E16ctrica on regional basis. Terms and conditions of 
employment were similar to those negotiated by LyF CF, the leading union of 
the national federation, but LyF MDP did not enjoyed co-management rights, as 
the latter were achieved in SEGBA by Law - no by a CCT. The CCT 36/75 was 
also suspended by the Dictatorship; it was recovered untouched by the union 
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during 1980s. It was the CCT in place at the time of privatisation of the 
company. 
The institutional structures of the system of industrial relations in ESI at the time 
of privatisation were rather simple from the beginning. The cornerstone was the 
CCT bargained in a Ministerial commission (Comisi6n Paritaria) integrated by 
public authorities, employers and union officials. Lay representatives 
(delegados) bear the responsibility at workplace level, to watch out that the 
employers do not breach the agreement. If this level fails, lay reps may call a 
union officer, and if still no solution is reached, a formal claim is submitted to the 
most appropriate of four commissions: terms and conditions of employment, 
safety, training and fringe benefits. The next step should be to elevate the claim 
to an ad-hoc commission (Comisi6n de Resolutiva de Reclamaciones), chaired 
by a Ministerial authority with power to deliver a final decision. The conflicting 
parts can appeal to the Ministry of Labour. 
These commissions were also the place where ordinary consultation was 
handled. Most important matters often involved officers in face-to-face 
negotiations, for the system gave room to regular and informal contacts with 
managers, which was an essential component of the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts and additional mechanism of micro-political exchange. In fact, these 
contacts permeated the whole structures. Although, the system was highly 
centralised, it depended on the ability of elected lay reps to make the 
agreement work. Mass dismissals and repression over the dictatorship explain, 
in part, why the union could not apply the agreement in its whole extension 
during 1980s, which led, in turn, to a deterioration of the industrial relations 
expressed in an increase, though still within moderate boundaries, of industrial 
action. 
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Trade union organisation in ESI 
In contrast to UK, trade union organisation in Argentina rests on a legal 
monopoly of representation and bargaining rights (personerla gremiao. Any 
organisation of workers can apply for public recognition providing it presents its 
internal books and other information to labour authorities. But, to replace a 
union with personeria gremial, the competing organisation must demonstrate 
that it has had during six month, at least 10 % more members than the other 
union. However, an organisation, without negotiating rights and without health 
cover institutions (obras sociales), has minimal chances to affiliate workers. The 
obras sociales are, perhaps, the most salient feature of Argentinean trade 
unions. They were created by the end of 1950s and the beginning of 1960s by 
means of collective agreements with employers. Both sides contribute to 
finance the obras sociales, but only the trade union run the administration. In 
1970, a Law compelled employers and unions to create obras sociales, not only 
for union members and their families, but also for workers of the same sector, 
as far as they contribute to their financial support. Thus, a worker could 
contribute to the obra social without being a trade union member. In any case, 
however, the worker contributed to the financial strength of the trade union. This 
somehow compensates the union against free riders as collective bargaining 
cover members and non-members. Thus, obras sociales, one of the pillars of 
the country health system, became a source of power and an axis of political 
exchange. 
Until privatisation, regional electricity unions (44 organisations in total for the 
whole country) were part of a FATLyF, a federative body. This body was 
dominated by LyF CF, the bigger ESI unions in the country. FATLyF managed 
the obra social for all electricity workers and offered other social benefits like 
housing building and tourism. All its members were organisations of blue and 
white-collar workers, with exclusive rights of representation (personeria gremiao 
over a particular geographical area. In companies like Agua y Energla E16ctrica, 
DEBA and later on ESEBA, which extended their operations over huge 
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territories, several trade unions had bargaining rights for certain regions. Thus, 
FATLyF represented all of them in a single negotiating table to secure a united 
front and keep homogeneity in terms and conditions. Indeed, the agreement 
CCT 36/75 closed by FATLyF set terms and conditions nationally, except for 
Capital Federal and Great Buenos Aires where LyF CF signed its own, the CCT 
76/75 for the public company, SEGBA. 
By contrast with UK, due to the system of personerla gremial, there was no 
room for inter-union competition in the ESI in Argentina, though political 
disputes between factions within FATLyF were common. Privatisation came to 
exacerbate the latter. 
The neo-liberal turn: Menemism and the legal offensive 
The neo-liberal offensive was, like in Britain, backed by a legal attack against 
individual labour rights and trade unions. However, unlike Britain, a group of 
unions exercised pressure on the Peronist Government, which had been 
elected with unions' support, and engaged in a political exchange, with dubious 
results for the file-and-rank, but important financial rewards for the organisation. 
Thus, in its first governmental term (1989-95), only 8 out of 20 legislative 
projects to reform labour laws were passed in the Parliament. Over this period, 
Peronist MPs, with union's backgrounds, blocked in a Labour Law Commission 
any legislative attempt to decentralise the collective bargaining and make labour 
contracts flexible. Only after 1994, when a corporative pact was agreed, these 
MPs stopped blocking the projects. All along, to introduce change, the 
government was forced to give in exchange protection and financial support to 
the obras sociales, and permitted unions to invest in the new business 
opportunities brought about with the privatisation and deregulation of the health 
system, pensions, ESOPs, insurance for labour accidents, and the privatisation 
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of public enterprises. As it will be shown later, this form of mobilisation of 
political resources is critical to understand LyF CF's response to privatisation. 
However, in the face of opposition, the state also exploited, in key conjunctures, 
its faculty to issue anti-union Decrees and repress unions. Accordingly, the right 
to strike in public services and utilities was restricted in 1990, in the midst of a 
wave of industrial action against the privatisation of railways and 
communications. The strikes were declared illegal, unions' personerla gremial 
and check-off arrangements were suspended, military forces were mobilised to 
run the services, leaders were threaten with penal prosecution, and more than 
400 workers were sacked. In 1991, in the context of the Convertibility Plan (by 
which the Argentinean peso was pegged to the value of dollar by law), the 
government decided to cut off wage increases to prevent a new inflationary 
crisis, and issued a decree linking rises in wages to productivity growth. Unions 
opposed this decision arguing that it limited actors' autonomy in collective 
bargaining but its consequences were much deeper. The Decree impacted on 
the whole structure of collective bargaining by forcing unions to deal over wages 
at firm level, to take into account differentials in productivity between 
companies. Besides, it constrained corporative strategies by precluding 
demands for governmental wage polices. Thus, trade unions were obliged to 
discuss together with employers how to increase productivity and concede 
changes in the labour process that they were previously resisting. Nevertheless, 
trade unions succeed in , 
keeping a centralised bargaining process by 
articulating sectoral and local negotiations. Hence, in 1993, another decree 
instituted bargaining at enterprise level; during 1995-2000,90 % of collective 
agreements were of that kind. Consequently, national collective bargaining in 
the private sector ended. 
Finally, there was the specific utilisation of law and decrees to bring change to 
public industrial relations and break public trade unions' capacity to obstruct the 
managerial decisions of the future private owners. This move was an essential 
part of the pre-privatisation period, with full involvement of a horde of 
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consultants paid with WB loans, who were personally involved in negotiations 
with managers, trade union officers, and authorities from the Ministry of Labour, 
the Ministry of Economy and the WB (Daireaux et al. 1990; CampaAo & Caruso 
1991; Campaho et al. 1991). It entailed the suspension of 718 clauses from 
collective agreements previously closed by trade unions with 13 public 
enterprises (Daireaux et al. 1990). The legal foundations were two laws passed 
immediately after the election of the Peronist Government, to deal with the 
economic emergency signalled by the hyperinflation peak, and to begin the neo- 
liberal reform of the state. But this aspect will be analysed in detailed 
elsewhere, for it will help to grasp, on the one side, the centrality of law in 
Argentinean industrial relations as a political power (re-)source, and on the 
other side, the participation of international agencies in the counter mobilisation 
process. 
Conclusion 
The comparison confirms the assumption that constituted the thread of this 
chapter: the divergence of the systems of industrial relations of these countries 
correlates with different patterns of trade union power. Although in both cases 
industrial and political (re-)sources of power are intertwined, the axis, upon 
which the trade unions movements from Britain and Argentina have traditionally 
built their respective strength, differs. In the former, industrial resources prevail; 
in the latter, political resources are paramount. However, when turning to ESI, 
industry and ownership effects bring similarities: a crucial economic activity 
grants unions' industrial power; the political environment of public enterprises 
assures them a degree of political influence. 
But differences remain, and from the point of view of the mobilisation theory, 
have consequences for the opportunity structure, and the forms taken by the 
process of counter-mobilisation and trade unions' responses to it. 
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It has been argued that the opportunity for trade unions to engage in political 
exchange with governments varies. While political influence is likely to be an 
enduring possibility for ESI trade unions in Argentina in democratic periods, it is 
less so in UK, where the chance to mobilise political resources seems to be 
lesser. For British trade unions, the fate of the opportunity structure appears to 
be associated, mostly, to industrial dynamics and managerial policies. Finally, 
as stressed in the conceptual framework of the research, Tilly (1978) finds in 
competition a debilitating factor for the opportunity structure of subordinate 
groups; British system seems particularly vulnerable to this circumstance. 
McIlroy (1999) has remarked the positive relationship in UK between legislation 
and counter-mobilisation. This chapter has shown that the Argentinean system 
of industrial relations amplified this connection. In UK, though important to 
frame the context of industrial relations interactions, neutralise threats of 
industrial action and laid down the general structure of the industry, legislation 
was an important but still secondary aspect of the process of counter- 
mobilisation in ESI. As it shall be shown, the truth of the latter seems to have 
lain in the industrial restructuring that followed privatisation. In Argentina, given 
the legal underpinnings of trade union power, counter-mobilisation primarily 
took a legal form in the run-up of ESI privatisation, which paved the way for 
further industrial restructurings. Legislation was crucial for privatisation success. 
Trade unions' responses depend on contextual conditions, and a main 
determinant of them is the system of industrial relations. In Argentina, the 
aforementioned centrality of legislation, which impinged on the counter- 
mobilisation itself, renders law a contentious resource. Hardly ever an important 
event of workers mobilisation is exempted of legal sides. Workers mobilisation 
manifests in this country, always simultaneously, in the streets, in the 
workplace, and in courts. Likely, the system gives room for political exchange; 
therefore, unions often mount political strategies to confront industrial troubles. 
In UK, these responses are unusual. Unions prefer to concentrate in 
strengthening their industrial resources. The structures, contents and strategies 
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of industrial negotiation and consultation, together with the level of membership, 
override union policy thinking. But other variables such as organisation, 
leadership, and decision-making, play a determining role on how these 
resources are combined and in which direction. For instance, political influence 
in Argentina is to be found as an outcome of either union cooperation with 
privatisation and the reform of labour institutions, or coalitions building to halt 
the privatisation programme and back industrial action. In UK, industrial 
resources will be pursued either within the framework of partnership 
agreements or by organising strategies. If these orientations differ politically, the 
kinds of resources they aspire to build are of a similar nature; for example, 
recruiting is paramount in both. 
To sum up, this chapter discussed, from the point of view of mobilisation theory, 
differences and similarities regarding trade unions' (re-)sources of power, which 
stem from the divergent natures of the British and the Argentinean systems of 
industrial relations, and from the political contingency associated to the 
management of public industries. In the following chapters, it will be necessary 
to bear these themes in mind, as they will recur when analysing the empirical 
findings of the research. 
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Chapter 7 
The Anti -p rivatisati on Campaigns in the Light of Mobilisation 
Theory 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the relevance of mobilisation theory for the 
understanding of the forms taken by trade unions' initial responses to 
privatisation. According to the analytical sequence laid down in the theoretical 
framework, the chapter focuses on the opportunity-to-act - or opportunity 
structure. This category, especially in a comparative perspective, requires 
detailed examination of the contextual variables that conditions the exercise of 
trade union power. In the realm of industrial relations, the opportunity structure 
is understood to be empirically determined by the general balance of forces 
between contenders, not only at political but also at industrial level (Kelly 1998: 
37), for by definition, state and capital counter-mobilisation is both a political 
and industrial process, and then, it is necessary to approach both dimensions. 
Although, there is considerable interaction between both levels, the starting 
point of a privatisation programme is, by and large, politically determined, and 
depends on the ability of governments to change power relations at the political 
level, before they are manifest in the industrial domain. Thus, though judgments 
about political priorities may turn on evaluation of the industrial position given 
that both spheres are mutually reinforcing, it may be argued that the crucial 
factors shaping the opportunity-to-act in the run-up of a privatisation programme 
are political. If this is true, the analysis of power relations and the power (re- 
)sources of the contenders should express this predominance. 
Objective changes in the opportunity-to-act, however, cannot explain by 
themselves the strategic choices of the actors (Farinetti 2002). The latter 
depends on how the opportunity structure is subjectively processed. In this 
regard, the combination of certain organisational aspects and certain leadership 
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styles are thought to be vital social mediations for workers to collectively define 
a set of demands and strategies to face opponents and act back upon the 
opportunity structure itself. Thus, a brief evaluation of appropriate data 
regarding workers' organisations and union leaderships will follow. This should 
contribute to deepen the understanding of trade unions' defensive responses. 
The analysis approaches, first, UK, and then, Argentina. In the former, ESI 
unions launched a single anti-privatisation campaign, which constitutes the 
focus of the analysis. In the latter, instead, it is necessary to separate the cases 
of LyF CF and LyF IVIDP as each union confronted with different companies, 
different branches of the state and their strategic choices differed radically. In 
every case, it is offered, first, a brief sketch of trade unions' initial response to 
privatisation. Then, the category opportunity-to-act is considered by evaluating 
power relations and trade unions (re-)sources of power. This analysis is carried 
out according to the theoretical framework laid down in Chapter 2. It integrates 
two different approaches. On the one side, it follows Lukes (2005) to discuss 
power in relational terms. It may be worth reminding it as it will be applied in the 
next sections: a) the capacity of a party in conflict with another to persuade or 
force the other to adopt a course of action other than the one it originally 
intended; b) the capacity of a party to control the agenda of interactions such as 
meetings, and determine which issues are kept in or off the agenda in the face 
of opposition; c) the capacity of a party to secure assent to its objectives by 
another group because of the successful diffusion of a hegemonic ideology. On 
the other side, against this background, it draws on Batstone (1988) and Kelly 
(2005) to explore particular aspects of trade unions (re-)sources of power when 
appropriated. Lastly, organisational and leadership data is incorporated into the 
analysis to illuminate the interaction: between the opportunity-to-act and its 
reading by organised labour. 
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United Kingdom 
FUSE campaign 
In March 1987, the joint union forum of the industry, ESTUC, through its 
campaigning arm, FUSE, launched a set of activities to oppose the privatisation 
of the electricity industry. The initial objective of the campaign was to mobilise 
the public opinion against privatising the ESI, and in particular, to contact 
Members of Parliament (MPs) as well as candidates at the coming general 
election, to persuade them not to endorse a manifesto commitment by any 
Party to privatise the industry (EPEA 1988a). In turn, its primary concerned was 
to prevent the breaking up of the generating boards (TUC 1988). Consequently, 
using the Divisional Electricity Supply Trade Union Councils (DESTUC), a new 
untried local organisation, the collective effort was directed towards lobby MPS - 
particularly Conservatives from marginal seats, to raise public awareness of the 
issues involved by organising local events, and to influence opinion formers 
(Electricity News, 8/3/89). From the outset, the electoral focus imposed itself 
upon industrial action, which was discarded. 
The announcement that the general election would be held on June, earlier than 
expected by ESTUC, meant that ESI unions should take the campaign to the 
public before FUSE were mature. The election result marked the failure of the 
first stage of the campaign, as it was openly acknowledged at the time: 
It is a matter of record that the campaign was not successful (EPEA 1988a: 
13). 
Let us be honest, the FUSE campaign against privatisation of the Electricity 
Supply Industry actually failed on 11 June 1987. That is when the 
Conservative Party was re-elected with a majority of 101 (EETPU DJIC n" 
4). 
Strictly speaking, after the national election, the FUSE campaign faded away 
under the new Secretaryship of NALGO, while the other ESI unions withdrew 
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their active support. The leading unions of ESTUC - EPEA and EETPU, and to 
a lesser degree NALGO - focused on securing changes over the legislation 
process. Thus, ESTUC established a small working party to monitor the Bill's 
progress, and to consider and submit its own amendments. In contrast to 
FUSE, this second stage of trade unions' strategy was quite successful insofar 
it obtained by legislation their main aims: the pension schemes, health and 
safety procedures, and provisionally, the industrial relations machinery. In 
particular, the issue of pensions has become the icon of the relative success of 
this pragmatic strategy as expressed in every interview. 
We secured one very important thing from the government, and that was 
never ever repeated. That was that we had pension schemes written into 
the act of Parliament. That meant the pension scheme was protected, and 
that happened in no other industry ( ... ) It was a collective thing. We, the 
trade unions, secured an agreement, collectively, from the government. The 
government wrote into the actual act of Parliament that anyone in the 
industry prior to the 1st of March 1990, who was in the industry privatised 
that day, would have the pension protected indefinitely (National Officer - 
Amicus). 
To sum up, trade unions' initial response to privatisation was characterised by 
its pragmatism as it was assumed that the privatisation could not be stopped. It 
was mainly electoral in the beginning. The possibility of industrial action 
surfaced early debates and conferences but union leaderships - particularly 
those of EPEA and the EETPU, but presumably an important part of NALGO's 
officials too, were convinced that industrial action would be disastrous for the 
unions. Then, trade unions aimed at influencing the would-be private structures 
of the industry, and mainly, taking advantages of the political environment to 
secure legislative changes in the Bill. 
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The opportunity-to-act 
Although a complex exercise, the application of Lukes' model may contribute to 
explore how political and industrial spheres interacted and conditioned the 
opportunity-to-act of ESI trade unions. 
Certainly, their inability to even think about stopping the privatisation - despite 
opposing the sale of the industry, was an expression of an unfavourable 
balance of power for organised labour. This unfavourable balance forced ESI 
unions to actively engage in shaping the future industrial structures, and 
therefore, to positively collaborate, through know-how and industrial peace, with 
the privatisation programme. Yet, trade unions' ability to use their industrial 
latent power, or at least, make the government to fear this possibility, proves the 
divergence between the political and the industrial facets of power relations in 
the run-up to privatisation. Political strength gave the government and top 
managers the lead and industrial lever; whereas industrial latent power gave 
trade unions defensive political bargain in a context in which the overt political 
influence of the labour movement was at a minimum. This divergence coloured 
the social interactions by which contenders pushed through their aims by 
mobilising diverse (re-)sources of power - or in which contenders had to 
abandon or modify certain objectives. 
The scope of political influence was defined in chapter 2 as a source of trade 
unions' power (Batstone 1988). In turn, social movement theorising evaluates 
the political strength/weaknesses of subordinate actors by taking into account 
the openness of the political decision-making of the state, the availability of 
allies, and the stability of the political alignments and the ruling elite (Tarrow 
1994). Applying this model to labour studies, Kelly uses the number of contacts 
between TUC and the state as an indirect way of measuring the openness of 
the political structure to trade unions; as he explains: "this is far from being an 
ideal source as it reports only TUC contacts, not those of affiliated unions, and 
given the nature of the source, there is probably some upward bias in the 
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reporting. But if we assume any such bias is constant over time, then it may 
provide a reasonably valid measure of trends" (Kelly 2005: ). Kelly quotes 
research by Holy Marsh (2002) that shows a steady decline in total contacts 
between 1983 and 1994, suggesting a reduction of unions' political access, and 
therefore, as already mentioned in the previous paragraph, of the political 
influence of the labour movement. Additionally, according to David Marsh 
(1992), contacts were increasingly initiated by TUC in search of a 'new realist' 
approach, not the government; and involved a move from face-to-face to 
weaker contact by writing. Finally, it was significantly less effective in 
comparison with those of the 1970s (Marsh 1992). Besides, trade unions' 
political influence within the Labour Party began to be questioned, once the 
association between trade unions and the Party was identified as part of the 
explanation of their electoral defeats. Moreover, although civil society in Britain 
affords the union movement many potential allies in its attempts to influence 
governments, recent research has shown that coalitions of protest are still rare 
in UK (Frege, Heery & Turner 2004). Lastly, the Conservative parliamentary 
majority closed the chance to benefit, at least, at the institutional level, from any 
instability in political alignments or divisions in the ruling elite. In short, as early 
recognised by EETPU: 
If one examines trade unions' attempts to influence Government policies, it 
is clear that we have had virtually no influence at all. Again, evidence of 
lack of real power (EETPU Shop Stewards Quarterly Review, 20, May 
1983). 
Despite this political environment, ESTUC could break the political exclusion, 
keep regular contacts with the Secretary of the State, and contribute to policy- 
making. The key factor explaining why electricity unions were able to secure 
concessions, whereas others unions elsewhere were unable to, would be 
related to their industrial power: 
Clearly, the Government's tactics are to avoid provoking opposition from 
the staff in the run up to privatisation. They know that on these issues 
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[safety, pensions, and industrial machinery] the membership would be 
prepared to take industrial action to safeguard their interests (EETPU 
1988). 
Thus, ESTUC succeed in reintroducing the transference of the negotiating 
machinery by law to the new privatised companies, and the new owner's 
obligation to give 12 months notice to withdraw from it, against the 
government's intentions to repeal both guarantees. EPEA commented on this: 
It is a limited protection safeguarding the integrity and continuity of the 
Industry's existing negotiating machinery, but nevertheless an important 
one in the political context of today (EPEA 1988a). 
This is still, presently, the overall framework in which those concessions are 
analysed by union officers: 
Question: Why do you think the government accepted to protect the 
pension scheme through legislation? 
Reply: Well the government didn't want... The government gave these 
concessions because they knew that if they attacked the pension scheme, 
or if they had compulsory redundancies, they would have given the trade 
unions the weapon to take industrial action. The objective of the 
government, considering these things, was to spike the trade union guns. 
( ... ) they could not encourage our members to challenge them. If they 
had 
attacked the pension scheme and threatened to throw people out without 
given good financial settlements, then, we would have balloted for industrial 
action. And they considered to spike our guns in terms of being able to take 
industrial action (National Officer - Amicus). 
Question: Why did the government give you those concessions? 
Reply: Well, remember that the government didn't want conflicts. The 
government itself was slightly nervous about how powerful the electricity 
unions were. And they didn't want industrial action (National Officer - 
Prospect). ýt I 
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A complete picture of this relative success should include the privatisation 
process itself (mainly, dealing at that time with one major employer prior to 
restructuring, rather than several as in water) and the political position of ESI 
unions (that is, their low profile during the 1984-5 Miners' strike). Yet, it seems 
reasonable to argue that industrial power opened ESI unions' defensive political 
influence. Then, the analysis of Lukes' first dimension of power should be 
qualified by incorporating unions' capacity to make the government modify their 
original preferences with regards the provision of official guarantees to specific 
unions demands. 
However, it is necessary to stress the defensive nature of this political influence, 
for unions strategy was rooted in an explicit acknowledgement of their own 
weakness that inclined them to certain courses of action preventing others. In 
this sense, the overall influence of the political and legal climate was 
paramount. 
The opportunity-to-act was read in the light of other trade unions' experiences, 
which as a rule were to be interpreted, unequivocally, as signalling that 
privatisation could not be defeated, for as it was graphically put it by an EETPU 
delegate: "Thatcherism and privatisation is the same thing" (EETPU 1988). 
Remember that the electricity industry was privatised along the line. Gas 
had been privatised, and so on, OK? We had learned from the experiences 
than the other unions or we thought we had. Because, in some instances, 
the other unions just opposed what was happening, blanket opposition. We 
took a farther pragmatic view. We said: "OK, we don't like what is 
happening. We will try to make the best of our job and there are certain 
policies that we want to pursue" (National Officer - Prospect). 
Question: Did the engineers take any kind of industrial action? 
Reply: No, we never had industrial action of any type ( ... ) Originally, we 
took the decision not to do that, because we would have been challenging 
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the government, and we all saw what had happened to the miners here ( ... ) 
We decided, what we would do, was to work within the system and tried to 
argue to the best of the system, and also not to challenge the philosophy 
(National Officer - Prospect) 
Sometimes you run in two... It's what we call run in two horses. So you got 
a public policy but if you know you aren't gonna win, at least, you make 
sure that you protect your members, and that was what we've done 
(National Officer - Unison). 
Thus, from the outset, the whole policy of ESI unions rested upon the 
recognition of the inevitability of privatisation. Most importantly in this sense, 
and leaving aside the moderate character of ESI unions, the negative 
development of trade unions' resources with regards to governmental support 
and intervention in disputes and conflicts - chiefly through legislation, 
conditioned any chance to resort to the offensive mobilisation of industrial 
resources. 
By 1987, when FUSE campaign was launched, the government had already 
passed three important pieces of legislation directed to change the balance of 
power between unions and employers. And during the run-up to privatisation, 
between 1988 and 1990, three new important Employment Acts were 
sanctioned. Chapter 6 approached the relevance of these changes in law by 
which the government crucially restricted through the 1982 Employment Act, the 
definition of a permissible trade dispute to the terms and conditions of 
employment, or the physical conditions in which any workers are required to 
work. Additionally, picketing and secondary action were restricted by the 1980 
Employment Act, unions were declared liable of unlawful acts by 1982 
Employment Act, and ballots were required before industrial action by the Trade 
Union Act 1984. It could be added too, that the attempt via the latter to engage 
the support of moderate trade union members in dissuading leaders from 
embarking on political campaigns, further narrowed the terrain of legitimate 
union activity to the industrial sphere, extended the range of activities 
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considered "political", and therefore, incremented the risks of legal challenges to 
union activities. 
In short, by mobilising their political resources into legal reforms, Conservatives 
targeted a key industrial source of power: unions' ability to disrupt production 
(Batstone 1988): 
At ESTUC's first weekend conference we seriously considered industrial 
action as an option to prevent privatisation, but the unanimous view of the 
council was that action would be illegal (EEPTU 1988). 
The same view is still expressed nowadays when considering the options for 
trade unions almost 20 years ago: 
You have to remember that at the period of privatisation was Margaret 
Thatcher. She made it illegal for people to take industrial action for anything 
except for trade dispute. I mean, it's quite clear that if we had taken an 
industrial action against privatisation, it would have been deemed illegal, 
and therefore, we could have been taken to court (National Officer - 
Unison). 
At the end of the day, direct action wasn't an option for us because the 
legislation introduced by Maggie Thatcher said we would be outlawed 
because it wasn't an issue which we... So strike... Unless it was a trade 
dispute, and did something to your pay and conditions, we couldn't do 
anything. It would have been deemed to be a political issue (National 
Officer - Prospect). 
On the contrary, at industrial level, managerial support together with procedural 
and other collective agreements - which according to Kelly and Heery are 
crucial power resources too (Kelly & Heery 1994), did not experience a serious 
deterioration in the run-up to privatisation, basically, for the national negotiating 
machinery was in place throughout the process. Changes in managerial styles 
and policies, the scope of consultation, the range of bargaining issues, and 
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even the structure of the industry did occur before vesting day, but they were 
not dramatic. It is difficult to know if this was the outcome of ESTUC's success 
in securing written guarantees from the government that the national bargaining 
machinery would remain in place until one year after vesting day, and therefore, 
brought about by union campaigning. It could be the case as withdrawal from 
the machinery was submitted by management soon after this day. In any case, 
though signals of the challenges ahead, changes at this level added to the sort 
of evolutionary change experienced, hitherto, for the industry: "until 
privatisation, therefore, the story of industrial relations in the 1980s is essentially 
one of continuity" (Ferner & Colling 1993: 118). 
If one turns the attention to the second of Lukes' indicators, that is, control upon 
the agenda of interactions and its contents, a difference between political and 
industrial spheres is again noticeable. 
There were frequent meetings with Cecil Parkinson - Secretary of the State for 
Energy, submissions to House of Commons Select Committee on Energy, and 
contacts with MPs (EPEA 1988b; Privatisation News and Journal Contact, 
several issues). They permitted unions to maintain some control upon the 
interactions and to keep key issues for trade unions' defensive strategy in the 
agenda: pensions, safety, the legal underpinning for the negotiating machine 
and shares schemes. For instance, informal contacts with Cecil Parkinson led 
EPEA in 1987 to prepare a submission about privatisation and competition 
(EPEA 1988a). During 1988, ESTUC held meetings on monthly basis in which 
issues like R&D, regulation of the industry, the break-up of the CEGB and the 
processes of consultation were discussed (EPEA 1988b). By the end of 1987, 
the House of Commons Select Committee on Energy began an enquiry into the 
"structure, regulation and economic consequences of electricity supply in the 
private sector" (EPEA 1988a). ESTUC sent written evidences in two occasions, 
and four ESTUC officials gave oral evidence. Due to ESTUC intervention, the 
Final Report of the Committee published in July 1988, was critical of 
government's plans as regards the division of the generation structure and the 
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ownership of the grid by the distributions companies. Lastly, ESTUC small 
working party monitored the Bill's progress by keeping constant liaison with 
MPs of all Parties as necessary. Through these interactions ESI unions 
mobilised political resources to influence, politically, the process of privatisation. 
Instead, the CEGB and Area Boards refused from the outset to discuss and 
consult with ESTUC its future structure; unsurprisingly, then, the latter was 
strongly critical of the CEGI3 indifference to consultation on fundamental issues 
like the break-up of the industry. Only after strong pressures the relationships at 
the industrial level improved, and mutual confidence was somehow re- 
established. It was only by the end of 1988 that informal discussions began with 
the CEGI3 about privatisation (EPEA 1988b). Things were only slightly better in 
Area Boards, where ESTUC representatives and a number of Chairmen agreed 
to facilitate exchanges of views and discussions. In this context, top 
management also reduced consultation with unions about traditional industrial 
relations issues, but without pushing meaningful changes. 
In short, while trade unions were able to put into the political agenda, industrial 
relations issues like pensions, health and safety, and the negotiating machinery, 
ESTUC failed to secure their industrial preferences regarding ESI structure - for 
instance, their opposition to the split up of the CEGB, the transfer of the 
obligation to supply to the distribution companies, or the ownership of the 
national grid by the distribution companies. 
Finally, the third level of Lukes' analysis of power relations refers to ideological 
hegemony. To carry out this analysis, it is essential to identify, first, the core 
ideological leitmotifs of the privatisation of the electricity industry. In this sense, 
by analysing the White and Green Papers for privatisation of public utilities, 
some scholars have suggested that their privatisations were often presented 
within an ideological package comprising: win-win scenarios, praise to 
consumer identity, and tributes to the benefits of management and competition 
(Haslarn et al. 1996). At this level, the analytical risks rest on the difficulties to 
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disentangle between what is evidence of Thatcherism's ideological domination 
of debate, and what of tactical choices by unions - for example, it might be 
argued that emphasis upon the aforementioned issues could have been a 
conscious choice by unions given the power realities they faced rather than 
acceptance. 
However, in a sense, the incorporation into union discourse of the central tenets 
of privatisation helps to legitimise the dominant discourse and, hence, 
reinforces its hegemony, even in the case of just a tactical decision. But, 
findings suggest that gradual discursive acceptance among ESI trade unions of 
some aspects of those leitmotifs was a real manifestation of the ideological 
impact of the changes in the opportunity structure. 
The most noticeable is the role played by the figure of the consumer in ESTUC 
campaign. The reference to consumers' interests, instead of those of workers 
and trade unions, was overwhelming. In the Charter in which ESTUC publicised 
their basic agreements when launching the anti-privatisation campaign, while 4 
out of its 10 points were related to consumers' concerns, no single explicit 
mention to workers' interests can be identified (ESTUC 1987; FUSE 1987). 
Similarly, in a seven points of principles, agreed after the Conservative re- 
election, the first two referred to consumers' concerns; although, this time, two 
points made the case for the continuation of the industrial machinery, and the 
terms and conditions of their members' employment (EPEA 1987). EPEA's 
presentations to the TUC and other conferences were deemed to show why 
privatisation would go against consumers' interests (TUC 1989a, TUC 1989b). 
Similar rationale led the ESTUC to consider after the 1987-election, that there 
was not obvious campaign to mount and confined FUSE to lobby: "It was 
agreed that if another campaign is necessary it would be based on a clear issue 
of concern to the public which might emerge" (EPEA 1987). This approach is 
still vividly evoked: 
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In opposing privatisation, we persistently argued our case on the basis of 
what was best for the consumer and the nation as a whole. But this didn't 
stop Conservatives, and they accused us time and again of self-interest. Of 
course, protecting the interests of our members was a primary concern, but 
we made clear that not at the expense of the consumer (National Officer - 
Amicus). 
It is opportune to remark that the water anti-privatisation campaign focused 
remorselessly on consumer interests - including security and quality of supply 
and the ability and will of a privatised water industry to comply with European 
standards, and although it was never sufficient to derail privatisation, at key 
points, it had the government on the defensive (O'Connell 1993; Ogden 1991, 
1993). But water unions spent a lot of efforts in building coalitions with 
consumer groups, an effective replacement for low workers' engagement, but 
also an incentive to it. In electricity, instead, coalition building was absent, a fact 
that further demoralised the rank-and-file. Evidence from unions' conferences 
suggested that FUSE was experienced by lay workers as a remote event and 
complaints about its features abounded (EETPU 1988; EPEA 1987; 1988; 
NALGO 1988b). 
Certainly, if win-win scenarios and managerial tributes were not endorsed 
during the campaign, the former matched up ideological developments in the 
EETPU, while the later toned with EPEA idiosyncrasy. 
EETPU was pioneering at the time the politics of a win-win type of social 
partnership, known by detractors as strike-free agreements, which proliferated, 
primarily, in several Japanese firms (Taylor 1985). The leadership of the union 
promoted this political line, as a modern approach that could collectively add 
greatly to the potential and prospects of private enterprises, and enhance the 
role and the involvement at work of the individual employee. Hence, the 
receptiveness to win-win scenarios among blue-collar workers was likely to be 
facilitated by the ideological battle of the EETPU leadership against the 'us and 
them' culture. 
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We created our own style of trade unionism, a coherent alternative to the 
political one, which has given game, set and match to the Government. We 
created a new type of union, an effective partner to management (National 
Officer - Amicus). 
EPEA, an engineering union that organised not only frontline engineering staff 
but also senior ranks of management, basically grouped the people responsible 
for running the industry. First, the nature of their constituencies colours its 
culture and ideological inclination: 
Our members, if you ask someone, they were proud to be an NJB 
employee or an NJM, and proud of their status. They were recognised to be 
elitish sort of people. Our constituencies, technical, professional or 
managerial staff would prefer to stay out of unions rather than being a small 
part in big unions representing other types of workers (National Officer - 
Prospect). 
But, second and most important for the analysis, among the senior members 
there has always been a tension between their worker and managerial souls. 
Plainly, at times we have conflict of interest ( ... ) Let's say to recognise that 
our members have a duty to do as managers, and that they have to do that 
first. Most of the time, we don't really have problems with the kind of things 
we have to achieve on their behalf. But, for instance, they often complain 
when companies want people redundant, but privately they agree with 
them... (National Officer - Prospect). 
This tension manifested in the run-up to privatisation, for many of their members 
in managerial positions shared the managerial wave, and saw economic and 
professional advantages in freeing themselves from the rigid structures of the 
national industry. Thus, many pursued their own managerial agenda in between 
the government's plans and unions' standpoints. This weakened somehow 
EPEA endeavours, whose leadership ehgaged in a subtle ideological baffle to 
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prevent senior members from what the union leadership conceived as 
misleading projections about the managerial future in a privatised industry. 
EPEA's readiness to confront a political issue through a technical discussion 
could be understood as another hint of this managerial thinking. 
Summarising, Lukes' model helps to identify how political and industrial 
variables combined to narrow the opportunity-to-act for ESI unions. Yet, it also 
contributed to identify how unions acted defensively upon those variables by 
mobilising political resources anchored in their latent industrial power. However, 
the analysis of the opportunity-to-act cannot explain in isolation the forms taken 
by unions' anti-privatisation campaigns. For a better understanding of the latter, 
the exploration of the categories organisation and interest definition are needed. 
Organisation, decision-making, leadership: multi-unionism and 
pragmatism 
The opportunity-to-act is processed by unions through organisational and the 
social mediations of interest definition. Thus, when applying mobilisation theory 
to industrial relations, the organisational domain is of prime importance. 
Moreover, trade unions, as secondary organisations, are highly sensitive to 
changes in the industrial and bargaining structures, and hence, privatisation in 
itself targeted trade union organisation as it shall be discussed in chapter 10. It 
is also important to acknowledge that organisations have diverse dynamics of 
decision-making and are commanded by leaderships with different styles and 
political outlooks. The combination of certain types of organisation, decision- 
making processes and styles of leadership is assumed to be crucial to account 
for the existence - or inexistence, and the particular forms, of workers' collective 
actions and unions' campaigns. Then, it is important to complete this analysis of 
the FUSE campaign with a few remarks on relevant data about the category 
organisation and interest definition, mainly, trade unions' leadership styles. 
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Chapter 6 already discussed the meaning of British multi-unionism. By 
definition, it poses serious challenges to workers unity, and privatisation was not 
the exception. However, through a coordinating structure, ESTUC, ESI unions 
attained a high degree of unity and were able to achieve a remarkable degree 
of unanimity in its response to the privatisation programme. Nevertheless, this 
unity was over-determined by the institutional framework from which unions 
agreed common demands and ways of action, and had different meanings for 
different unions. 
Clearly, for NALGO, compromise at the level of ESTUC was to cause a relative 
detachment from its internal process of decision-making, built upon the values 
of participatory democracy. A strong white-collar union, particularly, in the old 
Area Boards, NALGO organised certain groups with significant disruptive 
potential (mainly staffed billing and customer service functions employees), but 
without the latent industrial power of the manual and engineering unions, the 
leading organisations of ESTUC. While accepting the electoral focus promoted 
by EETPU and EPEA for the FUSE campaign, NALGO's initial involvement in 
the latter was characterised by the unsuccessful attempt to prioritise coalition 
building by working with consumers' organisations and other interested groups 
as they had done in gas, and were attempting to in water. NALGO made a list of 
target consumer groups and organisations, established contacts with water 
unions' campaign committee, and hold a weekend school for campaigners 
(NALGO 1988c). After the election, when EPEA consolidated its leading role, 
while agreeing within the ESTUC to support the Electricity Charter drawn by 
EPEA (ESTUC 1987), NALGO stressed its commitment with the continuation of 
FUSE: "We will be pursuing a number of initiatives of our own and we will seek 
to ensure that members are fully involved in the campaign" (NALGO News, 299, 
9/10/87). Nevertheless, this campaigning determination was, soon, simply a 
discursive device to soften internal dissatisfaction like the sort rose in the 
Annual Conferences: 
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Conference welcomes the united opposition of the FUSE to privatisation. 
Whilst urging the NEC to work to preserve this unity, Conference 
emphasises that NALGO's continued support for public ownership is 
independent of the views of any other union (NALGO 1988a). 
This warning, however, did not have chances to be translated into an 
independent policy. Thus, although NALGO's lay representatives were 
frequently critical of the campaign, urged the NEC to take a leading role, 
criticised the DESTUC, and raised proposals to set up FUSE committees at 
every workplace, in ESI multi-union structure, coalition building was beyond the 
individual will of a white-collar organisation. 
By contrast, given its constituency, EPEA was a powerful organisation that 
embodied the ethos of meritocracy and moderation, which have characterised 
the ESI. By organising the technical, professional and managerial staff, they 
easily took a leading role when the opportunity structure narrowed to the extent 
that a technical approach was the only option to be listened within the rules of 
the game, and the only political platform from which negotiate future industrial 
relations issues. This leading role within the ESTUC would last in their 
interactions with the state until the end of 1990s. It crystallised when in the run- 
up to privatisation and after, the NEC of EPEA was in charge of every 
submission to official spheres endorsed by ESTUC (EPEA 1986). It was 
reinforced when to monitor the legislative process and liase with MPs, ESTUC 
established a small working party co-ordinated by EPEA's leadership. 
Suggestively, the secretary of FUSE passed, at this very moment, from EPEA 
to NALGO. Industrial and organisational features contributed to incite ESI 
unions to accept EPEA's leadership within ESTUC. Regarding the former, not 
only its strategic role in running the power stations, transmission network, and 
distribution system, but also its technical expertise and the daily authority 
EPEA's members exercised in the industry, buttressed the campaigning 
replication of ESI internal seniority, once the negotiation moved to a political 
sphere but under technical clothing. Turning to the latter, while NALGO and the 
EETPU had membership' constituencies beyond the industry, EPEA's 
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constituency was almost entirely from ESI. Its top leadership was one hundred 
per cent personally involved throughout the process; its NEC was a general 
headquarters, which permanently fed the ESTUC with ideological and technical 
arguments in response to every issue coming out in the process. 
The case of EETPU is complex. The union was the main organiser of manual 
and craft workers, with enough strength to disrupt production alone. This threat 
was to be ritually used before privatisation to settle the NJIC annual agreement; 
only then, EPEA and NALGO dealt their own agreements. But the right-wing- 
populist leadership of the EETPU was a moderate force, which contributed 
significantly to keep industrial peace in ESI, aborted shop floor activism, and 
working together with management "achieved improvements in productivity 
through technological change, the closure of uneconomic plants and ( ... ) 
flexibility amongst staff' (EETPU 1990). This approach was undertaken through 
a political move combining organisational changes towards centralisation and 
an extensive use of formal democracy, under the ideological shell of 
modernisation. It entailed the abolition of areas committees and appeal courts, 
and the empowerment of the NEC to abolish or amalgamate branches, and 
appoint full-time secretaries and organisers. This power was manifested in 
disciplinary action against activists and opposition candidates, and in the 
closing of dissident branches (Hyman 1983). Periodical condemnation of these 
practices, and debates around participation and branch live, went by from the 
1971 to the 1983 Biennial Delegate Conferences when EETPU leadership 
finally took over the opposition by beating proposals to rigidly bind the Executive 
Council to conference decisions and to elect officials, which according to the 
NEC, aimed to thwart members' decision in ballot boxes and undermine the 
authority of the elected executive. Thus, the privatisation of the ESI found a 
populist leadership in firm control of a centralised organisation but immerse a in 
serious conflict within the labour movement, which led to its expulsion from the 
TUC. In this context, for the EETPU, compromise through ESTUC ensured, 
first, trade union acquiescence and, second, a common stage to pursue the 
election of a Labour Government to reverse privatisations policies. This was, in 
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fact, the only feasible strategy devised by EETPU, which had consistently 
opposed to industrial action to undermine public policies. Indeed, this 
compromise was also functional to dissipate misleading dreams with industrial 
action: 
I have yet seen little indication from the EPEA that they are likely to take 
action. NALGO may like to; NALGO are fond of spending a lot of money on 
lost causes (EETPU 1988). 
Does Conference believe that against this background and at this late stage 
we can go to ESTUC, to our members, asking them to support illegal 
action? (EETPU 1988) 
Thus, while the opportunity structure posed objective constraints to ESI unions, 
the concrete shape of FUSE campaign had much to do with the nature of trade 
unions' compromise through ESTUC, which in turn, was narrowly related to the 
organisational features of the individual unions, their respective bargaining 
powers, their mechanisms of decision-making, and the political orientation of 
their leaderships. 
Argentina 
The case of LyF CR from latent resistance to active support 
The itinerary of LyF CF's response to privatisation shift from latent resistance to 
active support. During 1980s, the union had openly opposed early calls to 
privatise the industry (Murillo 2001): 
Question: Did the union oppose privatisation? 
Reply: Of course, there was complete oppositionI The same people who 
later on supported it, during 1980s had been completely against 
privatisation. 'No to IMFI No to the financial casino! No to contractorsl' We 
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participated at that time in rallies, demonstrations, general strikes... " (Lay 
Representative, LyF CF). 
In 1989, the Lay Representatives Body of LyF CF's (Cuerpo General de 
Delegados - CGID) decided to support the Peronist candidate for the 
presidential election, who campaigned for a Keynesian plan to overcome the 
acute political and economic crisis experienced by the country. But the new 
administration surprised foes and followers by triggering a programme of neo- 
liberal market reforms, which included vast privatisations of public enterprises. 
As a result, LyF CF engaged in a mute opposition, as the union leadership 
believed that the bitter struggles, which erupted in telecommunications, railways 
and airlines would end up preventing the privatising wave. As the government 
opted to narrow the sources of conflict to few sectors, isolated threats of direct 
action were enough for LyF CIF to keep the status quo in the industry. 
Concomitantly, the union opened a political channel with the head of the 
Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio de Obras POblicas), who agreed to engage 
in negotiations to form a mixed company under public control and workers 
participation to reactivate generation and distribution. 
In September of 1990, a plan of industrial action in response to delayed 
payment of wages included anti-privatisation slogans. In response, the 
government threatened to repress the union, as it had done in railways and 
telecommunications. As a result, the union leadership convinced of the 
inevitability of the privatisation embarked in a pragmatic strategic shift. Two 
months later, the General Secretary of the union suddenly declared his support 
of privatisation of the industry conditioned to an active involvement in the 
process (Clarin 24/11/90). According to interviews, despite expressing public 
support to privatisation, the union had still hope in the Parliamentary opposition: 
We were absolutely convinced that Menem would not win the majority in 
the Parliamentary elections. His neo-liberal policies went against all 
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traditional ideas of Peronism. But people kept loyal to PJ and voted the 
party (Union OffiCi2l - LyF CF). 
When in the election of 1991, the Government won the majority in the 
Parliament, union leadership concluded that the only option left for the 
organisation was to choose between participation or confrontation, and inclined 
unambiguously for the former. 
Then, while opposing partial licenses, outsourcing or privatisation of the retail 
and commercial businesses, the union participated in negotiations and the 
preparation of the international biding. Along this process, the union attempted 
to secure the unity of the industrial structure, a single collective agreement, the 
previous definition of a regulatory framework, the continuity of the obra social 
and the implementation of ESOPs. With such defensive objectives in mind, the 
unions engaged in novel forms of political exchange, by which it obtained 
economic rewards in exchange for concessions regarding labour flexibility and 
political support. 
The opportunity-to-act 
Any analysis of the opportunity-to-act against privatisation for Argentinean trade 
unions should take into account the ideological and political consequences of 
the hyperinflation processes that hit the economy in 1989-90. Its disciplining 
effects upon the population have been stressed by the scholars (Campione 
2002; Murillo 2001; Sigal & Kessler 1997; Torre 1998), and even compared to 
those of a dictatorship or a political repression (Anderson 1994; Bonnet 1995). 
Indeed, Thwaites Rey (2003) argues that both the political terror implanted in 
the society by the dictatorship (1976-83) and the economic terror of the 
hyperinflation explained the popular tolerance to the neo-liberal reforms of 
beginnings of 1990s. The economic crisis prepared the terrain to make the 
population accept the need of a radical change in economic policy and to pass 
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the State Reform and the Economic Emergency laws, which launched the 
political process of market reforms and privatisation. At the same time, it meant 
the final surrender of the main political parties to the influence and the 
privatisation recipes of the IMF and the WB. In the specific case of the 
electricity, this general economic crisis combined with an energy crisis (1988- 
89), due to not only climatic contingencies but also the deterioration of the 
generation plants as a result of the lack of public investment. 
The three-fold model of power referred to at the beginning of the chapter, shows 
the subordination of LyF CF to state imperatives. 
As for the first dimension discussed by Lukes, the most striking finding is the 
abrupt conversion of LyF CF to privatisation. The Government determined 
response to union opposition persuaded the leadership of LyF CF to change 
reluctance into active support, which was crudely manifested by joining the 
officialist faction 'Menem Presidente' (Sur, 8/11/90). Thus, the course of action 
finally taken by the union was a far cry from its traditional opposition to 
privatisation. It expressed the unfavourable relations of power underpinning the 
opportunity structure. 
The analysis of union political resources over the process of privatisation 
applying Kelly's (2005) methodology presents difficulties as there are no 
statistics over the number of contacts between the CGT and the government 
generally, or between the latter and LyF CF specifically. However, the collection 
of data from national newspapers and the trade union's journal Dinamis gives 
the robust impression that contacts increased or decreased following trade 
union' political stance. While LyF CF kept a mute resistance to privatisation, 
information about official contacts and negotiations were rare in these organs. 
When LyF CF announced their support to privatisation, news about meetings 
with the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Labour, the Secretary of Energy, 
the Secretary of Privatisations, WB consultants and MPs proliferated in both. 
Besides, informal channels and direct personal relations with the President 
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Menem were common. The latter was part of a wider process of negotiation and 
political capture, which included personal favours and concessions as part of a 
renewed political exchange (Gonzdlez & Bosoer 1999). Regarding trade unions' 
political influence through the PJ, it underwent a process of de-unionisation 
during 1980s, which, in turn, eliminated a key source of internal opposition to 
government's neo-liberal reforms. As Levitsky stresses: "Party reformers 
dismantled Peronism's traditional mechanisms of labor participation, and 
clientelist networks replaced unions as the primary linkage to the working and 
lower classes. By the early 1990s, the PJ had transformed from a labor- 
dominated party into a machine party in which unions were relatively marginal 
actors" (Levitsky 2003: 4). This process is also illustrated by the gradual 
marginalisation of Peronist MPs belonging to trade unions (Table 6). Thus, 
trade union political influence within the PJ fell steadily just before the reforms 
began. 
Table 6: Peronist MPs with trade union background 
Parliamentary Period 198385 1985-87 1987-89 1989-91 1991-93 1993 95 
Number of union MPs 35 28 26 23 18 10 
% over total M Ps 13.8% 11.0% 10.2%1 9.0% 7.0% 3.9% 
Source: Nueva Mayoria, SeptieMbre 1994 - boletin nu 83. 
As for coalition building, interviews and sources showed that LyF CF inclined to 
pursue union traditional repertoires, without intention to go beyond its 
constituency. Finally, any potential instability in political alignments at national 
level was concealed by the context of economic and political crisis, which 
followed the hyperinflation. 
In short, it seems safe to claim that trade union capacity to mobilise political 
resources against privatisation was extremely low; the only room for political 
exchange would prove to depend on union subordination and cooperation. 
In addition to this, trade union power resources due to governmental support 
and intervention in disputes and conflicts vanished. This is of extreme 
importance given the prerogatives of the state to intervene and shape the 
136 
process and outcomes of industrial relations, as shown in chapter 6. 
Concurrently, this explains the dependence of trade unions on government and 
the role of political action in their strategy (Bunel 1992; Goldin 1997). The PJ 
was the historical channel to access the Government and gain its favour. Thus, 
to confront a Peronist Government implied the risk of political isolation and more 
important, to break the alliance that had provided unions with political resources 
and served well so far their corporatist interests. 
As for legislation, two main facts conditioned unions' ability to act. First, after 
trade union challenged the sale of telecommunications and railways, the 
government issued an anti-strike decree to avoid industrial action in the public 
sector in the pre-privatisation process, as demanded by the IMF (Thwaites Rey 
1999). Thus, as in the British case, the capacity of unions to disrupt production, 
a key source of union power, was inhibited. Second, the Decree 1757/90 
suspended a number of clauses from the CCTs of the public sector to force 
unions to enter in negotiations. In this way, managers and supervisors were 
excluded from collective bargaining, managerial authority upon the organisation 
of the labour process was reinforced, outsourcing was increased, and financial 
resources to the union were cut (Campafio & Caruso 1991; Ministerio de 
Economia 1990a, 1990b). The aim of the Decree was to curtail union power 
and dismantle obstacles to productivity improvements before privatisation in 
order to increase the appeal for private capitals (Daireaux et al. 1990; Campafio 
& Caruso 1991; Campafio et al. 1991; Ministerio de Economla 1990a, 1990b). 
The whole strategy involved the mobilisation of a variety of legal resources, the 
involvement of different state branches, and a myriad of well-paid consultants 
financed and technically supervised by the WB and BIRF (Banco Mundial 
1991). 
This curtailment of union rights, in turn, changed the balance of forces at the 
workplace in the run-up to privatisation. The union witnessed the dilution of 
agreements and support from management, and with it, how power resources 
at industrial level also withered away. ' This process will be analysed in some 
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detail in chapter 9. For now, it is enough to mention that the process began with 
the State Reform Law that froze wages and ordered a 10 % reduction in the 
workforce of public companies (Ministerio de Economla 1990c). It continued 
with the appointment of aggressive company Directors, who came from the 
private sector - paid partly by the WB (El Cronista Comercial 17/8/90), and 
mainly, with the suspension of clauses from the CCT that changed the rule of 
the games (Ministerio de Trabajo 1990). Finally, it was epitomised by the 
decision taken by an empowered management to stop the functioning of the 
Comisi6n Intema de Reclamaciones, the fulcrum of the negotiating machinery 
at the workplace. 
Thus, LyF CF experienced negative developments in its political and industrial 
(re-)sources of power in the run-up to privatisation, a situation that underwent 
the subordination of the union to official policy. 
The analysis of the second dimension of Lukes' model shows that union's 
subordination paved the way to union participation in the process of 
privatisation, though not necessarily opened the door to shape the contents of 
the agenda. LyF CF took part in the Privatisation Commission (Comisi6n de 
Pfivatizaciones), and maintained several meetings with the Minister of 
Economy, the Minister of Labour, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of 
Privatisations, WB consultants, and even with the President Menem in two 
occasions. LyF CF failed to secure most of its objectives: the integration of the 
industry, the level of employment, the single collective agreement, and the 
company responsibility to finance the obra sociaL The union achieved generous 
voluntary retirement packages (a common policy to restructure public 
enterprises for privatisation) and the ESOP, which was an essential component 
of LyF CF propaganda to legitimise its support to privatisation. 
At industrial level, the union also kept regular contacts with managers and 
industrial authorities but were ineffective, on the one side, given the gradual 
change in the balance of forces at the workplace, on the other side, because 
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decision-making about relevant issues were concentrated in higher political 
spheres. 
When approaching the third aspect of the model, the need to disentangle 
tactical choices from ideological subordination, comes out again as a problem. 
Nevertheless, the discussion illuminates the power of neo-liberal hegemony. In 
Argentina, privatisations were framed ideologically by the ethos of the sacrifices 
demanded from workers by a national crisis. It was stressed the responsibility of 
public companies in the crisis, the lack of public resources to make investments, 
the chronic incapacity of the state to manage efficiently economic activities, and 
the need to pay the foreign debt (Cifarelli 2000). 
Findings suggest that the leadership of LyF CF played a substantial role in the 
diffusion of some components of this ideology, though rejected others. The 
dilemma was to justify their strategic shift to neutralise opposition from activists. 
With this in mind, union leaders consciously assumed and reworked, on their 
own, the ideological leitmotifs of the neo-liberal discourse. 
For instance, while refusing the responsibility of the public sector and the 
legality of the foreign debt, LyF CF stressed time and again the inevitability of 
relying on private capitals to invest and revitalise the industry. The union 
recalled workers about the good relationships maintained with the private 
employers before nationalisation, presented privatisation as a service of 
electricity workers to the nation in crisis, and stressed the lack of alternatives. 
LyF CF did not accept that a public company is inefficient by definition, but took 
efficiency and competitiveness as leitmotifs: 
It didn't matter for us who would own the company. We didn't care about 
that. But let me tell you something, we do not think that the State cannot 
run the industry. Anyway, public or private the important thing was that the 
company should be efficient. We said to the Government and workers: 'Let 
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us work for an efficient company to gain competitiveness' (Union Official - 
LyF CF). 
LyF CF went further by developing its own discursive devices. It presented the 
ESOP as the fulfilment of the old participative traditions of the organisation to 
appeal a distrustful workforce. NEC's communications to lay representatives 
strengthened the continuity of aims between the old strategies and the new 
ones: 
Luz y Fuerza achieves in concrete, with the opportunity to buy shares, and 
administers them collectively under worker's organisation leadership, the 
implementation of its long-awaited philosophy of responsible participation in 
order to look after the national interest, consumers' interests, and the 
present and the future of the electricity workers (Dinamis, Abril 1991). 
Accordingly, the journal Dinamis devoted important space to present win-win 
scenarios stemming fr6m workers participation in shares-schemes: 
We hope that the old 'them and us' model in which interests are 
antagonistic, that is, where capital opposes workers, becomes a new 
model, where everybody gain if businesses are successfully run (Dinamis, 
December 1990) 
Though with less enthusiasm, the same line of argument is reaffirmed today 
within the ethos of popular capitalism: 
We fought for getting shares. We defended the ESOPs. Why? After 1976 
the state was very authoritarian and did not allow us to participate. This 
situation did not change with the democracy either. That is the reason of 
our support to privatisation. For us, the ESOP meant a new participative 
style. A new role for workers in a popular capitalism (Union Official - LyF 
CF) 
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Overall, the image, after applying Lukes' model to the case of LyF CF, is one of 
union subordination with the aim of revitalising the traditional channels of 
political exchange between unions and the state. The novelty rests on the 
content of the exchange. The union, as in the past, compromises to deliver 
social peace and collaboration, whereas the government denies unions' 
influence in the design of public policy and just offers business opportunities as 
compensation. However, this devaluation of the traditional political resources 
did not alter LyF CIF inclination to neglect the development and mobilisation of 
industrial (re-)sources. 
Organisation, decision-making, leadership: the birth of a new style 
of unionism 
Two organisational developments are relevant at this stage for our enquiry 
about the relationship between the opportunity-to-act and trade unions' internal 
capabilities. On the one side, the growing weakness of the workplace structures 
(comislones intemas), and with it, of a lively internal democracy capable of 
posing limits to a bureaucratic leadership. This fact was the outcome, first and 
foremost, of the military repression between 1976 and 1983; second, of the 
restructuring of the public enterprises just before privatisation. The latter 
targeted the union, once more, through the massive retirement of the remaining 
old and experienced lay representatives. By this way, it stopped the slight 
recovering of workers' organisations that continued the end of the military rule. 
On the other side, this pre-privatisation restructuring also meant financial 
pressure upon the assets and resources accumulated by the organisation to 
serve its members. LyF CF defended the so-called 'multiple trade unionism', a 
strategy that intended to go beyond the horizon of gremial struggles towards the 
exercise of political influence in the design of public policy, the participation in 
the running of the industry, and the satisfaction of workers social needs. To fulfil 
the latter, the union devoted, energies to supply workers with cheap houses, 
hotels, holidays packages, an institute for secondary studies and training, 
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pharmacies, food cooperatives, personal loans, and so forth. These resources 
were, historically, important levers of power for union leadership. But, job loss, 
and hence, a decrease in union membership, and the suspension of employer 
contributions to the union threaten the very sustainability of an organisation that, 
just before privatisation, employed 1100 workers, and signed as employer 5 
different collective agreements (LyF CF 1989). 
These organisational factors help to explain the strategic choices of the union 
bureaucratic leadership in the face of an opportunity structure that discouraged 
forms of collective action based on workers' mobilisation. Thus, pragmatism 
prevailed before the new contents of the political exchange set down by the 
government. The bureaucracy of the state rejected the traditional mediating role 
of Peronist unions based on their tactic, which combined doses of workers' 
mobilisation and negotiation. Instead, 'business opportunities' became the only 
offer made by the political power in exchange for union political and ideological 
reliability. The eclipse of the internal life of the organisation, and consequently, 
of a more participative democracy, and the absence of an articulated 
opposition, plus a huge institutional structure about to collapse, due to lack of 
money, eased the way for the union leadership to accept the new compromise. 
In this manner, they inaugurated a new style of unionism in Argentina. Some 
authors have classified it as a local type of business unionism (Palomino 2005). 
However,, the principles of business unionism were already present in 
Argentina, mostly, in the workings of the obras socials. This new style has gone 
beyond that towards a truly entrepreneurial unionism, which assumed directly 
the function of capital in the running of a diverse portfolio of businesses. In 
further chapters, its components will be analysed in detail. 
The case of LyF MDP: opposition and community alliances 
In this case, the anti-privatisation campaign is arguably still an on-going 
process, for a new campaign asking to rescind the private concession obtained 
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by EDEA in 1997 was launched by the union in the beginning of 2005. It began 
in 1987, two years before the assumption of Carlos Menem, when the actual 
leadership won the internal election. Since then, the campaign has included a 
vast repertoire of collective actions against the process of privatisation, which 
took ten years, partly, as the result of workers' opposition. Three stages were 
particularly conflictive during this period. 
First, between July 1987 and August 1990, the union fought the project to divide 
DEBA - the provincial generation and distribution company covering the 
Province of Buenos Aires, in three functional firms as the first step towards its 
privatisation: ESEBA SA, ESEBA Distribuci6n and ESEBA Generaci6n. Over 
three years, the union launched several campaigns, often based in the 
democratic vote of the membership through general assemblies, that included 
widespread propaganda, the exercise of political pressure over the Provincial 
and industrial authorities, and even industrial action. Alongside the campaign, 
the union attempted to get support from the CGT and FATLyF, which ultimately 
ended up supporting the privatisation. In addition, the leadership sought to forge 
alliances with the trade unions operating in other geographical areas covered by 
the enterprise and with local sections of public unions. Indeed, by the end of this 
period, LyF MDP deepened the orientation towards coalition building by making 
the first call to community organisations, universities and political parties to join 
the struggle. Differently from LyF CF, the union opposed the Emergency and 
State Reforms Laws (8 de Octubre, nO 36 31/10/89), as also differently from LyF 
CF the union opposed the anti-strike decree one year later (8 de Octubre, 
several issues). 
The second stage began after a relative period of peace, when in May 1992, the 
Provincial Government announced the privatisation of the company. In this 
context, the union confronted rationalisation and restructuring plans mounting a 
sustained defence against a three-fold attack. The main front was the attack to 
the collective agreement, which counted on the, connivance of FATLyF. The 
rationale of this assault was the managerial search of control over the labour 
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process and the establishment of flexibility at the workplace. Another front was 
the downsizing of the workforce through outsourcing, voluntary and early 
retirements, and compulsory redundancies. The third front was constituted by 
anti-union policies, and even derecognition. With these defensive aims in mind, 
union officials widened their tactical repertoire, which included: all sort of 
industrial action, legal submissions, workers and popular demonstrations, 
workers and popular rallies, silent rallies, political alliances with local authorities 
and local sections of political parties, sitting protest demonstrations in front of 
the Municipality, hunger strikes and fasts, blackouts to show community 
solidarity, the gathering of 70000 solidarity signatures, organisation of popular 
musical concerts, and even the putting up of a tent in front of the company for 7 
months and 11 days. In all the cases, the union forged alliances with community 
organisations and other local unions. Most crucially, the union promoted during 
this stage, together with other unions, mainly from the public sector, the 
formation of a new peak organisation, the Central de Trabajadores Argentinos 
(CTA) to rival the pro-reform CGT (8 de Octubre, several issues; LyF MDP 
1995c). 
The third stage runs between September 1996 - when the union asked the 
Provincial and Municipal Governments to implement a popular referendum, and 
July 1997 - when the company was finally privatised. Over this period, the anti- 
privatisation campaign was again the main focus of LyF MDP, which deepened 
its political alliances with community organisations to oppose the sale, and 
organised a popular assembly when the authorities finally rejected the 
referendum. Simultaneously, the organisation continued to oppose early and 
voluntary retirement, and decided to confront compulsory redundancies; every 
member inclined to accept the offer had to face expulsion by decision taken in 
general assemblies. Calls for industrial action completed the picture (8 de 
Octubre, several issues; LyF MDP 1997). 
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The opportunity-to-act 
The political and ideological environment faced by LyF MDP was similar to that 
confronted by LyF CF; however, there are important peculiarities to note. 
Privatisation developed initially at national level; the Provincial State was not 
under the same hurry to sell the provincial public enterprises. Similarly, the 
interference of IMF and WB with the design of public policy was lesser at 
Provincial level, given that it was much lesser the Provincial foreign debt. 
Besides, as the union succeeded in postponing the sale, though the positive 
image of trade unions continued to be very low (Nueva Mayoria 1997a), popular 
support to privatisation started to fade away following other traumatic 
experiences (Nueva Mayorla 1997b) (see Table 7) . For instance, this pressure 
pushed the Provincial administration to set down in the privatisation bill a 
minimum level for employment in the would-be private company in order to 
avoid massive downsizing. Crucially, the union leadership was not enrolled in 
the Peronism, although most union officials belonged to it. Together with 
organisational and agency type variables these structural factors are relevant to 
understand the virulence of the anti-privatisation campaigns in this case. 
Table 7: Percentages of Positive Image of Trade Unions and Privatisation Policy 
(Oninion Pollsl. 
1 87 1988 1989 1990 1991 19 5 1996 1997 
Trade Unions 191 16 21 111 8 8 
1 
7 7 6 6 7 
Privatisation 
- 
281 29 35 45 1 36 36 28 30 28 22 18 
bource: Nueva mayoria i9q-ta, 1997t) 
This time, Lukes' model appears as lacking to grasp the phenomenon in its 
whole meaning. 
As for the first face of power, ' while the union's opposition to privatisation was 
unsuccessful, as f6r-as it didn't prevent, or reverse it, union' campaigns delayed 
the privatisation for years. To argue that the'union was either persuaded or 
forced to adopt a course of action other than the one it originally intended 
seems not enough, and' perhaps untrue. The union has fiercely fought 
privatisation all along the'way, even after its implementation, by alternating its 
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repertoire of tactics, partly, as a result of external pressures stemming from 
governmental interventions and managerial attacks. It was finally defeated, and 
therefore, the effective privatisation of the industry indicates that power relations 
were not favourable to workers. But, the political direction chosen by the union 
suffered no alteration, and ESI workers engaged in collective actions until the 
last minute to stop it. And they still campaign for the re-nationalisation of the 
company. Indeed, the union has launched this year a national campaign for the 
re-nationalisation of the energy industry. 
As stated before, Kelly's model to analyse the openness of the political 
decision-making of the state presents difficulties for the Argentinean cases. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to infer some basic tendencies from the collected 
data about the political dimensions of the (re-)sources of power of LyF MDP 
(Batstone 1988). 
Contacts with the Provincial Government were scarce and often related to 
situations of conflict, given union complete opposition to privatisation. There 
was neither personal channels between union leadership and political 
authorities nor union affiliation to political parties. Instead, the union intended to 
take advantage from differences in Provincial and Municipal political alignments. 
The Municipal Government never assumed an open anti-privatisation stance 
but local councillors voted statements of support for the union during its conflict 
with FATLyF, in 1993, and during conflicts with ESEBA related to outsourcing 
policies, in 1994. However, in 1996 the local council voted against the project to 
organise a referendum about the privatisation submitted to the Municipal 
Legislative body by the union. Yet, in 1997, just before privatisation, the same 
body accepted to organise an Open Session in which issues and information 
about the privatisation of ESEBA were debated, and trade union officials and 
other representatives of the community had the opportunity to explain the 
reasons of their opposition. This action was important to popularise union's 
political views and consolidate community alliances. Thus, LyF MDP's ability to 
exercise political influence was also small as in the case of LyF CF; but the 
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important thing is that, even this small capacity stemmed from a different logic. 
The union was able to replace the declining repertoire of traditional political 
resources for a new one: the support and mobilisation of communitarian 
organisations. 
Trade union power resources, which depended on governmental support and 
intervention in disputes and conflicts, evaporated. The same adverse conditions 
outlined above with regard to Governmental labour policies and legislation 
applies to LyF MDP. As for the risk of repression, as time passed, it faded 
away; in fact, despite acute confrontations the Provincial Government did not 
use open violence to defeat the trade union's resistance. Perhaps, this was 
partly due to the richness of its tactical repertoire. The union shifted constantly 
between different types of collective actions, some of them very powerful in 
terms of symbolism (hunger strikes, for instance) and without damaging 
production or service levels. In these cases, the political cost of repression 
could have been enormous for the Government. Moreover, the union often 
reassured the basic provision of minimum standards of power, avoiding open 
defiance of the anti-strike legislation, although, in fact, the union did not comply 
with the law. 
As a result, public authorities and top management attacked procedural and 
other collective deals to undermine the industrial dimensions of union power (re- 
)sources. This counter-mobilising move included macho-management tactics, a 
parallel union, and continuous harassment through administrative and legal 
means. The most striking episode was the recognition by the Ministry of Labour 
of a collective agreement signed by FATLyF on behalf of the electrical workers 
in 1992, which replaced the old agreement of mid-1970s for a flexible one, to 
prepare the company for privatisation and to weaken trade union power at the 
workplace. This was not only a flagrant disregard for the law but also a hallmark 
of the connivance between the Government and a corrupted faction of the trade 
union leadership. Moreover, the spread of,, political 
' 
extortion and anti-union 
tactics was the inevitable corollary., It is possible to list several examples. In 
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1994, ESEBA replied to union opposition to outsourcing by imposing sanctions 
to 500 workers and firing 23. After that, the management made a proposal to 
exchange the compulsory redundancies for trade union voluntary acceptance of 
the collective agreement signed by FATLyF to replace the CCT 36175. In 
addition, ESEBA used financial penalties to encourage defections from LyF 
MDP, refusing to pay $120 (Argentine pesos) in food tickets to those retaining 
membership. Given that the average wage was $700, and the additional food 
payment was given to members of the breakaway union, the incentive was 
significant. Moreover, officials of the breakaway union benefited from paid- 
holidays to carry out their representative duties, despite the lack of personerla 
gremial of the organisation. The story of the policy of early and voluntary 
retirement is another example of bullying and repression. Threats, home letters, 
compulsory transfers to other cities, and dismissals likely to be exchanged later 
for better redundancy packages, were the background of this policy; among the 
victims were many lay representatives. In 1995, ESEBA even failed to comply 
with the conciliaci6n obligatoria decided by the Ministry of Labour during a 
labour conflict, confirming 193 dismissals of members of LyF MDP, among 
them, once more, lay representatives. Soon after, the company suspended 60 
workers, in this case, attempting to include members of the NEC. At the peak of 
the confrontation, there was an arson attack on trade union premises, verbal 
assaults to NEC's members, threats. to their relatives, and even a drive-by 
shooting to the house of a trade union official. Methods of this kind have been 
very persuasive to deter social mobilisation in Argentina after the last 
dictatorship. Shortly, the analysis of power resources at this level reveals the 
most negative change, despite unions' ability to mobilise workers through in 
industrial action. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that the Provincial 
Government together with the provincial and the national branches of the 
Ministry of Labour shared responsibility for this situation, as they tolerated and 
even encouraged most management decisions despite their illegal character. 
Regarding the second analytical variable of Lukes' model, union opposition 
reduced to a minimum the field of interactions. In fact, there was no real agenda 
148 
of negotiations around privatisation. Negotiations came out during conflicts but 
not as a part of a concrete agenda, which was absent in the run up to 
privatisation. By rejecting the idea that privatisation was unavoidable, LyF MDP 
rejected pragmatism, the common landscape among public union facing 
privatisation (Orlansky & Orciani 1994). Thus, the union negotiated neither the 
future structures of the industry nor compensations for workers. Instead, LyF 
MDP mobilised industrial action, community alliances or legal resources to 
confront every decision contrary to their interests. 
The analysis of the third dimension of power shows a continuous ideological 
struggle to combat the diffusion of the idea of privatisation among workers. The 
union performed an ideological counter-hegemonic role that was very 
successful among the rank-and-file and secured that union members did not 
give their assent to the sale of public assets. Union officials combated the 
association between privatisation and win-win scenarios in the public discourse 
by pointing to the failure of previous privatisations. They also argued bitterly 
against the inefficiency of the public companies, framing it as purposely pursued 
to justify their sale to the private capital. Besides, union leadership claimed the 
social role of public utilities refusing to measure their efficiency just in terms of 
competitiveness. Finally, instead of the abstract praise of the consumer identity, 
LyF MDP articulated common policies with community groups. The most 
important achievement of this alliance was the promulgation of the TEIS Law 
(Electrical Tariff of Social Interest) in 2002, for households that cannot afford the 
provision of electricity. The ideological impact of this type of action was 
notorious. 
In this case, a fierce inter-union dispute is a salient factor shaping the 
opportunity structure faced by the union. While LyF MDP embarked in an 
intransigent anti-privatisation campaign, the national Federation zigzagged 
between soft opposition and opportunistic political support. When the latter 
finally opted for the 'entrepreneurial strategy', the rupture was unavoidable. The 
first open conflict had appeared when FATLyF decided in 1989 to support the 
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transformation of DEBA in ESEBA. Then, political differences blow up again 
when FATLyF derecognised an alternative negotiating proposal prepared by 
several unions under the leadership of LyF MDP. But the key event was the 
process of negotiation started by FATLyF and ESEBA in 1991 to close a new 
collective agreement for the company. LyF MDP, first, complained to the 
Ministry of Labour, and second, presented a legal claim before the Courts. 
Simultaneously, the union leadership organised a political faction within the 
Federation, which gained the support of 19 out of 44 members, but the 
experience finished in January of 1993, when the leadership of FATLyF 
expelled LyF MDP from the federative body and dismantled the antagonist 
faction. Soon after, the Federation took over the control of the obra social of LyF 
MDP, an essential power resource of Argentinean trade unions. This dispute 
ended in 1994, when FATLyF finally reached a new agreement to replace the 
old and protective CCT 36/75; in this way, LyF MDP prerogatives at workplace 
level were limited. Then, the last step was the contribution of FATLyF to form a 
parallel organisation that challenged the position of LyF MDP, though it failed to 
gain terrain among the workforce. If it never posed a threat to LyF MDP's 
hegemony, this new organisation together with FATLyF was functional to 
legitimise several of the illegal actions taken by the company and the Ministry of 
Labour. By action or omission, the Provincial Government backed this strategy. 
This inter-union dispute forced LyF MDP to spend a lot of time and resources to 
overcome its negative effects. Essentially, it allowed management to negotiate 
a new agreement, which undermined union power. 
Summarising, the determination of the Provincial administration to carry out the 
privatisation programme, the empowerment of managerial prerogatives, anti- 
unionism, and inter-union rivalry are variables that speaks of an unfavourable 
opportunity structure for LyF MIDP. Yet, some other aspects appear to be a bit 
more ambiguous. Tensions among the municipal, provincial and national levels 
of the state apparatus let the union get access to local representative bodies. 
The lesser involvement of IMF and WB in the privatisation of the provincial 
company meant less pressure upon the administration to sell the company 
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quickly. Thus, union opposition was successful in delaying privatisation; 
concomitantly, popular support for privatisation decreased, easing the field for 
the development of coalition building as an alternative political resource, which 
contributed to widen the repertoire of action of the union. Lastly, the union did 
not form part of the PJ, and consequently, it did not have to demonstrate loyalty 
to the Government. But the capacity to exploit these ambiguities depended, 
partly, on organisational features and the skills, styles and political objectives of 
the leadership. 
Organisation, decision-making., leadership: towards social-unionism 
There are four organisational differences with LyF CF, which may be of 
relevance to understand the variability of their responses. First, the smaller size 
of LyF IVIDP seemed to have facilitated wider rank-and-file participation. 
Second, the organisation, in contrast to LyF CF, did not suffer the same loss of 
experienced lay representatives. On the one side, repression during the last 
dictatorship was softer in the case of LyF MDP; on the other side, the strong 
opposition of the organisation to voluntary redundancies prevented the exodus 
of militants during the pre-privatisation process. Third, the organisational 
resources to service members were small. In this sense, LyF MDP neither had 
financial pressures to sustain a huge structure when privatisation policies 
impacted on its budget nor owned assets likely to be invested in the new 
businesses. Servicing members was not a key legitimating apparatus for its 
leadership. To provide services to membership the organisation had strongly 
depended on FATLyF until it left the national Federation. However, most of the 
unions operating in the same public company (14 in total) shared similar 
features, but chose to accept privatisation and supported, ideologically, 
politically and economically, the 'entrepreneurial unionism' of FATLyF . 
Then, a relevant difference seems to rest in the style of leadership and'the 
dynamics of the process of decision-making. The defence of a participatory 
151, - 
democracy, instead of a formal representative one; the promotion of lay 
representatives bodies; the development of communication channels for the 
rank-and-file; the amount and quality of information to be passed on to 
members; and strategic coalition building within and beyond the trade union 
movement; have been essential features of LyF MDP since 1987. The union 
leadership devoted time and effort to encourage participation. and when the 
latter occasionally fell, its NEC implemented special policies and propaganda to 
increase its level. For instance, during 1990, the growing absence of lay 
representatives from meetings troubled the union, which put forward the 
problem by different channels and, eventually, sanctioned some of them. 
Similarly, when the attendance to assemblies declined, the union applied the 
rule book in order to discipline members. As a result of these efforts, the internal 
life of the organisation was livelier than the internal life of the average public 
union in Argentina. A comparison between the number of general and lay 
representatives assemblies held by LyF MDP and LyF CF over the period under 
study illustrates the latter. 
Table 8: Mass and Lay Reps meetings In LyF MDP and LyF CF 
Trade 
Union 
Ly F MDP Ly IF CF 
Type of 
assembly 
General 
Assemblies 
Lay reps 
assemblies 
General 
assemblies 
Lay reps 
assemblies 
1990 5 5 
1991 10 6 
1992 14 8 
1993 3 6 
1994 14 20 0 1 
1995 6* 4* 0 1 
1996 7** 5** 0 1 
1997 5 4 
1998 2 3 0 2 
1999 5 0 2 
2000 4 0 3 
2001 3 2 - 
2002 4 6 0 3 
no ciata 
data between 1-1 -1995 to 30-4-95 (**) data between 1-5-1996 to 31-12-96 
This data speaks of the commitment of LyF MDP to a democratic process of 
decision-making, which spurred the mobilisation against privatisation. Over the 
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interviews, union officials stressed the importance of the interaction between 
leadership and rank-and-file democratic decision, which has supported every 
strategic choice along the anti-privatisation campaign and beyond. Information 
and mutual trust seem to have been key factors: 
The thing is that ( ... ) people was very well informed; although information is 
not enough. People saw our dedication to the organisation. We could do 
things better or worse, but they did not doubt about our utter dedication to 
the cause. And what we anticipated, it was shown in practice (Union Official 
- LyF MDP - Official) 
There is trust... Most fellows do not share the political orientation of the 
leadership, but they know that they will neither betray nor negotiate for their 
own interest. Let's say that there is mutual trust and that is why you will find 
discipline among workers (Lay Representative - LyF MDP) 
A basic aim of the leadership of LyF MDP has been to supersede the traditional 
model of Argentinean unionism by a new social unionism, autonomous from the 
political bureaucracy of the PJ and the state, oriented to the community and 
combative. To achieve this objective the union orchestrated a political strategy, 
backed by the mobilisation of the rank-and-file, which comprised a wide 
repertoire of collective actions, coalition building within and outside the labour 
movement, the extensive use of legal resources, and the provision of counter- 
hegemonic information. Those tactics crystallized, eventually, in the formation of 
the CTA, a new peak organisation to dispute the leadership of the Argentinean 
labour movement. 
Conclusion 
By putting forward a conceptual framework, in which it is possible to link 
external and internal conditions that constrain trade unions' strategies and 
workers collectivism, mobilisation theory has proved to be useful to analyse the 
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forms taken by the anti-privatisation campaigns under study. Furthermore, to 
apply the theory within a comparative research design seems to enrich its 
explanatory scope. 
In general terms, the comparative analysis shows that, during the process of 
privatisation, adverse changes in opportunity structure due to political and legal 
factors were not automatically translated into effective changes within the realm 
of production. This was a heterogeneous development in scope and timing. In 
this regard, differences between the British and the Argentinean experience 
suggest, for instance, that the role of Governments in changing power relations 
at the micro-political level of industrial relations varied according to the degree 
of external pressures behind the programme of privatisation, and the extent to 
which the micro-politics of industrial relations are expressed in legislation and 
formal rules, in which the state plays a central role. Similarly, comparison 
showed that the mobilisation of political and industrial dimensions of union 
power resources might vary according to these same institutional variables, but 
also with the internal dynamics of union decision-making and leadership styles. 
ESI unions from both countries experienced legal offensives to thwart their 
ability to disrupt production. Yet, the evolutionary change of the organisation of 
labour and the industrial relations arrangements in UK, allowed unions to 
maintain their industrial (re-)sources of power, and hence, industrial latent 
power. This helped British ESI unions to gain defensive political influence within 
a context of political retreat, Ihough, ironically, this influence failed to shape the 
agenda of negotiations with regards the future structures of the industry. On the 
contrary, in Argentina, public authorities used their industrial relations 
prerogatives to undermine the industrial power of ESI unions. In this manner, 
they prevented union from mobilising industrial resources defensively to oppose 
the governmental decision to change the scope and content of the characteristic 
political exchange of the Argentinean system. The latter had guaranteed trade 
unions the ability to mobilise their influence to doom to failure government's 
policies, including programmes of privatisation during 1980s. As privatisation 
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needed, firstly, to be imposed politically in the public agenda, this capacity had 
to be eliminated. 
The theoretical framework stressed that trade unions are conditioned by their 
external circumstances but also seek to shape them, according to how they 
interpret the opportunity structure, which in turn depends on organisational 
aspects and agency type variables, like leadership styles, workers participation, 
decision-making processes, that is, the social mediations comprised by the 
category interest. In this regards, the case of LyF MDP is paramount, as a 
combative leadership was able to confront privatisation through participatory 
processes of decision-making, which sustained workers' collective action. The 
union chose not to accept the inevitability of privatisation, and therefore, did not 
enter into negotiations to achieve the best possible outcome. Thus, union 
leadership refused to engage in any form of political exchange, either at micro 
or macro level. A corollary of that choice was that the organisation was forced to 
replace traditional resources and to find other ideological and political resources 
to keep members' cohesion over a long and open confrontation. Community 
alliances were the key substitutes developed by LyF MDP along the process. In 
the main, this case revealed that different political choices changed the 
hierarchy and content of union resources. While other organisations neglected 
coalition building, LyF MDP devoted huge energies to achieve this aim. Yet, the 
case of Unison would also show that it is not only a matter of political choice, 
but also of organisational possibilities, for while coalition building appeared to 
have been among the aims of several union officials of this organisation, who 
wanted to replicate what the union had done in water or gas, ESTUC precluded 
the evolution of this strategic orientation. The organisational variable also 
contributes to explain, partly, the particular choices of LyF CF, as the weight of 
its accumulated assets and its organisational structures to service members, 
created the material possibilities for the development of a commercial strategy 
with the favour of the public authorities. 
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The analysis shows too, that political contacts tied unions into a privatising 
agenda, and hence, reinforced unions' preferences for the mobilisation of 
political resources, whereas reduced the likelihood of the collective mobilisation 
of workers. Yet, if power is defined as the ability to achieve outcomes, in the 
end, both alternatives were unsuccessful to prevent privatisation. Still, the first 
one permitted British unions, for instance, to secure protection for pensions, 
whereas the second one, delayed privatisation for years in the case of LyF 
MDP. As for the factors tending to encourage workers' collective actions, the 
combination of Lukes' model and the comparative approach seems to suggest 
that an important one was the struggle against the ideological assumptions, 
which backed the privatisation programme. 
Finally, the comparative approach gives credit to McIlroy's (1999) insight about 
how far adverse legislation, and other negative institutional and political 
developments, may support full-time officials hostile to forms of collective action 
based upon rank-and-file mobilisation. EETPU and LyF CF offer the possibility 
to make the case for this interpretation, as their officials discouraged industrial 
action by pointing constantly to external limitations. This fact may add to a more 
subtle analysis of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation by including not only 
capital and state demobilising strategies, but also the old problem of the role of 
trade unions in reinforcing capital and state hegemony. 
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Chapter 8 
The Forms of Counter-mobilisation: the Politics of Money 
Mobilisation theory has been applied in chapter 7 to cast light on the anti- 
privatisation campaigns following in full the sequence set in the analytical 
framework: first, the analysis of the opportunity-to-act; second, the evaluation of 
the prospects of mobilisation by assessing the categories organisation and 
interest. This chapter, instead, intends to analyse a particular aspect of the 
process of counter-mobilisation: the variety of policies, by which workers and 
union officials were bought off through money incentives. Basically, these 
policies were intended to counteract discontent over the privatisation process 
and after, when private companies began to introduce change in the realm of 
production. Arguably, the aim was to dampen the sense of injustice (amongst 
members and negotiators) by providing some incentives for existing employees, 
which comprised a wide range of initiatives, from those with financial 
consequences for individuals and unions to those with ideological impacts on 
workers and union leaderships. As stressed by an English union official: 
When the companies were given the power, they wanted to change certain 
things, and the only way they could change it was by giving people more 
money (National officer - Amicus). 
However, the politics of money was pursued not only by managers after 
privatisation, but also by public authorities before it. Its most salient aspect, 
shared by both countries, was the use of generous redundancy packages to 
downsize the workforce with a minimum of industrial conflict. While in Argentina 
this policy involved the state and international financial institutions before 
privatisation, in UK the bulk of the process began after it. Similarly, ESOPs - the 
so-called PPP (Programas de Propiedad Participada) in Argentina, were 
implemented in both countries, as sweeteners to reduce union opposition. Yet, 
sources of variability may be found in different employment laws, labour 
markets' conditions and unions' structures and governments. These sources 
also determined country specific phenomena like the use of personal contracts 
in UK, or the emergency of an entrepreneurial trade unionism, built around the 
new business opportunities opened to the union leadership in exchange for 
social peace and ideological support in Argentina. 
Regarding the theoretical and conceptual objective of this chapter, the point is 
to investigate the multiple consequences of a particular counter-mobilising 
policy, the mobilisation of money resources, as to clarify the relationships 
between counter-mobilisation and change in the categories of opportunity-to- 
act, organisation and interest definition. 
The chapter will focus on four main dimensions of the politics of money: 
voluntary redundancies, shares schemes, personal contracts and business 
compensations. 
The politics of voluntary redundancies 
The main consequence of the ESI privatisation in UK and Argentina was a 
dramatic job loss. The figures available, though difficult to achieve for the whole 
period, are revealing. Between 1990-91 and 1995-96,46480 employees had left 
the industry in UK, that is, a reduction of 32.6 % (see Table 9). 
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Table 9: Job loss In the electricity industry between 1990-91 / 1995-96 - UK 
Company Workforce 
1990-91 
Workforce 
1991-92 
Workforce 
1992-93 
Workforce 
1993-94 
Workforce 
1994-95 
Workforce 
1995-96 
Variation 
1990-91 
1995-96 
Eastern 
Electricity 
10001 9877 8415 7003 6403 6113 -38.9 
East Midlands 
Electricity 
7382 8243 8684 7914 6458 
I 
5051 -31.6 
Hydro-Electric 3484 3480 3494 3552 3584 3435 -1.4 
London 
Electricity 
6691 6581 6258 5532 4908 4404 -34.2 
Manweb 5483 4623 4533 4604 4582 3303 -39.8 
Midlands 
Electricity 
7729 7643 7370 6207 5815 5114 -33.8 
National Power 15713 13277 9934 6955 54471 4848 -69.1 
NIE Nd nd 3851 3536 3035 2826 
NGC 6550 6217 5666 5127 4871 4565 -30.3 
Northern 
Electric 
5528 5364 4826 4714 4456 3882 -29.8 
NORWEB 8203 7917 7977 7652 7617. 8196 -0.1 
Nuclear 
Electricity 
13924 T3-300 12283 10728 9426 8815 -36.7 
PowerGen 8840 7771 5715 4782 4171 4148 -53.1 
Scottish 
Nuclear 
1976 2047 2172 2060 1860 1704 -13.8 
Scottish Power 9848 9495 8724 7778 8041 8036 
_-1 
8. 
SEEB 6340 6257 6039 5339 4680 1 4278 -32.5 
Southern 
Electric 
8362 8340 7642 7391 7091 6728 -19.5 
South Wales 
Electricity 
3767 3632 3166 3350 3218 2979 -20.9 
South Western 
Electricity 
5676 5553 5569 5092 4656 3424 -39.7 
Yorkshire 
Electricity 
7126 7105 6850 57643 4924 4294 -39.7 
TOTAL 142623 
. 
136722 
, 
129168 
. 
115080 
. 
105243 96143 -32.6 
gource: uenire ror ine btuay oT Kegulatea inaustnes. UK. 
In Argentina, figures show a similar story. Between 1990 and 1993,4499 
workers left the industry, that is, a reduction of 28.4 % of the workforce (see 
Table 10). However, this rate is misleading, for the state had already began a 
process of rationalisation through voluntary redundancy programmes. At the 
beginning of 1990, SEGBA employed 22451 workers; when the company was 
transferred to the new owners, 6645 of those had gone by means of an early 
retirement programme. Thus, if we take the end of 1989 as a reference, the 
total workforce was almost halved in four years. 
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Table 10: Job loss over the first year of privatisation - Argentina 
Company 1992 
(privatis tion) 
1993 Variation 
Central Puerto 1115 798 -28.4 
Central Costanera 795 661 -16.8 
Edenor 6443 4164 -35.3 
Edesur 6529 5051 -22.6 
Central Dock Sud 75 60 -22.0 
Central Pedro de 
Mendoza 
59 31 -47.5 
Edelap 741 542 -26.8 
SEGBA residual 59 Nd 
TOTAL 15806 11307 
Source: de Luca 1998 
The main forces underlying job reductions included rationalisation, technological 
change (particularly, in the case of UK, as generating companies switched 
capacity from coal to smaller gas fired plant, which were more automated), 
organisational change, and transference of maintenance functions to external 
contractors (particularly, in Argentina). While some of these aspects might have 
occurred without privatisation, the latter provided an opportunity for pushing 
through downsizing measures. 
Such a job cut demanded the mobilisation of big financial resources to avoid 
conflict; governments and companies used money to overcome resistance. 
Only against this background of generous redundancy packages, it is possible 
to understand workers' passivity before the devastation of the employment in 
the electricity industries. 
In UK, ESI unions overtly opposed compulsory redundancies. Traditionally, 
electricity workers had never suffered compulsory job losses, due to the 
collective bargaining strength of the unions. In ESI, moderate amounts of 
redundancies were usually done voluntarily, as its staff benefited from long 
service and large pensions at the time of retirement. Yet, unions apparently did 
not foresee the size of the job loss to come owing to the combined pressures of 
the regulator policies, city expectations and the post-privatisation plans of 
ration alisation. Therefore, in their eagerness to contribute to a peaceful 
transition, trade unions considered acceptable severance packages whenever 
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workers found them to be generous. In this context, companies used their large 
money stocks in conjunction with the large profits they were making in the post- 
privatisation to fund the pensions of the time and generate selective voluntary 
severances. In sum, good financial packages coupled with protected pensions - 
ironically, a key bargaining objective of ESI unions, ensured the companies the 
possession of a powerful device to downsize the workforce. 
Q: how many members did the union lose as a consequence of 
privatisation? 
R: well, as a consequence of privatisation... you are talking about 40000... 
Or maybe more, 50000 people have left the industry. They have left the 
industry -I have to say - almost without exception with very good financial 
packages. There have been no strikes, or very few strikes or 
confrontations, because the companies continue to offer generous 
redundancies payments. And also, the pension scheme, that meant that 
you could retire with no loss of benefits at the age of 50 (National Officer - 
Amicus). 
Moreover, many of those who left a company continued to work elsewhere in 
the industry. And even within the same firm, as in the extreme case of 
PowerGen, where almost half of 1000 redundancies returned as short term 
contractors by an arrangement included- in their severance packages. 
The pace of job loss ended up weakening the morale of the workforce, and 
hence, trade unions ability to mobilise members into collective actions to stop a 
policy they themselves accepted in the beginning. It is possible to argue that the 
politics of voluntary redundancies led to the development of a 'redundancy 
culture' among the workforce, that is, a favourable attitude towards voluntary 
severances as a shortcut to obtain financial benefits. Qualitative data from 
interviews supports this assertion: 
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The members were demoralised... demoralised. They wanted to get the 
money and go. Put the past behind them. Leave the industry (National 
Officer - Amicus). 
R: So, this company immediately announced 2500 job losses in quite 
really... really attractive terms. They were oversubscribed. right? Three 
times, near everybody in the company. 
Q: Everybody wanted to leave? l 
R: It is not an exaggeration. There was a massive... massive queue of 
people wanted out (National Officer - Unison). 
People came at the time and asked me to get voluntary redundancies. I 
personally refused to negotiate under such terms. Even active union 
members... just wanting to get good money to leave somewhere else 
(National Officer - Prospect). 
Thus, when immediately after privatisation, massive redundancies started to hit 
the financial and organisational strength of trade unions, the officialdom found in 
this cultural attitude an additional barrier to organise workers against this policy. 
A former NALGO official depicted the counter-mobilising effects of money as 
follows: 
Buy [workers'] cooperation. If the company has to announce 3000 job 
losses, redundancy terms: "Well, this is what is on offer. You are gonna get 
between one year and two years wages. You get a lump sum, and you can 
out into a pension scheme (... ) You can get an immediate pension now 
without any loss in benefitsm. They [workers] actually know that they can 
take the redundancy, and get a job in a related field, with someone else, the 
next week. They have no problem. And they got a big lump sum ( ... ) pay 
the mortgage or whatever. And the management know that even if we want 
to fight things - because at the time you wanted to fight these things -I 
knew that the blokes would be split probably fifty-fifty. "We want you to fight 
it, we are not gonna fight to anything, we want severancesm (National 
Officer - Unison). 
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The development of a 'redundancy culture' was just one aspect. Besides 
subjective consequences, massive job loss depleted trade unions of lay reps. 
Workplace structures were seriously damaged, for a lot of experienced union 
reps and activists left the industry through severance packages. This trend 
meant an objective lost in the midst of the growing fragmentation of the industry 
and the negotiating structures, which, in turn, was putting new pressures upon 
workplace capabilities: 
Among the people who left the industry, there was a lot of our senior reps. 
So, overnight, which is lost, it's lots and lots of experienced reps. And at the 
time, we looked at it, and thought: "Well, we dead". Because, it is a 
paradox. If you don't get any reps who can organise things to face within 
the industry all these new structures, and new businesses, and new 
companies, which began to be set in place... ' what? (National Officer - 
Unison). 
But, it was really tough at the time, and we lost a lot of the good people as a 
result of the redundancies that were taken place. And of course, you know, 
we can condemn redundancies but on an individual basis a lot of them 
were men in their fifties, the company offers them a financial package, and 
they said: "Yeah, I'm going to take it! " It was a kind of bribery. So we lost a 
lot of union reps and activists (National Officer - Amicus). 
Thus, this policy encouraged in ESI an extreme manifestation of more general 
inclinations within the UK: to seek compensation for job loss rather than to 
contest it. Some critics and union officials have blamed the line of legislation 
stemming back to the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, explicitly thought to 
ease industrial restructuring and reduced the scope for mobilisation against job 
loss by unions (Clegg 1972; Turnbull 1988; Turnbull & Wass 1997). 
In the case of Argentina, the research finds the existence of identical counter- 
mobilising policy. Still, similarities in management strategies in a different social 
and institutional context, led to differences in implementation and success, for 
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workers, very soon, confronted it. Since then, the politics of voluntary 
redundancies was a formal shell that concealed managerial harassment and 
persecution. It counted as well, with the benevolence of the Ministry of Labour, 
which gave legal cover to managerial practices by means of its prerogatives 
over the employment relationship. As in the previous chapter, it is necessary to 
differentiate between both cases: LyF CF and LyF MDP. 
The government aimed to restructure SEGBA to prepare the company for 
privatisation. In this way, the national state shared the social and economic 
costs with the private companies, which, in turn, followed later on identical 
policy. As a result, LyF CF had to face voluntary redundancies programmes 
before privatisation: 
There was a first clear-out before selling the privatisation binding. There 
was a first wave between 1991 and 1992, when privatisation began. At that 
time the public company offered 1.4 wages per each year of service to 
workers wanting to leave. Then, there was a second wave from 1992 until 
1996. You may have around 14000 workers that left the industry till today 
with voluntary retirement. That is, over the years, 14000 workers from the 
former SEGBA have gone (National Officer - LyF CF). 
This statement illustrates the general picture, but hides a gradual change in 
workers' mood, due to the growth of the unemployment rate. This is an 
important difference with UK, where workers had reasonable prospects of re- 
employment during privatisation. In Argentina, in the beginning, not only the 
offer of voluntary redundancy programmes was usually oversubscribed but also 
many workers asked union reps to arrange for them severance packages: 
In the beginning, all blokes who left the industry thought they were going to 
do wonderful things with the money: set up small businesses, buy a house 
or a car, open a kiosk. This debilitated the organisation. We tried to 
convince the lads, to tell them: "Please, don't leave, stay, we shall resist'. 
Impossiblel "You stay, I go". Until 1994, we were like that, losing our voices 
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screaming: "Don't leave... don't leave... don't leave ... " (National Officer - 
LyF CF). 
However, this germen of a 'redundancy culture' stopped together with the rise of 
unemployment. After 1994, as stressed by scholars studying other privatisations 
(Ramirez 1999; Goldin 1997), nobody wanted to leave the industry: 
After 1994-95, nobody wanted to leave; everybody had opened the eyes. 
People saw what had happened with those who left the industry, either they 
had spent the money or their businesses had failed. And they were again 
coming to ask for jobs. People without studies. Where were they going to 
find a job? How would they compete? You don't have studies... new 
technologies... everything changing... they could not compete. They were 
now unemployed, coming to the union asking for jobs, and there was not 
work. You know, if companies were still firing people! (Lay Representative - 
LyF CF). 
When workers began to reject the severance packages, companies started to 
raise their amounts. Before privatisation, those made redundant received an 
average allowance of US$ 9912, which was 10 per cent higher than that 
required by law. In total, the amount paid out by SEGBA was IJS$ 55.5 million. 
After privatisation, the average received as compensation by employees, who 
were made redundant, was up to three times the pre-privatisation payment. 
Thus, voluntary retirement packages were up to 300 % more than a severance 
deal following the labour law. While in the UK, statutory terms constitute a pretty 
meagre minimum, which is nearly always substantially improved in unionised 
settings, companies in Argentina pay strictly the amount specified by law. 
Hence, such severance packages were very attractive. Nevertheless, the 
politics of money continued to show limits as a counter-mobilising strategy. As a 
result, management shift towards harassment and repression to force people 
into voluntary redundancy programmes. 
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All interviewees, from national officials to lay reps, referred to repressive tactics. 
The reported evidence paralleled evidence recollected in other privatised 
companies by scholars and legal prosecutions. Indeed, telephone companies, 
for instance, were denounced to the Parliament by trade unions for such 
repressive practices (Ramirez 1999; Expte. nO 27.849/02). By mid 1990s, ESI 
managers began to communicate who were no longer in company's plans, and 
made to those affected the recommendation to join redundancy programmes. If 
workers refused the offer, management deployed a different range of tactics, 
which involved transfers or changes in working times and tasks or both. The 
latter included downgrading of skilled workers and upgrading of unskilled 
workers to posts, in which, their skills were insufficient to carry out the job. 
I took training courses to work as junior programmer... but they sent me out 
to read meters! What's for? Why did they invest in training courses? It was 
not only me. Everybody the same, and even more in the administrative 
sections. They kept my wage but started to compel me to join a severance 
package. And I couldn't be out there reading metersl (Former ESI worker - 
LyF CF) 
The people didn't have training for these tasks... They had been 
administrative for years, and suddenly, found themselves having to work in 
the strqet... meter reading... even maintenancel Then, the company started 
to ask most of them to leave because they were doing other grades' tasks. 
Unbelievablel (Lay Representative - LyF CF) 
In extreme cases, when workers continued to refuse the invitation to join 
redundancy programmes, tougher psychological tactics were applied. For 
instance, reluctant workers were located in empty offices where they had not 
job to do: 
It was a policy of fear; seed fear and mistreat workers psychologically. And 
it was not just a matter of swearing at workers. Look, to give you an 
example, in Central Puerto, workers were brought to an office, where they 
were left there without work. Chairs, a couple of desks, a telephone, 
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nothing else. One yearl! Maybe somebody cannot understand but for a 
worker to be sat down the whole day with nothing to do... Every single dayll 
(Lay Representative - LyF CF). 
A variation of this psychological pressure was to face managerial meddling in 
workers' private life. For instance, interviewees manifested that the Human 
Resources Department used to ring or send letters to families of reluctant 
workers to let them know that the company had offered him-or-her an important 
sum of money; that the trade union had convinced him-or-her to resist; and 
therefore, that sooner or later the company would have to fire him-or-her. 
This hard line lasted until 1997 when another approach emerged. To cut costs 
companies had been outsourcing different services. Thus, the would-be 
redundant workers started to be encouraged by managers to form cooperatives, 
and provide the service to be outsourced to the company as new owners. 
Hundreds of workers invested their severance packages to form cooperatives, 
usually, under the technical advice of the company and later on, the trade union 
too, which negotiated with the companies the sale of the service. Most of these 
cooperatives went to bankruptcy in few years (LyF CF 2000,2001,2002,2003). 
Another peculiarity of the politics of money in Argentina was that it was backed 
by the WB, the BIRF and the Ministry of Labour. The formers gave loans to the 
state to finance programmes of retirement before privatisation, and participated 
in the design of the programmes (Banco Mundial 1991). The state, in turn, 
funded part of companies' severance programmes once privatised. In addition 
to this, the Ministry of Labour gave institutional support to the process by 
authorising the voluntary retirement programmes (homologaci6n). This official 
legitimating practice continued even when the politics of money only worked by 
putting pressures upon the workforce through repressive tactics. The meaning 
of this official backing was that workers were unlikely to go to court to denounce 
unfair practices by employers. 
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Finally, as in UK, massive redundancies undermined trade union power. 
Obviously, membership loss implied financial loss. Most relevant, job loss had a 
direct impact upon the workplace structures of the union. 
I'm talking to you about all those things in a funny manner, but it was 
demolishing for us. And when a union lay rep left... even more 
demolishing... And they also left, a lot of lay reps left, and also many 
activists. The companies bribed many activists. Sometimes, they got two 
times more money than rank-and-file workers. Exactly the same thing they 
tried to do with others, and me, companies offered a lot of money to hard 
line union reps (Lay Representative - LyF CF). 
In order to analyse the case of LyF MDP, it is necessary to recall, firstly, the 
peculiarities of the opportunity structure confronted by this union. In this sense, 
two facts are relevant regarding the politics of voluntary redundancies. On the 
one side, the Provincial Government neither enjoyed the benefits of WB's loans 
nor its technical support. On the other side, as the successful opposition of LyF 
MDP delayed the privatisation, the social costs of earlier sales within the 
industry, and beyond, were clearer for the workforce reinforcing rank-and-file 
decision to confront the sale of the industry. So there was never enthusiasm 
among electricity workers in Mar del Plata for voluntary redundancy 
programmes. This attitude was strengthened by the union leadership who 
framed these programmes as unfair practices and hidden dismissals of workers. 
Q: Did people join voluntary retirements? 
R: Well, yes, there was people, but not many because we rejected it as 
hidden compulsory redundancies. 
Q: And what did you do? Did you campaign? 
R: Yes. We didn't accept it. We were not like other unions that accepted the 
voluntary retirement. No, we opposed it (National Officer - LyF MDP). 
When by the end of 1992, ESEBA launched a voluntary retirement programme, 
the company found out that the overwhelming majority of workers rejected it. 
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Company's reaction was to persecute dozens of workers, among them, 
members of the CGA (Comisi6n General Administrativa - equivalent to the 
NEC), lay reps and activists, by threatening them with dismissal if they refused 
redundancy schemes. The union replied by taking industrial action in the 
workplaces where voluntary programmes were implemented. Since then, the 
union fought back every attempt to introduce voluntary redundancies, though 
with variable consequences. The company, in turn, deployed a set of unfair and 
repressive tactics to force workers to accept special severance packages. 
Important conflicts around this policy marked every single year from 1992 to 
1997. 
The description of the practices of the private companies that took over the 
business in Buenos Aires applies to Mar del Plata. Yet, an important difference 
is that the company was still under public management when harassment to 
workers began. Another difference was that, given the opposition of LyF MDP, 
the company, from the beginning, extorted workers by putting them into the 
dilemma of having to choose between either to accept a voluntary retirement 
package or to face dismissal. Consequently, many workers joined the 
programmes despite union's open opposition. Those who left the industry under 
these circumstances were punished with expulsion from the organisation, a 
decision often taken by a general assembly. 
A critical event illustrates the unfairness and harshness of company's tactics. In 
1995,4 members of the CGA (including the second person in union hierarchy), 
8 lay union reps and 4 well-known activists were bribed with generous 
severance packages - almost three times the usual offer - and left, together, the 
organisation: 
They could not privatise the enterprise. We stopped 4 years the 
privatisation of ESEBA with our struggle. So, to break the opposition the 
company bought off part of our CGA, US$ 640000,160000 each one, and 
12 union lay reps, all of them members of our workplace organisation [in 
fact 8 union lay reps and 4 activists (8 de Octubre, 126,11/03/96)]. The 
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company realised, well, the company, and the Provincial Government 
realised that they could not defeat us. We were resisting, and they had 
already dismissed, unfairly, 6 of our lay reps. So, the company chose to buy 
off union reps (Union Officer - LyF MDP). 
In spite of the repressive and unfair tactics by which ESEBA attempted to force 
workers into the voluntary retirement, it is important to underline that between 
1992 and 1997, only 36.7 % of the total job loss was due to redundancy 
programmes (LyF IVIDP Memoria y Balance - several issues); in fact, a sign of 
the partial failure of the politics of money to avoid conflict. The remaining job 
loss is explained by normal retirement, early retirement programmes, some 
compulsory redundancies and, mainly, transference of employees to other 
public jobs outside the ESI industry, mainly, at the local council 
A factor that helps to explain this partial failure, is that LyF MDP leadership took 
full advantage of the opportunities to frame the politics of money under 
adversarial terms: 
We were warning people about things ( ... ) Honestly, I would say we 
pioneered many campaigns. For instance, when we talked to fellow lads 
about voluntary retirements, I'm not going to say that they laughed at us but 
they looked at you as if they were wondering: 'What is this guy talking 
about to me? " And we use to tell them: "Watch out, it is happening in other 
places". We tried to generate antibodies, and there was who believed and 
who didn't, who prepared themselves and who didn't (Lay representative - 
LyF MDP). 
We have been saying to fellows in every opportunity in the face of every 
new scheme of voluntary redundancies: 'Don't join the voluntary retirement. 
Think. Every single job we left meant more work for the rest of us. This let 
the company to introduce precarisation and flexibilisation. Keep with us and 
fight" (Union Officer - LyF MDP). 
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At this point, it is worth directing the attention towards the role of the leadership 
of LyF CIF too. The evidence is mixed. Yet, as a general point, it is possible to 
affirm that union officials did not embark in an ideological struggle against 
voluntary retirement programmes. It is also possible to stress the absence of 
initiatives like those of LyF MDP to punish members who joined the 
programmes. Yet, the union took industrial action in 1994 and organised a 
demonstration in front of EDESUR to denounce persecution from management 
to force workers into redundancy programmes. However, while many lay reps 
opposed voluntary retirements at workplace level, others encouraged people to 
leave and negotiate the conditions: 
To be honest, it must be said that in some places, union reps used to tell 
workers: "Sign up, ask for 5 or 10 thousands more. They'll give you the 
money". And if you asked the company, you got the money (Lay 
representative - LyF CF). 
In the case of Costanera, at least, there were two clear-outs. Voluntary 
retirements. Often voluntary retirements agreed with the union. It is true. 
What did the company do? They sent you to an office, every day, without 
work. And then, union reps came and said to you: "Come on, guys, don't 
bother anymore... get out... " The company won because workers got tired. 
It is true. It is painful, but it is true (Lay Representative - LyF CF). 
Besides the data offered by interviews, other sources confirm that LyF CF 
reached and signed agreements on voluntary retirement with the homologaci6n 
of the Ministry of Labour, hence, legitimating the rationale of the politics of 
voluntary redundancies (LyF CF 1992,1993,1994). LyF MDP, instead, 
consistently refused to legitimise such practices all along the process. 
To sum up, the politics of voluntary redundancy not only affected power 
relations as understood in Lukes' model, by cementing ideological 
understandings and expectations, and hence, diminished the opportunity for 
trade unions to act, but also undermined the organisational strength of trade 
unions. Moreover, as shown by the analysis of Argentina, when a determined 
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leadership opposed it, special severance packages were mobilised to divide this 
opposition by bribing leaders. All these factors together distorted the social 
processes of interest formation. Yet, when intermediate variables precluded its 
effectiveness - as in the case of Argentina when unemployment skyrocketed, 
the mobilisation of money resources through voluntary redundancies covered 
and intertwined with repression. 
The politics of shares 
Scholars showed that ESOPs were used to ease acceptance of privatisation 
(Goldin 1997; Murillo 2001; Pendleton, Wilson & Wright 1998; Saunders & 
Harris 1994). This literature has illuminated different dimensions of this 
preventive policy against workers mobilisation. Thus, it points to the financial 
benefits but also to the intention to refocus a sense of employee identity 
(around the company rather than the industry) and employee interests (around 
performance and competitive advantage). It even stated the links between 
ESOPs and the Conservative ideology of the popular capitalism. In any case, 
while it is difficult to measure their effects, evidence suggests that ESOPs 
played a counter-mobilising role in the privatisation of ESI in UK and Argentina. 
In the case of UK, the issue of shares seems to have impacted differently 
depending on the union. Overall, the contextual conditions made ESOPs 
appealing for staff, for companies went into flotation with low-valuations in order 
to ensure full share subscriptions, and consequently, share prices usually rose 
immediately afterwards, offering substantial benefits to those that sold. 
Qualitative findings from interviews suggest that managerial staff approached 
the issue as a possible long term investment, while manual workers opted for 
quick benefits; but union officials were unable to provide any figures to support 
this claim. Nevertheless, for EPEA it was an important matter from the 
beginning, which occupied the attention of its membership and union officials: 
"(w)e have little doubt that the effect of free and discounted shares will prove 
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generally popular with our members" (Privatisation News, n* 2, October 1988). 
EETPU paid less importance to ESOP schemes in its journal and conferences. 
Its approach was that the scheme should be "free from management influence 
and able to provide membership with effective voice within all sections of the 
industry ( ... ) according to union long term aim of increasing participation" 
(EETPU 1988). Hence, EETPU stressed that a collective trust was needed to 
ensure an independent voice. For Unison, instead, rather surprisingly, the topic 
went almost unnoticed in the organisation's press and conferences. 
As EPEA led the pre-privatisation negotiations, ESTUC lobbied continuously to 
get the best possible share ownership arrangement for membership. Thus, 
EPEA channelled its line of argument through ESTUC: that despite their 
opposition to privatisation, by asking for a share scheme, the unions were 
protecting members' interests, that an ESOP would not be compensation for 
any detrimental effects stemming from privatisation, and that the Governmental 
offer should be comparatively better to previous offers to other unions 
experiencing privatisation (Privatisation News, several issues). 
Besides the pragmatic approach, former EPEA officials have little doubt about 
the rationale of the politics of shares: 
There have always been in this country share schemes initiatives. As long 
as I can remember companies used to reward in some instances their 
employees through the issue of shares. Now, one of the ways the 
government wanted to gain the consent of the workforce was to give them 
financial incentives in the success of privatisation. And they followed the 
path that they had adopted in other privatisations and they gave the staff 
the opportunity to own shares (National Officer - Prospect). 
In addition to this short term aim, that is, to reduce workers opposition to 
privatisation, long term aims were also part of the rationale of the politics of 
shares. For instance, it was mentioned earlier that in order to gain public 
support, a strong ideological campaign was developed around common 
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ideological motives, mainly, that public enterprises were inefficient and 
ineffective because of their insulation from market forces and bankruptcy, and 
that public industrial relations needed to be transformed to undermine over- 
mighty trade unions (Pendleton & Winterton 1993). Yet together with these 
criticisms a positive argument was deployed: the building of a popular 
capitalism through spreading the ownership of shares (Ernst 1994; Saunders & 
Harris 1994). In John Moore's words, the birth of a 'property-owning 
democracy'. In the Conservative Party's 1987-election manifesto such objective 
had already emerged clearly as the historic transformation of British society 
through the widespread of share ownership. The expected outcome in the realm 
of production was that this trend would increase workers' commitment to the 
companies. While it would be imprudent to conclude that onwards, workers 
loyalty with the companies effectively increased, it is important to underline this 
ideological side of the politics of money: 
We were entering into what they called share owning democracy, and 
therefore, how you incentivise the employee to be identified with the new 
owner. So what do you do? You give a share in the company by giving 
workers shares or enable them to buy shares. And that was the 
philosophical basis behind the whole privatisation project... All those 
incentives for the staff. Well, the idea was that you link, or the philosophy 
was (that) you then translate your allegiance as an employee to the 
financial success of your company (National Officer - Prospect). 
Besides the effective fulfilment of this ideological aim, what interviewees' 
testimonies do suggest is, that, at the very least, the politics of shares 
sweetened privatisation, since workers massively invested in ESOPs: 
So there were further incentives, cash incentives all along the line that 
conform to the conservative idea... Workers in the electricity industry were 
given special incentives to buy shares. The Government introduced a 
saving scheme through a building society. And workers were encouraged to 
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deduct or allow deductions from their pay to buy shares in some future day 
and this was put into a society fund, a saving scheme. 
Q: and was this successful in terms of workers adherence? 
R: Oh, yes, yes, it was. Most workers actually invested and if you bought 
500 you got a thousand because you know the number was double 
because you got free shares (National Officer - Prospect). 
In the case of Argentina, PPPs were included in the State Reform Law of 1989 
to ease privatisation. They involved the chance for workers to have a formal rep 
(usually, a union rep) in the Board of Directors; a situation that, generally, did 
not happen as a consequence of ESOPs in the UK. Again differently from UK, 
unions had the means effectively to become institutional investors. These 
features amplified the influence of PPPs on trade union and workers' attitudes, 
at least in the case of LyF CF: 
In our case, when we knew about the PPP, the first thing we did was to fully 
involve ourselves to get a PPP, because a lot of unions were unable to get 
it. We were very busy trying to implement the shares scheme (Union Officer 
- LyF CF) 
LyF CIF developed a conscious strategy towards controlling the PPPs in order to 
gain influence within the companies by accessing business information through 
worker representatives. Additionally, it was also thought as a way of financing 
trade union'social services: 
You have 10 % of each company... I believe that this gives you power. The 
idea was to gather the 10 % of shares of each company in our Loan 
Cooperative, to make a saving stock, a market within the cooperative to 
gather all workers' shares. Then, every time a worker wanted to get the 
money, the union could have bought them the shares. And use them to 
finance services, to build houses, and obviously, to put workers' reps in the 
board of directors of each company (Union Officer - LyF CF). 
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The CGA deployed considerable efforts and resources to propagandise the 
PPPs as an opportunity to achieve the old union objective of workers' 
participation. As a result, the politics of shares had an important ideological 
impact upon union activism, too. Simultaneously, the rank-and-file appeared to 
have simply assumed the PPP as a kind of compensation for the expected 
effects of privatisation. In any case, over 90 % of workers signed up to the 
programme (Dinamis, several issues). Once the PPPs were implemented, most 
workers sought to sell their shares as soon as possible to receive cash: 
People wanted to sell, sell, sell... You know... It is easy, you see, at worst, 
one peso. For each worker it can be almost 30000 pesos. Some may 
cancelled a house mortgage, or buy a car, or sort out a health problem, or 
whatever (National Officer. LyF CF). 
What do you think? l When are you going to get 45000 dollars? l Where do 
you get it? l That is why workers from both Central Puerto and Costanera 
sold to the Chilean owners their shares very early. We couldn't stop it (Lay 
Representative - LyF CF). 
This clash of interests between the organisation and its members illustrates the 
counter-mobilising success of the policy. As to buy or sell shares was an 
individual decision, the trade union ended up losing control of the acts of its 
rank-and-file. In certain cases, the situation led to open opposition between the 
leadership of the union and the membership: 
In some companies, workers did not want the union managing the PPP. I 
was lay rep in Costanera. Workers over there didn't allow the union to 
represent them in the Board of Directors. They just didn't want the union. 
There were many conflicts. Workers, finally, chose their authorities by 
voting between two options: one from the union and an independent one. 
And the latter won (Lay Representative - LyF CF). 
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More important, the conflicts around the PPP should be understood as 
expressing not also workers' lack of confidence in the union leadership, but also 
the disruption of the internal life of the organisation due to the counter- 
mobilising effects of money. 
On the contrary, the leadership of LyF MDP rejected the PPP, though the 
organisation attempted to use it, later on, to increase union control upon EDEA. 
There were again some differences between the national and provincial PPPs, 
which are of importance for comparative purposes: 
Back to the differences between the Governor of Buenos Aires and the 
President... The former said: "Gentlemen, we are not going to waste 
workers savings as in the national PPPs. We are not going to facilitate the 
business of the few who can buy workers' shares soon after privatisation". 
So the Provincial Government introduced changes in the scheme (Union 
Lawyer - LyF MDP). 
The interviewee refers to the Provincial Law 11771, by which workers received, 
individually, their shares, only at the time of retirement. They were not allowed 
to sell in advance the shares, which would be paid - as in the case of the 
privatisation of SEGBA - through dividends. The implementation of the 
programme should take no longer than 9 months since July 1997, and workers 
would choose their representatives to the Board of Directors. 
Union determined refusal to enter in discussions about different alternatives 
with regard privatisation meant, in fact, that LyF MDP did not consider the 
potential of the programme from the point of view of workers: 
So, what happened? Well, that there is a right, and I shall say, the fellows 
didn't see this possibility, that there is a workers' right to access company 
information through their participation in the Board, minority participation of 
course, but participation. Obviously, the only thing one can do with a 10 % 
of shares is to say: "We don't want this, we don't want that, we don't want 
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this". But I can also go to the Justice and say: "I don't want it because this 
and that, and I want you to make an enquiry' (Union Lawyer - LyF MDP). 
The financial side of the politics of shares failed to attract the union leadership 
of LyF MDP, and the union, initially, despised the PPP for ideological reasons. 
Nevertheless, EDEA took a preventive decision to secure the absence of LyF 
MDP's representatives in the Board of Directors. Thus, the company colluded 
with FATLyF to appoint pro-company union representatives. Since then, LyF 
MDP have campaigned against this usurpation by publicising this situation to 
the community, taking the case to court and mobilising workers to increase the 
pressure upon the company and the public authorities. 
Thus, it is possible to detect a clear counter-mobilising rationale behind this 
particular policy, in this case, sweetening the acceptance of privatisation 
through money incentives. But again, the same policy shows multiple sides with 
potential effects, in particular on power relations - due to the ideological 
message attached to it, but also on the social processes of interest definition 
and the strategic orientation of union leaders- as shown by the cases of LyF CF 
and LyF MDP. 
Peculiarities of UK: the politics of personal contracts 
Once more, differences in legal frameworks are sources of variability. The 
notion of a personal contract is more powerful in a legal system based 
substantially on the common law as in the case of Britain, where the individual 
contract of employment acts as the conduit for most employment rights. In 
Argentina, instead, unions were able to set stricter legal limits to individual 
contracts. Thus, the diffusion of personal contracts to eschew collective 
bargaining and rights to pre-determine pay rises in favour of performance 
management systems was a relevant dimension of the politics of money in UK 
(Evans & Hudson 1993). Companies were able to take out of collective 
bargaining powerful groups of staff with consequences not only for them of 
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course, but also for those that continue to negotiate. Unsurprisingly at this stage 
of the analysis, the counter-mobilising effects of this policy have been multiple. 
To begin with, it has been commonly emphasised their role in furthering loyalty 
to the company by shifting managerial identification away from trade unions and 
sending a message to managers as to their new position as employers. The 
same point of view was expressed by interviewees: 
The idea was to divorce senior and middle managers from strong support to 
the trade union to strong support to the company. And the way they did it 
was by getting them away from relying on the union to negotiate their 
salaries, to deal ( ... ) on the one to one bases (National Officer - 
Prospect). 
In fact, it constituted a determined strategy towards the building of a true private 
management: 
In the public sector, the companies didn't need certain commercial skills, 
certain accounting and financial skills, in short, certain managerial skills. 
Once in the private sector they need all those skills. And also there was a 
sense that they wanted to change culture. You've grown up in a public 
sector management culture. And they want you to change your mind. That 
was definitely the case to introduce personal contracts (National Officer - 
Prospect). 
Yet the impact went beyond these cultural boundaries since they posed a 
concrete threat to the organisational strength of EPEA. 
In 1987, EPEA reported the growth of the, at first, covert, but then, admitted 
policy of the Company Boards, developed with the slightest consultation, of 
inducing certain NJMC staff to accept non-negotiable posts. The report 
presented the policy as part of a 'softening up' process on managers prior to 
privatisation. This policy was facilitated by holding down management pay to 
make personal contracts. Their introduction continued in the following years 
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despite complaints by EPEA. By 1990, all ESI companies managed to hire the 
majority of their managers on the basis of an individual contract. According to a 
managerial survey organised by EPEA, while in 1989 only 17 % of respondents 
admitted to be in personal contracts, in 1990 this figure reached 72 % and half 
of them said to have been transferred in the first half of the year (EPEA 1990; 
EPE, 73,2, February 1991). Thus, when companies began to give notice of 
withdrawal from the negotiating machinery, most of them have already placed 
their managers on personal contracts. Though the same survey showed that 
77% of those on personal contracts manifested that collective representation 
would be still relevant for issues like pensions, safety organisation, professional 
responsibility and the like, the danger to EPEA was evident. Interrogated about 
whether or not the process of privatisation impacted immediately on trade 
unions, former officials of EPEA often mentioned the introduction of personal 
contracts: 
The impact on trade unions were several. First and foremost, from our point 
of view, because we represented the engineers and the higher managers, 
the first the companies -did was to take the higher managers and engineers 
out of the collective bargaining (National Officer - Prospect). 
This quotation points to the 'reason why personal contracts have been 
conceived by trade unions officials as anýundermining force of collective 
bargaining: 
Our legal framework was very permissive in this respect in allowing 
employers to undermine collective bargaining through personal contracts 
(National Officer - Prospect). 
So having got the senior managers out the collective bargaining, they, then, 
sat down and discussed with the trade unions a revised method of 
collective bargaining. Looking away from the collective agreements, 
bringing in a company based bargaining, a single table, where all the 
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unions in the industry sat down and talked to the employer (National Officer 
- Prospect). 
This policy is also explicitly associated with an anti-union approach through the 
use of money: 
There was a trend in the UK at that time: union derecognition. The 
electricity employers were subtler about it. Instead of getting into 
confrontations with the unions, they bribed individuals away and said: ULook 
you could stay in the collective agreement, or if you like, there is an extra 
2000 pounds. What do you want? And you can have free medical care and 
we give you a better car". So there were inducements, personal 
inducements (Regional Officer - Prospect). 
Additionally, personal contracts deprived unions of vital information for collective 
bargaining. It has been stressed in chapters 6 and 7 that the power of EPEA 
rested, partly, upon the role occupied in the labour process by its technical, 
professional and managerial constituencies. By organising the employees in 
charge of running the industry, EPEA exercised a great influence and gathered 
worthwhile technical and financial information to bargain within the industry from 
a position of strength. In the case of EPEA, more than in the case of other ESI 
unions, membership loss implied information loss. This side of the policy was 
reinforced by the early introduction of confidentiality clauses into the letter of the 
contracts (EPEA 1989b). 
After privatisation, most companies, though not all - PowerGen kept everybody 
in collective bargaining for instance, continued with this policy depended on 
their own individual approaches. Some companies started to take out the 
technical and some administrative grades from collective bargaining, peeling off 
layer by layer the top levels and restructuring the company grading. In National 
Power, for example, the policy began to affect not only EPEA but also NALGO, 
which opposed personal contracts all over 1990 and 1991, because it was 
thought as an attempt to break workers solidarity and to introduce multi-skilling 
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without remuneration (NALGO 1990b; NALGO News, nO 494,20/9/91). Again 
during 1997, National Power intended to persuade the overwhelming majority of 
the professional and technical employees to leave the collective bargaining 
machinery. However, a significant number of EPEA's members rejected this 
time the offer; according to the data collected in interviews, perhaps an early 
indication of a changing environment: 
Also, I think, our members' experiences of personal contracts have not 
taken them in the way they were portrayed by the employer ( ... ) because 
personal contracts are less secure. People who are in personal contracts 
are now much easier to be dismissed than people in collective agreements. 
So people have got an experience now and personal contracts haven't 
been a positive experience. To some extent, this makes personal contracts 
more difficult to initiate, and less attractive, because the ongoing 
government is more or less supportive of collective bargaining, at least, 
more than the conservatives during 1990s (National Officer - Prospect). 
What actually happened, in practice, is that in the early years of that 
process people was seduced to take a personal contract, and then, the 
favourable terms were actually narrowed. So, when the company car was 
not renewed, they suddenly discovered that the car that had previously was 
no longer available to them. So, the company then, cut back the costs by 
reducing the bonus and just moderately increased the salaries (National 
Officer - Prospect). 
Furthermore, some companies have began to bring people into collective 
bargaining since 2002: 
Q: What is the reason for this trend? 
R: the reason is that it is too much time consuming to deal with individuals. 
It appears to be the reason. And you got a political climate that is changed, 
a political climate that is more encouraging towards collectivisation, you got 
that the climate within the country is shifting with the Labour government. 
Not dramatically, as some people had expected, but it is there. Overall, it is 
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easier to deal with five hundred people sifting with the trade unions, two or 
three trade unions around the table, than it is to deal with three hundred 
people in collective bargaining, and the other two hundred on the individual 
bases. And there was no real individual contracts. The only individual thing 
was the salary. It was the same contract, all the terms are identical but with 
different pay. The only thing there, was pay (Regional Officer - Prospect). 
However, the administrative argument does not seem to provide the full answer 
to this, since the multiplied administration involved should have been noticed 
before, and in fact, as recognised by the interviewee, individual terms did not 
vary much in practice (Evans & Hudson 1993). Then, it might be worth 
mentioning that offering inducements to eschew collective bargaining has 
become more difficult since unions challenged UK law in the European Court of 
Human Rights; the law now prohibits such activity where the main objective is to 
undermine membership levels or union organisation (Collins 2006; Wilson & 
Others v. United Kingdom 2002). 
Summarising, a political process, whose objective was to build a private 
management, was embedded in the diffusion of personal contracts. This 
process comprised, on the one hand, ideological elements; on the other side, 
the partial de-collectivisation of managers and other high ranks employees. In 
this latter sense, it undermined collective processes of interest definition. 
Besides, by encouraging senior and middle managers out of collective 
bargaining this policy targeted the organisational power of EPEA. In so doing, 
the process weakened the engineers, who were more reluctant to enter in these 
arrangements, and in fact, had disputed managerial prerogatives since 1970. 
Once in full control of the right to manage, some companies started recently to 
reverse somewhat this policy, due to practical and legal pressures. 
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Peculiarities of Argentina: the politics of compensation 
This aspect of the form taken by the politics of money in Argentina needs to be 
put in a wider context. As stressed by scholars (Etchemendy 2001; Etchemendy 
& Palermo 1998; Murillo 1997,2001; Palomino 2005), the CGT accepted 
market reforms in return for business concessions. Apart from generous 
severance packages and employee-owned stock programmes managed by 
unions, the latter obtained important compensations during 1992 when the 
government attempted to reform the pension system and union welfare funds 
(obras sociales). In both reforms, the CGT negotiated its participation as service 
provider. The government explicitly included a provision for unions to create 
pension funds (AFJPs) and restricted competition in the social security system 
to existing obras sociales, that is, excluding new private health insurance 
companies during an undefined transitional period starting from 1993. Later on, 
in 1994, unions also secured from the government the right to establish 
insurance firms for work accidents (ART). Besides, unions obtained subsidies 
for restructuring obras sociales, and a bailing out of their debts in relation to 
social security provisions. 
It is within this context that LyF CIF adopted an aggressive outlook towards 
businesses opportunities as compensation for the financial loss brought about 
by a declining membership. This position was channelled through FATLyF, 
actually, a national arm of LyF CF, that even participated in the privatisation of 
less profitable segments of the electricity industry through a body created to that 
end. As a result, FATLyF bought five of the privatised units, including three 
utility groups (Patagonia, Litoral and Northwest) and two transportation 
companies (Transnea and Transnoa). It also obtained special conditions for the 
concession of the state-owned coalmining zone (Yacimlentos Carboniferos 
Fiscales - YCF) providing inputs for electricity utilities. This policy orientation, 
which arose with the union strategic shift from latent resistance to active 
support, crystallised in the Conference of FATLyF of 1992 (FATLyF 1992). In 
this conference, LyF CF imposed a motion on smaller reluctant unions, by 
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which FATLyF was authorised to adopt whatever necessary measure to take 
advantage of the business opportunities to come along with the market reforms. 
In a fifteen point document, FATLyF tackled how to seize opportunities opened 
not only with the reform of the social security and the pension systems but also 
with the privatisation of less profitable electricity industries, administration of the 
PPPs, and other independent areas like tourism and banking (FATLyF 1992). 
This orientation was ratified in the 1993 VI International Conference of Trade 
Unions, members of the IPCTT, at the request of LyF CF, and the 1994 LyF CIF 
Annual Conference (LyF CF 1994a; IPCTT 1993). 
Together with other unions (FeNTOS, SUTECBA and Sinclicato del Seguro that 
together and in total own just a 12 % of the business), FATLyF created an 
AFJP, Futura, by far the biggest business controlled and run by the federation. 
At present, the pension fund owns a portfolio of more than $ 267 millions, 
including $ 1,5 million shares in privatised utilities (AFJP Futura website). 
Findings revealed that, apart from the 5 electricity businesses, YCF and Futura, 
FATLyF owned at least 10 more companies (Contacto, October 2000). 
Beyond the activities developed from within FATLyF, LyF CF involved in the 
politics of micro-entrepreneurship, which followed the failure of the politics of 
voluntary redundancies to achieve the expected downsizing of the industry. As 
mentioned above, the union organised cooperatives of former empýloyees, who 
invested the severance packages, to provide services for the new privatised 
companies. In 1995, three years after privatisation, 290 workers grouped in 24 
cooperatives worked providing outsourced services to three companies: 
EDESUR (12), EDENOR (6) and Central Puerto (6). Due to this micro- 
entrepreneurship, the union received as check-off, the annual amount of US$ 
29648 (LyF CF 1995). 
The union also created a company to provide, food tickets. The rationale 
underlying the next statement is paradigmatic of union justification for 
embarking in economic activities: 
185 ' 
As we saw the food tickets coming to replace part of our wages, in fact, a 
plain attack against our institutions, the obras sociales and the union itself... 
Our policy was to say: "Why don't we organise a tickets' company? *. We, 
as a union. We were the only union, I think, in the whole Latin America, that 
created its own enterprise. We called it Lyfchek (Union Official - LyF CF). 
The enterprise survived just a few years before succumbing to competition. Yet, 
this has been often the rationale accompanying the investments: as the union 
debilitated because of a declining membership and employer contributions, it 
was necessary to counterbalance this trend by developing alternative sources 
of income. 
In sum, the politics of compensation rested upon specific institutional features of 
Argentinean unions, that is, their traditional involvement in providing social 
services through institutional bodies, dependant from union administration, 
mainly, through the obras sociales. This policy worked as a significant counter- 
mobilising force, for it served to buy the union leadership off and helped to 
moderate union politics. Moreover, it also increased the tensions between 
negotiating and combative trends within FATLyF. From the beginning, the 
counter-mobilising nature of engaging in businesses was clear for LyF MDP and 
others organisations that opposed the politics of compensation within the 
national Federation and beyond. The conflict between both orientations ended 
up with the expulsion of LyF MDP from FATLyF. This occurred when the 
Federation, pushed by LyF CF, changed rule books of the organisation to adopt 
a pro-business orientation. 
Although LyF MDP refused any form of political exchange based on business 
compensations, the politics of micro-entrepreneurship impacted upon the 
organisation. Many workers left the industry seduced by the opportunity to 
become independent micro-entrepreneurs. Once more, it was under ESEBA, 
still a public company, when the policy began. In 1995, the union launched an 
important campaign against this tactic, in which the CGA framed the issue as a 
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labour fraud, given the conditions of the contract that workers had to sign to 
provide the service (LyF MDP 1995a, 1995b). This campaign was crucial to 
reduce the success of this aspect of the politics of compensation, the only one 
that truly affected LyF MDP. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the counter-mobilising side of the politics of 
money, and how it acted to prevent conflicts over the process of privatisation 
and after, in UK and Argentina. This does not mean, necessarily, that the 
counter-mobilising content was the only rationale behind these policies, which 
may have been implemented for other aims as well - costs reduction, 
organisational efficiency and the like. Yet, findings support that all these 
initiatives shared common features, that is, that all of them implied the 
mobilisation of money resources, had counter-mobilising objectives, and 
affected workers' collectivism. 
If the previous chapter showed that the conceptual framework laid down by 
mobilisation theory proved to be useful to analyse the forms taken by workers' 
initial responses to privatisation, this chapter exemplifies its potential to study 
how governments and managers deployed resources that target crucial 
dimensions of workers' collectivism, in this specific case, financial resources. 
However, its usefulness seems to be limited to map the main dimensions that a 
counter-mobilising force ought to target in order to undermine workers' 
collectivism. The comparative dimension, in turn, helped to identify variability in 
what the theory defines as the opportunity-to-act. 
The four dimensions of the politics of money studied in this chapter manifest a 
two-fold purpose: to break up resistance and to further loyalty to the new private 
firms. Regarding the former, findings show that public authorities and managers 
had to conceive policies to break resistance to change at individual and 
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collective levels. For instance, while the politics of voluntary redundancies was, 
mainly, a device designed to buy off workers individually, the politics of 
compensation in Argentina was clearly a strategy directed to establish a tacit 
pact with trade unions, a new type of political exchange, whose content 
consisted on business opportunities. Nevertheless, all of them ended up 
affecting both levels: voluntary redundancies, for instance, targeted workforce 
morale, and therefore, arguably, make more difficult for unions to mobilise 
workers through collective action. It also depleted union of experienced union 
officials and activists. The politics of shares was an incentive for individual 
workers but in Argentina, it was also an important component of the politics of 
compensation. Personal contracts in UK debilitated the organisational strength 
of EPEA by taking individuals 'voluntarily' out of collective bargaining 
arrangements. 
Regarding the aim of furthering loyalty to the companies among the workforce, 
findings are not conclusive as to whether or not companies succeed. It seems 
possible to argue that the above was a secondary objective, a desire of the 
private management often clashing against the rough reality of seeking profits 
by cutting labour costs and increasing productivity. 
The comparative dimension of the study was also crucial to highlight factors that 
may explain variability. For instance, differences in the employment law may 
contribute to explain the important role played by personal contracts in UK, a 
strategy unlikely to be successful in Argentina; differences in legal frameworks 
seems to have affected as well, the chance of unions to represent workers as 
share owners and mobilise them around this issue. Similarly, the fate of the 
politics of voluntary redundancies appears to have been narrowly linked to the 
state of labour markets. While the study points to the development of a 
'redundancy culture' among the British workforce, a rising rate of unemployment 
thwarted similar germens in Argentina. Soon after privatisation, Argentinean 
workers began to reject voluntary retirement programmes. Consequently, not 
only private companies but also the Provincial State deployed a wide range of 
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repressive tactics and psychological persecution to force people to join the 
redundancy programmes. From then onwards, what appears formally as a 
process of voluntary downsizing hid what, in fact, was a process of compulsory 
redundancies. In the language of the mobilisation theory, the opportunity 
structure for companies and the government changed, and hence, the chance 
of using money to downsize the industry faded away. Given this scenario, the 
state not only encouraged harassment and repression, but also devoted more 
efforts and resources to bribe unions with business opportunities to fragment 
workers resistance, and keep discontent an individual expression. 
At this point, it is necessary to refer once more to the case of LyF . MDP, which 
shows how far counter-mobilisation strategies are mediated by workers 
organisational capabilities. Thus, union structures and government proved to be 
relevant sources of variability too. This is not to say that LyF MDP was immune 
to the politics of money; but to stress that union leadership is relevant to explain 
variability in workers responses. First, the politics of voluntary redundancies and 
compensation succeed at the individual level, and by this way, impacted on the 
organisation. The politics of money seduced individual workers, though fewer 
than the industrial average. It corrupted members of the CGA and other union 
officers; yet, it did not pervade union officialdom. In sum, union leadership could 
mobilise the collective power of workers all along the process against different 
manifestations of the politics of money. 
Back to the theoretical aspects, while the analytical sequence laid down in the 
conceptual framework opportunity-to-act, organisation, interest definition, 
proved to be useful to study the forms of workers' defensive mobilisation, this 
chapter shows that a focus on the effects of counter-mobilisation upon workers' 
collectivism may require a more flexible and empirical approach. However, it is 
essential to emphasise that it was mobilisation theory, which signalled the 
direction of the analysis. 
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Finally, the chapter also showed that change in the intermediate variables may 
influence very quickly the field of social interactions and subjective processes. 
This was the case in Argentina when a sudden rise in unemployment impacted 
upon the effectiveness of the politics of voluntary redundancies. Workers began 
to oppose it, and concomitantly, managers started to back redundancies 
programmes with repression. In this new context, even a extremely moderated 
union, like LyF CF, mobilised the rank-and-file through industrial action and 
rallies. This reminds Tilly's self-criticism: "the model has no time in it. Collective 
action does. The most obvious defect of the model is that it makes no allowance 
for the ways a contender's collective action affects its opportunities and its 
power. The model provides no place for strategic interactions and no place for 
the conquest or loss of power. Collective action affects a group's power, but that 
effect takes time" (1978: 58). This chapter suggests that change in external 
variables also affect contenders' opportunities and power. 
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Chapter 9 
Privatisation and Collective Bargaining 
The focus of the chapter is the vital counter-mobilising forces unleashed by 
privatisation; in this case, the fragmentation of collective bargaining and the 
changes of its procedures. 
The empirical analysis is informed by mobilisation theory to shed light on why 
and how these phenomena brought about changes in workers' capacity to 
mobilise. In this sense, particular attention is to be paid to factors, which 
diminished trade unions' ability to confront management, or impacted upon their 
organisational structures. At theoretical level, the chapter provides room for the 
study of the strategic interactions of the contenders and the conquest or loss of 
respective power, which demanded Tilly in the quotation closing chapter 8. The 
comparative perspective will show, in turn, important differences between UK 
and Argentina, within a common horizon of growing obstacles to collective 
mobilisation. Having been its basic aim to increase managerial prerogatives, the 
assault upon collective bargaining happened in national contexts, which differed 
regarding the system of industrial relations, the extent of decentralisation and 
restructuring, and the evolution of market structures. Thus, these intermediate 
variables influenced the final outcome of the process; at the same time, these 
differences set limits to the symmetry of the comparison. Lastly, the analysis will 
also point to meaningful differences between unions. 
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United Kingdom 
The process of counter-mobilisation against collective bargaining 
By lobbying the Government, ESI trade unions ensured through the ESTUC the 
continuation of the national negotiating machinery throughout the process of 
privatisation, and obliged the new private companies to announce, 12 months in 
advance, any intention to withdraw from it. This achievement was, in fact, a tacit 
recognition by ESTUC of the inevitability of the end of the traditional 
arrangements as well as a reassuring guarantee of time to negotiate the future 
institutional framework of industrial relations. Preventing any optimistic hope for 
the establishment of a common negotiating machinery across companies, there 
had been, in the run up to privatisation, abundant signals of enthusiasm among 
management with the opportunity to put an end to national bargaining. In 
several of the would-be private companies, middle managers began to let 
unions know about their distaste for national and industrial institutions in the 
new environment. The message took a diversity of forms, from the rhetoric of 
corporate culture building - as in PowerGen for instance, to the crude economic 
language of regional differentials in the cost of living - as in Norweb. As 
managerial pressures mounted, the EETPU had, for example, to alert shop 
stewards to resist the undermining of the bargaining machinery until new 
negotiating structures were agreed by the union. In brief, as stated by an 
interviewee: 
Most of the companies, if not all of them, saw privatisation as an 
opportunity to liberate themselves from national bargaining (National Officer 
- Prospect). 
Thus, it is possible to argue that the decentralisation and fragmentation of 
collective bargaining was a key aspect of capital counter-mobilisation, partly 
intended, partly the unconscious by-product of other requirements. Still, as 
Lukes (2005) might put it, the end of centralised procedures showed the 
capacity of the new management to force trade unions to accept a course of 
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action other than the one they originally pursued. In marked contrast to their 
early calls to defend the national machinery, trade unions ended up dealing 
company agreements and procedures with stoic pragmatism in search of the 
better possible arrangements. Decentralisation and fragmentation were clear 
signals of unfavourable changes in power relations. In the face of this situation, 
craft unions were generally more pragmatic than the predominantly public 
sector ones. 
In December 1991, East Midlands and National Power gave notice of 
withdrawal from the machinery. Soon after, the remaining private companies 
followed the example. By June 1992, unions reached the first agreement with 
PowerGen, which included single table bargaining (STB), flexible working, and 
the harmonisation of terms and conditions for all employees. The bulk of 
company agreements, however, were balloted during 1993 (Table 11). 
Table 11: Introduction of Company Agreements 
1992 1993 1994 
PowerGen (June) National Power (January) Eastern Electricity 
Scottish Power (December) Southern Electric (February) London Electricity 
Yorkshire Electricity (February) Norweb 
East Midlands Electricity (April) Swale 
NGC (April) SWEB 
Midlands Electricity (May) 
SWEB Connect (May) 
Manweb (July) 
SEEB (July) 
Northern Electric (November) 
According to a shared view among current national officers, there was not 
widespread radical change at that stage, apart from the new bargaining 
structures: 
So [companies] were not all necessarily radical themselves; though they 
had, certainly, their own ambitions. So, different sources of bargaining 
formats came out of this move from public to private (National Officer - 
Prospect). 
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In the immediate post-privatisation aftermath, there was not any visible 
change in bargaining strength. So, trade unions were able to achieve at 
company level... in company agreements... in company bargaining, terms 
and conditions that were still very much acceptable in terms of the economy 
as a whole (National Officer - Amicus). 
Early on, the employers were more concerned about stabilising their 
businesses; in stabilising employee relations in their companies; than they 
were about attacking in any dramatic sense the terms and conditions 
(National Officer - NALGO). 
The interviewees stressed that, initially, management was just satisfied with the 
break up of the national machinery, which allowed managers to take 
responsibility and authority for their own employment conditions. There is an 
extended belief that the managerial agenda was dominated in principle, by how 
to achieve change in collective bargaining structures, and if possible, also in 
payment structures. In 1993, at least five companies succeeded in introducing 
performance related pay (PRP), and by 1995, most of them, if not all, had PRP 
for certain categories of workers. Still, in the main, employers restrained their 
full agenda of desired changes until establishing companies' frameworks for 
negotiation. It follows that over the period of transition from national to company 
bargaining (1991-1992), when the new firms inherited the national agreement, 
the companies amplified the rigidities of the old arrangement under market 
competition by compromising a common line of negotiations composed of 
minimum offers. The strategic aim was to discourage unions' attachment to 
national machinery, but avoiding radical changes and confrontation. This 
negotiating context pushed unions to seek mandates from their constituencies 
to explore alternatives at company level. EPEA, for instance, convinced 
themselves by 1991, that either unions succeeded in backing up a unified claim 
across the industry, or they had better contemplate separate company 
arrangements. By the same period, the EETPU found out comparative 
advantages over other unions. On the one side, the negotiating experience of 
the union in the private sector could translate into a relative organisational 
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strength at local level. On the other side, company agreements opened a 
window of opportunity for their constituency to move up through additional skills 
and career progression. NALGO, in turn, while keeping the opposition to the 
break up of the machinery, joined manual and engineers' unions and asked 
membership mandate to define new institutional frameworks at company level 
through ESTUC. 
It took months of painstaking negotiations to finalise the company agreements. 
Although trade unions were overworked along a process that put a lot of strain 
on their human resources, by the end of 1993, five companies were still under 
negotiations. The final outcome was a variety of bargaining formats, though, in 
the main, STB prevailed. Yet, some companies set up multi-table bargaining 
structures, either by strict replication of three agreements, or by a two-table 
bargaining (TTB) that, in general, maintained the split between, on the one side, 
technical and administrative staff, and on the other side, manual and craft 
workers. However, this was just the starting point of a process of 
decentralisation, in which, initially pay bargaining, and later on, terms and 
conditions too, tended to be split into smaller units, as the electricity companies 
themselves sub-divided the bargaining structures in different business units: 
Over a very rapid period, two or three years, the companies themselves 
began to subdivide their own companies agreements because they rapidly 
realised that they, at the company, they faced more than one labour 
market, more than one commercial circumstance, and actually began to 
shape with us new agreements, which were at the company level (National 
Officer - Prospect). 
Additionally, the external influence of the regulator, requiring the unbundling of 
distribution businesses, accelerated even more the process providing 
companies with a justification for pushing through the decentralisation of 
bargaining. From 1995 onwards pressures towards devolution of bargaining 
within companies started to grow. On the union side, there was not uniform 
policy. When by the end of 1995, SEEB indicated the desire to move away from 
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company-wide agreements to agreements based on the separate businesses; 
trade unions agreed to enter into discussions despite not receiving any concrete 
proposal from any business unit. In Northern Electric, instead, the same 
intention faced mass meetings and strong protests. However, once again, 
companies forced the acceptance of a course of action, which unions disliked 
and even opposed, though lukewarmly. By the end of 1990s, most companies 
had subdivided their negotiating structures into smaller units. 
The next sections address the counter-mobilising effects of the process of 
radical decentralisation of bargaining, particularly, the growth of inter-union 
competition and latent tensions, and the coming out of differences in bargaining 
power. 
The growth of inter-union competition 
For mobilisation theory, the growth of inter-union competition is a debilitating 
factor for workers and their chance to gain and control power resources 
collectively in order to increase the opportunity for collective action to arise (Tilly 
1978). Decentralisation, the introduction of STB, and finally, the devolution of 
bargaining to business units furthered competitive trends. 
Early in the pre-privatisation period, trade union's leaders foresaw an uncertain 
future likely to encourage inter-union competition for members. They arrived at 
this conclusion for various reasons. It is necessary to recall the aggressive 
recruiting policies pursued by the EETPU over 1980s, by means of single union 
agreements. Besides, inter-union disputes led to the expulsion of the EETPU 
from the TUC and increased the negative expectations. Later on, the imminent 
end of the law enforcement for the carrying out 
* 
of the national negotiating 
machinery fed fears that companies would give notice to leave the national 
agreement whatever your own trade union did or said, and that other unions 
could, then, try to negotiate separately with the companies concerned. Also, the 
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pace of job loss and plant closure announcements showed the hard times to 
come with regards union's membership. As a result, unions diverted their 
resources and energies from alternative uses in the run-up to privatisation to 
launch recruitment policies, or at least, reinforced them. The first symptoms 
were a set of mandates on the topic of recruitment from union conferences, 
branch motions, official policies and campaigns. This emphasis continued in the 
early days of privatisation. 
For instance, EPEA decided in December 1988 to offer single union 
agreements to new entrants to the industry to counteract the threat embedded 
in the bargaining policies of t he EETPU, and the three large manual workers' 
unions: TGWU, AEU and GMB (EPEA 1988). In November 1990, again in the 
midst of a debate about conflicts with other unions in competition for recognition 
in new companies, EPEA's NEC established, officially, the promotion of 
recruitment as a prime union task (EPEA 1990). NALGO declared 1989 as a 
recruitment year for ESI (NALGO 1989a). The central tenet was a programme 
of action aimed at maintaining NALGO's position as the main union for NJC 
staffs, and equipping it for negotiating in the private sector (NALGO 1988b; 
NALGO News, n" 347,30/9/88). During 1990, NALGO's reports on privatisation 
often stressed the danger of the growth of inter-union competition as the 
background for the extension of the 1989 recruiting campaign (NALGO 1989b). 
The moves by EETPU over 1989 and 1990 to poach NALGO's members in 
some branches and start to recruit NJC employees, and the attempts by APEX, 
a GMBTU's arm for the recruitment of white-collar workers, to increase its 
influence and numbers of seats within the different negotiating bodies, seemed 
to justify at the time NALGO's insistence (TUC 1990). EETPU, in turn, did not 
need special recruiting policies to be implemented. The union had already been 
involved in bitter inter-union disputes for years for that cause; as the head of the 
union, Hammond, graphically stated: "We are up to our necks in the struggle for 
membership. We make no apologies for that" (Contact, 17, n" 4, August 1987). 
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During 1991-1993, inter-union competition decreased as workers confronted the 
establishment of private companies and jointly negotiated the agreements 
anew. However, the introduction of STB, and to a lesser degree TTB, ended up 
blurring the traditional frontiers of recruitment. This gave unions greater 
incentive to poach members and restart the competition for new starters: 
Q: how have union relationships been in the sector? 
R: you have effectively, Unison -I use the present names - and Prospect, 
representing white collar. Amicus, GMB and TGWU representing blue-collar 
workers. That is no so clear now, because a number of the industrial 
negotiating forums allows all unions to sit at the same table ( ... ) We now 
represent a small number of engineers as well, you see, whereas before we 
wouldn't. Relations between the unions at that time were very good, and 
now, well, things changed. There is more competition for members 
(Regional Officer - Amicus). 
I really don't like them [Amicus and Prospect) at all, because they are I 
aggressive poaching unions. Well, we are no pure on this either. But we 
shouldn't actually poach each other's members. There is no point in that. 
There are large pockets of non-members out there, we should go and 
recruit those members. But the easiest members to recruit are existing 
trade unions members, for the very reason that they show an interest in 
joining a trade union (Regional Officer - Unison). 
These practices brought about disputes, which were usually sorted out on-site. 
Only rarely, inter-union conflicts reached TUC Disputes Committee, as in the 
case of Southern Electric in 1996, when Prospect was found guilty of poaching 
members from Unison and the AEEU (EPE July/August 1996; TUC 1996). 
While disputes have not helped to encourage trust and unity among unions, it is 
necessary to recognise that, gradually, unions began to comply with agreed 
procedures of inter-union transfers. Particularly, after the general recognition 
that there are huge pockets of non-unionised workers in the industry, and 
hence, that efforts should clearly be directed towards their recruitment; for 
instance, one in five of Southern Electric staff were non-unionised at the time of 
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the dispute. Thus, for some interviewees, though important, the tendency 
towards inter-union competition should not be exaggerated: 
Q: Did job loss provoke inter-union competition? 
R: Yeah, I mean, perhaps not as much as you expect because, you know 
the English system, there is always a certain amount of competition 
between unions. And I suppose, after privatisation, all unions were looking 
to survive (... ) we were all quite ruthless in trying to recruit new members 
and hold on to our existent members (National officer - Unison). 
The introduction of STB 
The implementation of STB was pushed by companies, whereas trade unions 
shared a common distrust about it. The latter, instead, attempted to favour, 
when possible, the replication of the traditional negotiating bodies or, at least, 
TTB arrangements. There were exemptions, however, among companies. 
Paradoxically, in Yorkshire Electricity, due to the managerial fear about the 
prospects of an unintended empowerment of unions by STB, unions succeeded 
in keeping the traditional separations. SEEB, in turn, inclined to TTB to guard 
supervisory and professional terms from being indirectly determined by those 
they supervised, and to maintain different levels of call-out payments for manual 
and non-manual staff (Gall 1994: 68). Eastern Electricity set up a TTB 
machinery, which comprised a Professional Group, covering ex-NJB 
employees, PAG grades and ex-NJIC foremen, and a Staff group, covering 
industrial and clerical support employees. This division was thought to facilitate 
the introduction of PRP schemes in the Professional Group Agreement, and the 
end of annual incremental progressions. Yet, time would increase the number of 
companies with STB. But, time also finished with trade unions' uniform and 
contrary viewpoint about it, as craft groups perceived it as an opportunity to 
crack the interface problem and the administrative staff as an opportunity to 
press their claims for equal pay. 
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Two central arguments were offered by employers to explain the early 
introduction of STB: the reduction of the amount of time and resources spent on 
union negotiations and the establishment of intra-company consistency with 
regard to pay and conditions (Gall 1994). Findings from ESI, however, do not 
support any of these claims. They show that the adoption of STB by electricity 
companies was just a first step towards devolution of bargaining to business 
units. This evolution was announced by the devolution of decision-making down 
in the managerial hierarchy already before companies gave notice of withdrawal 
from the negotiating machinery. It manifested, on the one side, in the 
proliferation of profit centre policies and, on the other side, in the procedural 
agreements established by a number of RECs to discuss organisational change 
and work flexibility. Although senior managers were freed up, time and 
resources for negotiations multiplied with the devolution of bargaining involving 
a mass of junior managers; companies attempted to counterbalance this factor 
by signing agreements for two-years, and even three-years. A more important 
consequence was the tendency to the equalisation of terms and conditions 
across different grades of workers within each bargaining unit, together with 
growing inconsistencies across the company. Repeated mergers and take- 
overs only added to such inconsistencies. It comes as no surprise, then, to find 
in some companies the same rationale, the saving of time and resources, for 
current programmes to harmonise terms and conditions, and to have one pay 
negotiation for all business units. Rather, in short, STB seems to have been the 
favourite means to further devolution, the main counter-mobilising tool for 
debilitating unions' ability to resist change in payment structures, work 
practices, and terms and conditions of work; its subsequent subdivision, a 
strategic move to match more easily the conditions of local labour markets, 
both, with regard to regional wage differentials and skills. 
The engineers organised by EPEA were the main losers within STB, for its 
implementation downgraded their representational rights. Gall refers to this type 
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of phenomenon as a form of derecognition or decollectivisation (Gall 1994). 
According to a Prospect's official: 
As you gave unions seats according to their size, the manual unions, 
because of the largest numbers of staff, of course, took most seats than the 
others. So the unions were forced to work together. And you no longer have 
individual policies being dealt with at national level. So, the NJB's, which 
are mine union's policies, were always different from the manual workers' 
policies. Well, what of course is done, is weaken our union because we had 
exclusive rights for the technical staff (National Officer - Prospect). 
By contrast, even when STB threatened somehow the preponderance of the 
EETPU's representational rights among former NJIC members as well as the 
preponderance of NALGO among former NJC members, their situation was 
different from that of EPEA. In May 1992, EETPU amalgamated with AEU to 
form the AEEU, strengthening its position with regard to other manual unions. 
Besides, EETPU was already used to compromise policies within the NJIC 
body, with TGWU - despite major political differences between them - and 
GMBATU. Most important, it opened an opportunity for industrial craft unions to 
sort out favourably the dispute with EPEA about task demarcations as the 
interface question was addressed. Lastly, Amicus ended up dominating most 
STBs until their subdivision, and then, it continued to dominate STBs in the 
leading business units of ESI companies. The latter, in part, compensated 
manual workers for the damages brought about to their bargaining power by the 
end of the national machinery. ' 
NALGO - Unison from 1993 when companies' agreements proliferated, was the 
main victim of the subdivision of the STB into business units' agreements, which 
revealed the disparity of strength among different groups of workers, but not of 
the STB arrangements in themselves. First, because white-collar workers had 
often built their negotiating power upon the shoulders of manual and 
engineering unions, and the STBs, in the beginning, did not put in serious risk 
such strategy. But second, and despite their utter opposition to the break up of 
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the negotiating machinery, because Unison found out that STB might give 
administrative and clerical staff the chance to seek harmonisation of pay, terms 
and conditions. This hope ended with the subdivision of bargaining into 
business units, but it is enjoying a rebirth since some companies have 
expressed the wish to harmonise terms and conditions by reunifying the 
company STB. 
For EPEA, instead, there was no similar compensating factors. EPEA had built 
their power by maintaining the exclusive rights to represent the engineers in an 
independent body within a highly centralised and formalised negotiating 
machinery; by keeping strict demarcation of tasks to prevent craft workers 
diluting their control upon the labour process; and by establishing a pay link 
between NJB and NJIC pay. All these aspects were targeted through STB, by 
which EPEA was outnumbered by AEEU-Amicus, a factor that contributed to 
the erosion of their leading position within the industry. Unsurprisingly, EPEA's 
initial reaction was to oppose any arrangement, which involved the possibility of 
being, outvoted concerning their own members' pay and conditions; yet, this 
position proved to be untenable. Thus, the union was left with no choice but to 
accept sharing the negotiating table with other unions. In the years that followed 
the establishment of the new arrangements, concern with STB was common 
among EPEA's members from different companies. To give just a few 
examples, in SWALEC's STB, EMA obtained 3 places out of 15; in SWEB's just 
2 out of 15, whereas in the past there had been a committee of nine members 
who regularly met the company, at high level, to discuss NJB issues. Early 
complaints arose not only in companies from the South West but also in NGC, 
Midlands Electricity or Southern Electric. 
These differences awaked latent tensions and brought about new ones. 
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The old sources of inter-union frictions under the new arrangements 
As privatisation opened dissimilar opportunities for manual workers and 
engineers with regards to the inter-union rivalry for the demarcation of technical 
and craft skills, management exploited in their favour this traditional source of 
friction. The company-based bargaining agreements negotiated throughout 
1993-95 opened up to ex-NJIC employees, to a greater or lesser degree, the 
work traditionally carried out by engineers. Craftsmen took on extra work and 
responsibilities for little or no additional remuneration; the carrot was career 
development. SWEB, for example, launched a job redesign programme, which 
included a new team structure to dispense with engineers being involved within 
the teams, confining them to project work and reducing their numbers. By this 
exercise the company targeted senior authorisations and pushed down levels of 
responsibility replacing operational engineers by operational technicians after a 
concentrated period of training. The strategy adopted by Southern Electric, 
instead, was to devolve what had been engineers' duties to craftsmen, 
particularly, safety documentation and work planning, but without seeking 
radical change in the organisation of labour. This process continued all along 
the time. In all cases, these managerial policies benefited from the enthusiasm 
of AEEU-Amicus, whereas were resisted by EPEA. 
Because our guys go into the job, and then they say: '"All right, sit down". 
For two hours, wait for that bloke coming out, put in a piece of paper to do 
the next job, or switch out, switch in, and that was it. We can do that, but we 
were not authorised to do that at that time (Lay Representative - Amicus). 
But the other people [engineers] are saying, well you are taking our job. Oh, 
yeah, we know, we are comfortable with that, because we are the AEEU 
union, we had a major conflict with them, a major conflict (Regional Officer 
- Amicus). 
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Another old source of tension that has provoked several skirmishes between 
Amicus and Prospect under the new arrangements is the antagonistic position 
hold by their constituencies within the industry: Arnicus organises manual 
workers, whereas Prospect organises people who occupies managerial roles 
and exercises authority over the former. Interviewees referred to this note of 
discord between the organisations: 
Q: How do you agree common lines of negotiation with a trade union that 
organises mostly engineers and managers? 
R: well, the answer to your questions is that this situation does cause 
tensions. There is no doubt about this. It cause tensions. And sometimes 
there has been a break up and the trade unions went in different directions 
( ... ) Because the industrial staff 
feels that guy is my manager, he disciplines 
me. Why should we deal with them? And there are tensions. Very real 
tensions (National Officer - Amicus). 
In fact, I've been in the middle of an argument developed between the 
Prospect's and the Amicus' reps because Amicus feels that Prospect... 
well, you know: "They are all managers, they defend the company, they are 
fighting the workers". So they [Amicus' stewards] started an argument 
about a recommendation and decided not to go with the recommendation. 
So, other man, from Prospect, got accept. And he said: *I'm not speaking 
with them because I don't agree'. And one of the stewards started to say: 
"That's because you are a manager tooll" ( ... ) And I'm the one saying: 
"OK, 
let's cool down". And that quite happens. So, there are tensions, obvious 
tensions between trade unions, and that, because one sees the other as 
the management's union, and the managers' union thinks the other is a left- 
wing, militant union (Regional Officer - Unison). 
Conflict between Unison and other unions in the industry was related, mainly, to 
differentials in pay and labour conditions. Although, there had always been 
frictions due to this issue, the national machinery reserved NALGO an exclusive 
body to discuss white-collar needs, and therefore, lessened inter-union 
disputes. Rather, it encouraged NALGO to press upon management to enhance 
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the status of white-collar workers. While STB, on the one side, opened new 
space to pursue equalisation, on the other side, it confronted Unison with the 
agendas of engineers and manual workers. As stated by a trade union official 
from Unison, which organises most low-paid workers in the ESI: 
I mean, there were tensions between Unison and the other unions because 
the reality is that other unions, when we are actually in the meeting, they 
say: "We are not going to have our members to lose any money". So, on 
the one hand, they say: "Yes, we agree with this, we agree with doing this 
because it is equal pay issues, and the law, and so on". On the other hand, 
they try to make sure that people get their money. Of course, that created 
tensions (Regional Officer - Unison). 
The frame of reference for this quotation is the harmonisation policy pursued by 
Unison to improve the terms and conditions of their members: 
We tend to support what we call harmonisation. So, we do away with the 
distinctions between manual workers on the one hand, and staff workers on 
the other. We don't like to have second class citizens so we like to have 
everybody treated the same. Obviously, there are going to be different pay 
scales, but you know, it shouldn't be on poor terms and conditions. That is 
not always the case with the other unions, because sometimes their 
membership is stratified, and they only recruit within a certain band of 
workers so they like to keep those separated (National Officer - Unison). 
The growth of tensions within STB due to differentials is confirmed by officials 
from manual unions: 
Sometimes there are clashes between unions, because, sometimes, trade 
unions' constituencies are people who are in a lower pay, who prefer a 
fixed money increase; where people on higher pay resists that on the basis 
that they will prefer a percentage increase. This is all to do with differentials 
(... ) So, there are tensions in STB. In most occasions unions find an 
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accommodation to go forward; but in some occasions, they don't (National 
Officer - Amicus). 
All those tensions have militated against the opportunity to articulate unified 
fronts and collective demands. One official from Prospect, while confirming the 
existence of conflicts between unions, introduced a subtle viewpoint on the 
problem: 
What is interesting is that while full-time officers work well together, there 
are certainly tensions at the level of the members, but not between the full- 
time officers. I think, what happens is, in fact, some people tend to think 
that, well, if you are working in this area you can belong to this union but 
you can't belong to another union. Some of that is there, there are tensions 
there between the staff (Regional Officer - Prospect). 
The important point to stress seems to be that, since one consequence of 
decentralisation was that more negotiating tended to be done by lay 
representatives, by overburdening the full-time officer cadre, changes in 
bargaining structures amplified inter-union tensions at firm level. 
The irruption of differences in bargaining power 
Yet, the counter-mobilising effects of devolution were widened by the 
subdivision of STBs into business based agreements, as this policy showed the 
disparities in the bargaining power of different groups of workers. Broadly, 
differences emerged between, on the one side, the people employed in 
generation and distribution, and on the other side, those employed in 
commercial and retail activities. The causes of this diversity have to be 
understood in relation to the characteristics of the labour process, the labour 
market and historical traditions: 
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Initially, it was more a company agreement but along the time the 
companies began to segment their own agreements. This began to reveal 
the disparity in power strength between different groups within the same 
company. So, the engineering staff and craft staff still get good deals 
because they have, literally, the key to the power. The retail and the 
commercial people were more exposed, and also, it began to expose that 
the companies face more than one labour market. The labour market in 
which they obtained the engineer and craft staff was different, than the 
labour market in which they obtained the retail staff, for example (National 
Officer - Amicus). 
Over the time certain parts of the company businesses revealed 
themselves as weaker. You have to make a distinction here, between the 
engineering activity and income, and the retail and commercial activities. In 
the engineering, the trade unions were stronger. There, you have an 
environment where engineers and craftsmen went to work with a different 
ethos. And they had a very strong strategy independence ( ... ) Union 
density in these areas was much substantial. In some other parts of the 
companies there was less commitment to trade unions. In the past the 
terms and conditions in the retail and the commercial areas had been built 
upon the strength of the industrial areas because it was one national 
agreement (National Officer - Prospect). 
Thus, this difference in bargaining strength impinged upon the respective power 
of trade unions, for it targeted mainly Unison, whose members belonged mostly 
to powerless sectors (Unison 1994,1996a, 1996b). Sales and marketing 
employees, though reasonably well unionised, were never as willing to take 
collective action as manual workers, and their collective bargaining power 
diminished too. Later on, trade unions faced similar problems in customer 
services as companies consolidated call centres, in metering as outsourcing 
developed, and even in the newer small generating plants, where neither 
Amicus nor Prospect are always strong. For some interviewees, contracting 
was able to keep a reasonable bargaining strength, similar to that of distribution. 
Others interviewees, instead, argued that contracting suffered a continual attack 
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on terms and conditions by employers, similar to that of retail, mainly, in 
subsidiary companies and green-field sites. 
Tactics to lower pay, and weaken terms and conditions in powerless sectors, 
varied. It was usually the result of gradual changes introduced in pay bargaining 
settlements. Yet, in several occasions, faced with proposals to close certain 
business, unions negotiated concessions. For instance, by this means Southern 
Electric obtained important changes in Energy Sales and Marketing. In retail, 
these manoeuvres comprised effective closures, mass redundancies, and the 
reopening of businesses as franchises, employing new staff with lower pay and 
conditions. In SEEB, the same strategy included tens of workers, who had left 
the company with redundancy packages, employed the next week by the 
franchiser to do the same job but with lower terms and conditions. According to 
interviews, even Prospect members doing technical work were treated exactly 
the same in a number of occasions. 
Union officials from ESI and engineering feared that, under STB, the bargaining 
position of manual workers would be "undermined by having joint negotiations 
with white-collar workers, as the former were more readily unionized than their 
white-collar counterparts" (Gall 1994: 70). Yet, neither STB nor bargaining at 
business units seems to have seriously undermined the power of manual 
workers for this reason. Today, however, after the long detour of bargaining 
devolution, some companies are aftempting (like Eon) or considering (like EdF) 
to unify pay bargaining and harmonise terms and conditions. While workers in 
call centres and retail activities welcome this policy, workers in generation do 
not like the idea. The former see harmonisation as an opportunity to overcome 
the difficulties they face to obtain money out of their business units; the latter, 
instead, consider that companies attempt to lower their wages and deteriorate 
their terms and conditions. Thus, a pattern seems to emerge: in the recent past, 
separation opened the opportunity for employers to exploit the lack of 
bargaining power of clerical employees; nowadays, the weakened position of 
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white-collar workers is used to undermine the power strength of craft and 
engineering staff. 
To sum up, fragmentation and devolution of bargaining in ESI have had 
important counter-mobilising effects, as it was accordingly feared by ESI 
officials: 
There was a common fear among trade unions that the break of a national 
bargaining would undermine our bargaining strength (National Officer - 
Prospect). 
Argentina 
The process of counter-mobilisation against collective bargaining 
The process of counter-mobilisation against collective bargaining was different 
in Argentina. While in UK the majority of changes occurred after privatisation, 
without a clear and concerted agenda, and were pursued by private companies; 
in Argentina, a set of relevant changes happened before privatisation as a result 
of a detailed plan, and were carried out by public authorities and consultants 
employed by the Ministry of Economy. The reason was that, from the point of 
view of the government and the international financial institutions, which backed 
the sale of public companies, the power of trade unions in the public sector 
expressed itself in the contents and procedures of collective bargaining, so that 
public collective agreements were deemed to be an obstacle for the success of 
privatisation. Thus, the government decided to dismantle the agreements in 
order to attract private investors. This entailed a different starting point for the 
counter-mobilisation process against collective bargaining in Argentina. The 
involvement of the government, however, should be also understood as being 
determined, in part, by the institutional features outlined in chapter 6; 
particularly, the legal underpinning of the Argentinean system of industrial 
relations, for it narrows management's opportunities to push change without 
legal support. 
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As the analysis will show too, there are differences in Argentina between the 
case of LyF CF and that of LyF MDP, which relates to the peculiarities of the 
opportunity structures faced by these organisations and their distinctive 
processes of decision-making and leadership styles. Yet, despite their diverse 
characteristics, the process of change of collective bargaining underwent two 
phases in both LyF CF and LyF MDP. The first phase, before privatisation, was 
characterised by the offensive of public and industrial authorities to force unions 
to accept radical modifications in the content of CCTs. The second one, after 
privatisation, when the electricity companies either refused to continue with joint 
arrangements bringing about the fragmentation of negotiations as in the case of 
LyF CF, or simply targeted workers collectivism but without fragmenting 
bargaining as in the case of LyF MDP. During this second phase, two additional 
variables help to differentiate the Argentinean cases from the British ones: a 
different structure of union representation and the absence of mergers and 
takeovers affecting the boundaries of the industry. 
The case of LyF CF., two steps towards the end of the centralised 
bargaining machinery 
The decision of the National Government to curtail union rights stemming from 
public CCTs, was part of a bigger programme of reforms of the public sector, 
which counted on financial resources provided by the WB. It involved a number 
of branches of the national state under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Economy and the participation of dozens of experts in industrial relations, public 
sector, law and economics, who carried out a diversity of studies and projects 
(Banco Mundial 1991; Daireaux et al. 1990). In the case in point, a team of 
consultants was responsible for the design and implementation of a strategy, 
whose aim was to change the conditions, which had allowed public trade unions, 
to defend, rather successfully, pay and terms of employment. The explicit 
objective was to remove obstacles to productivity growth and to regain 
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managerial control. It is important to bear in mind that the clause of ultra- 
actividad included in the CCTs permitted unions to keep past achievements by 
boycotting negotiations, while they simultaneously negotiated wage-increases 
by means of ad hoc acts. In the private sector, this tactic has also been 
important for trade unions; but employers have had the power to introduce 
change despite the restrictions of collective agreements. In the public sector, 
this possibility has been always smaller. Thus, the dilemma for the Government 
resided in how to force unions to negotiate collective agreements anew avoiding 
open conflicts and resistance through legal manoeuvres. 
After the evaluation of alternatives, the solution was to be found in a strategy, 
whose core rested on a complex legal apparatus. It was composed of two 
steps: first, the suspension of a set of clauses deemed to damage productivity 
and managerial prerogatives, and second, the opening of negotiations between 
the enterprise and the public unions. To carry out this task, a team of experts in 
industrial relations together with personnel managers analysed more than 6000 
clauses, which belonged to 50 collective agreements of 13 national enterprises. 
In total, the team suggested the suspension of 718 clauses. In the case of 
SEGBA, 14 clauses and 1 act were suspended through an administrative 
decision of the Ministry of Labour, which on December 14 th of 1 990 rejected the 
formal claim of the LyF CF. In a context characterised by the massive 
mobilisation of legal resources to push change through, the appeal to court 
attempted by LyF CF was condemned to failure; the Supreme Court of Justice 
denied it. 
The suspension of clauses affected five main areas. First, public authorities 
targeted clauses, which warranted subsidies to the union above those required 
by labour legislation. LyF CIF had enjoyed until this decision, an amount equal to 
4% of total wages, deposited in trade union's account by companies for social 
ends. The union distributed this money between its Housing Fund, the Children 
Holiday Camp, and its Cultural, Educational and Sportive Fund. In addition to 
this, the union received a fixed amount of money for a programme of Life 
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Insurance, organised by its Loan Co-operative. This cutting of funds hit union's 
services severely. Second, automatic increases in line with inflation, were also 
stopped. The policy behind this measure was to tie wage increases to 
productivity growth - anticipating a specific Decree on the matter that would be 
issued by the government one year later. Although the suspension of index- 
linked wages was particularly unpopular among public workers, it was backed 
by a vast percentage of the population, for the government had attributed 
economic problems and the inflationary pressures, partly, to the outcome of 
wage increases in the public sector. Third, the Ministry of Labour suspended the 
group of clauses that guaranteed trade union participation in recruitment, 
promotions and levels of employment. Fourth, a clause included in 1975 in the 
collective agreement, by which the enterprise committed to job stability, was 
removed. Lastly, higher levels of management were taken out of collective 
bargaining. 
The Governmental strategy was thought to take advantage of the opportunities 
opened by the economic and institutional crisis. It would prove to be successful: 
public trade unions opted for negotiations and refused to take industrial action. 
Chapter 7 already mentioned the disciplining role of the crisis, which 
immobilised the civil society. The consultants who were in charge of designing 
the plan congratulated themselves on the extent of the transformation; for them, 
the suspension of clauses had created favourable pre-negotiating conditions for 
public enterprises for first time in more than forty years (Campano & Caruso 
1991; Daireaux et al. 1990). 
To launch the second stage, the same team of consultants devoted their efforts 
to train negotiators and draft directives about the issues to be achieved in 
bargaining (Ministerio de Economia 1990a, 1990b). They wanted to change 
managerial culture in order to adapt the behaviour of management to the 
dynamics of the private sector. The idea was to prepare public managers to 
face negotiations with trade unions from a position of strength; in particular, to 
help managers to draft their own proposals. Historically, union officials had the 
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initiative. They used to set the agenda of negotiations by putting on the table 
their own draft agreement; managers limited themselves to accept or object to 
the content of union documents. To carry out the negotiations, the government 
set a single table for the electricity enterprises touched by the decree: SEGBA, 
Agua y Energia, and Hidronor. The trade union side was occupied by LyF CIF 
and FATLyF, the trade unions that had negotiated the past agreements. 
However, partly, because of changes in the authorities of the Ministry of 
Economy, partly, because of delays due to trade unions' opposition to the 
employers' project; negotiations derailed. The new collective agreements of the 
electricity sector would be finally signed by the new private owners from 1992 
onwards. 
Despite the failure of negotiations, the government delineated the agenda of 
change, for the list of aims of the industrial authorities, as far as contents is 
concerned, would be replicated by the new companies. The bottom line of the 
list was to reduce provisions in the public agreement as to the minima required 
by Labour Law; thus, forty years of workers' achievements over the minimum 
recognised by law was put at stake. The official directives emphasised the need 
to maintain management's exclusive right to decide over recruitment, career 
development, discipline, transfer of employers and others; establish links 
between increases in wages and productivity, or better, productivity and actual 
profits; create new procedures and bodies to prevent and sort out collective 
conflicts; and oblige unions by concerted agreements to maintain essential 
services in case of industrial action. Perhaps, the most contentious directive to 
negotiators was to introduce the so-called uclJsula de blanqueo", a clause to 
annul every single right or obligation emerging from previous agreements, acts 
or company resolutions. This clause targeted the notion of ultra-actividad, for if 
accepted by trade unions, this clause meant that the negotiating parts had to 
deal every single issue anew. The clause was softened by the official policy, 
according to which, when a controversial topic came out, the negotiating parts 
could extend the validity of a clause belonging to an older agreement for 6 more 
months; but after this period, its validity expired. 
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Fragmentation of bargaining 
As the government dismantled the protective collective agreement of 1975, the 
new private owners found themselves empowered, for LyF CF had been 
momentarily deprived, not only of the right to participate in managerial 
decisions, but also of important sources of income. In fact, by declaring most 
daily issues as non-negotiable until the finalisation of a new agreement, the 
decree froze the ability of the union to mobilise workers at the shop-floor, as 
proved by the evolution of trade union claims through the CIAPs (Table 12). 
Only from 2001 onwards, claims formally dealt at company level recovered. 
Table 12: Evolution of Trade Unions Claims trough CIAPs 
Type of claim 1989 1992 1995 1998 1999 2001 2003 
Claims from last year 596 588 112 22 23 80 n/d 
New claims 100 32 22 1 - 74 136 
Total claims 696 620 134 23 23 154 n/d 
Favourable 95, 180 2. - 8. 58. 102 
Quit from procedure 401 118 5 48 n/d 
No favourable - n/d 
Waiting for resolution 10 48 n/d 
bource: LyF GF Memoria y Balance (several years). 
As a result, the privatised companies started to run the business in a context in 
which the risk of interference from trade unions was very low. Thus, companies 
faced the negotiations from a position of strength. Trade union officials were 
convinced that the CCT 78/75 would not be recovered: 
We could do nothing. It was clear we would neither stop the government 
nor recover the CCT 78175. We decided not to expose members to the 
consequences of industrial action. What's for? How do you fight back the 
Government? And our guys would not strike... none of the public unions 
took industrial action [in fact, workers from telecommunications, railways, 
public health, public schools and many others did take industrial action]. 
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There was one thing clear for us: the CCT 78/75 was lost (Union Official - 
LyF CF). 
Given the extent of the counter-mobilisation, LyF CIF was on the defensive. Its 
aims were, on the one side, to avoid the fragmentation of collective bargaining; 
on the other side, to defend, first, pay, and second, terms and conditions of 
employment. Yet, the union found out that companies were ready to take full 
advantage of the situation and, therefore, unwilling to negotiate. Then, it was 
the union, which, at the time, had to insist to negotiate over the suspended 
clauses to renew the agreement. Moreover, union officials were ready to make 
concessions in exchange for money. However, the union failed to achieve its 
main objectives. 
While, initially, LyF CF was able to avoid the fragmentation of bargaining in the 
distribution side, company agreements proliferated in the generation side. In 
1993 the union closed an agreement with the distribution companies EDELAP, 
EDESUR and EDENOR (CCT E 225/93). By contrast, it took time to finalise the 
company agreements in generation, apart for Central Puerto where agreements 
were concluded in 1993. In Central Dock Sud the agreement was closed in 
1994, and in Central Costanera the negotiations ended in 1995. The contents of 
the agreements were similar to those of the CCT E 225/93 with regard to terms 
and conditions; but in generation workers received better wages and additional 
cash benefits. Thus, as in the UK, fragmentation highlighted disparities in the 
power of different groups of workers. Still, the absence of multi-unionism, 
business agreements within the same firm, and company mergers and 
takeovers softened the effects of this disparity upon organised labour. 
Although, the distribution,. companies succeeded in introducing change, they 
refused to continue with joint bargaining. As soon as the CCT was closed, the 
companies announced that they would not embark on joint negotiations in the 
future. LyF CF complained but was unable to counter the decision; 
consequently, fragmentation developed as well in distribution. Nevertheless, 
215 
fragmentation stopped at this stage, for the law forbids negotiation of CCTs 
below company level. Besides, the market structure of the electricity industry in 
Argentina did not pass through the process of mergers and takeovers 
experienced by the industry in UK, both factors that benefited the stabilisation of 
the bargaining institutions. However, as will be shown in chapter 10, 
fragmentation constrained the ability of LyF CF to engage in collective action. 
Distribution companies, particularly EDESUR, were reluctant to honour the 
agreements, which brought about conflict with union lay representatives and 
demoralisation. In 1994, the union threatened industrial action if EDESUR did 
not abide by the agreement, continued to neglect health and safety measures 
and to persecute lay representatives (Dinamis, n" 48, Julio 1994; LyF CF 
1994b). In this context, the negotiations to reach the company agreement were 
tortuous. Starting in 1995, bargaining lasted almost three years. Between 1995 
and 1998, when EDESUR finally accede to close the CCT 316/98, management 
reinforced direct communications with employees to reduce the influence of the 
union to a minimum within'the shop-floor and ignored union lay representatives 
every possible time. In EDENOR, despite following a similar path, the company 
agreement was implemented in 1995. However, it was only after painful 
negotiations, which included threat of industrial action, that EDENOR sat in 
1998 at the negotiating table. 
The reluctance of EDESUR and EDENOR to negotiate and their intention to 
sidestep the union cannot be explained by their failure to introduce change in 
the agreements. The CCT 223/93 was a crude expression of the counter- 
mobilisation launched by the government in 1990. It manifested the new power 
relationships within the industry, as it incorporated almost every 
recommendation given in the directives to the public negotiators, now, pushed 
forwards by the private managers. It is necessary to recall once more that the 
government had issued a decree (1334/91) forbidding wage increases without 
productivity growth. Accordingly, a special commission was set up by the 
Ministry of Labour to evaluate whether or not increments in wages were 
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accompanied by changes to spur productivity. This was a weapon for 
employers to push through changes deemed by the commission as proofs of 
expected rises in productivity, before authorising (homologaci6n) the CCT. In 
short, the distribution companies took full advantage of the opportunities 
opened by legal means. The CCT E 225/93 was limited to employees and 
workers: middle and high levels of management were not included; their clerical 
support employees were also out of the agreement. Most important, workers 
employed in contracted companies were explicitly excluded too; this would 
become later, an important source of inter-union competition as outsourcing 
grew. Exclusive managerial prerogatives over recruitment, staff levels, job 
design and the labour process were reaffirmed. Flexible working practices were 
also conceded by the union by means of general statements of intention, 
increasing the opportunity of managers to introduce change as they no longer 
had any obligation to consult or negotiate with unions over organisational 
issues; this objective was reinforced by reducing workers categories from 15 to 
6. Lastly, the working day was extended from 7 to 8 hours and 12 minutes. LyF 
CF, in exchange, recovered their sources of income; the union also obtained 
money for workers as compensation for signing the new agreement and, at the 
end of the year, under the form of a productivity prize. Besides, the union was 
able to keep certain clauses without alteration despite managerial insistence on 
the contrary. 
The irruption of the unknown: inter-union competition 
Apart from fragmentation, outsourcing was another vital dimension of the 
process of counter-mobilisation against collective bargaining. After privatisation, 
private companies began to outsource marketing and customer services, 
maintenance and repair, construction, wiring, cleaning and security. These 
contractors, in turn, subcontracted work to smaller companies, cooperatives 
formed by workers who had been dismissed by the core companies, or 
independent workers, often under worse conditions of employment, and low 
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security levels. These contractors promoted unionisation of their workforces 
with other unions to avoid abiding by the CCT of the LyF CF: 
The companies, instead of choosing our CCT, join the CCT of UOCRA, or 
UOM, or whichever CCT from whichever trade union as far as it is lower 
than ours ( ... ) And we are talking about legal workers, for they have only 
200,300 guys within the CCT. When the contractors need more workers, 
they themselves contracted out labour force too! (Union official - LyF CF). 
This caused a new situation for LyF CF, which had never experienced this type 
of competitive challenge. For instance, the power station Central Costanera had 
795 workers at the time of privatisation (de Luca 1998), and over 95% of them 
members of LyF CF. By the year 2000, it had only around 200 workers and 
subcontracted out companies which employed, in total, equal number of 
workers under different CCTs, including that of LyF CF. Masa, for example, the 
most important contractor of Central Costanera, employed 70 workers under the 
CCT of LyF CF, for all of them were outsourced straight to the contracted 
company without losing their benefits. But, when the workforce is not enough for 
the tasks required by Central Constanera, Masa hires additional workers under 
the CCT of the UOCRA. In 2002, the company had to employ 100 extra 
workers, who earned 2 pesos an hour, while the company was paying 6 pesos 
per hour to its core workers (LyF CF 2002). 
This type of situation created tensions between LyF CF and competing unions. 
LyF CF has presented formal complaints to the Ministry of Labour, in which the 
union requested the recognition of its right to represent workers (personer/a 
gremiao, who were carrying out tasks proper to the ESI activities. 
As this trend developed, outsourcing became a key issue in the agenda of LyF 
CF, particularly, since 1996 (LyF 1996). The union started to put pressure upon 
contracted companies to organise their workers, while making core companies 
responsible for the conditions in outsourced companies. At the same time, LyF 
CF looked for official recognition from the Ministry of Labour, of its right to 
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monopolise the representation of workers of contracted companies. In 1998, for 
instance, LyF CF formally complained in the Ministry of Labour that EDESUR 
had 700 contracted workers out of the electricity agreement and without health 
coverage (LyF CF 1999). By the end of 1990s, union policy began to pay off, 
although often conceding lower wages, and worse terms and conditions in the 
CCTs agreed with contracted companies. In 2003, LyF CIF had closed 12 of 
such agreements, 7 of them with companies providing services to EDESUR 
(LyF CF 2003). If these employees benefited in comparison to workers covered 
by CCTs of other unions, differences with core electricity workers persisted. 
Thus, not only the amount of CCTs bargained by the LyF CF grew in the last 
years, but also the union developed a kind of second-class CCT, which is 
applied to contracted companies. 
The truth of the matter is that the extension of the phenomenon concerns union 
officials: 
The private owners began to form contracted companies. What did those 
companies start to employ? The workers who had gone from the industry... 
The company needs them. It is not true that you managed all this with 4000 
workers. The reality is that we should be in 9000,10000 blokes according 
to circumstances ( ... ) We are 4000... Where are the remaining 5000? 
They 
are working. They are working in contracted companies (National Officer - 
LyF CF). 
Although approximate, these figures illustrate the magnitude of the counter- 
mobilising effect of outsourcing. As stated by a shop-steward when discussing 
the problem: 
We may have, moving around, not always as permanent workers... let say 
3000,3500 people working for contractors. And another 1500 coming and 
going... Today they are working, tomorrow they aren't. They are swarming 
around the contracted companies. And the thing is that we don't represent 
most of these companies (Lay Representative - LyF CF). 
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As they share the same place of work, shop stewards have attempted to recruit 
them, at least, as volunteers, when contracted workers have no union 
representation at all. But this tactic proved to be a failure, for while workers fear 
to be dismissed, a volunteered affiliation means just a precarious access to 
trade union services, but not to the CCT, which apply just to the core company. 
In short, trade union's strategy has been threefold: to negotiate with contracted 
companies to obtained their consent to facilitate the official recognition-, to make 
responsible core companies for the situation of outsourced companies; and to 
lobby the Ministry of Labour to be recognised as the only union with the right to 
represent and negotiate collective agreements in the contracted companies. 
The case of LyF MDP: struggles around collective bargaining 
To explain the distinctive character of the counter-mobilisation process in the 
case of LyF MDP, as compared to that of LyF CF, it is necessary to bear in 
mind two factors. 
Firstly, the Decree 1757/90 could be applied to curtail trade unions rights to 
national companies like SEGBA, but not to the provincial company ESEBA. 
Consequently, the CCT 36/75 remained untouched in ESEBA until its 
replacement in 1994 by the CCT E 1052/94, the product of a political 
manoeuvre planned by the public authorities, which were running the company. 
Second, it is worth remembering that the process of fragmentation of ESEBA 
had a different outcome than that of SEGBA. While in SEGBA there was only 
one union representing the entire workforce, in ESEBA there were fourteen 
unions. Yet, in ESEBA, multi-unionism was completely different from that of UK. 
There was not inter-union competition for membership, for unions organised the 
workforce according to regional basis and delegated their bargaining rights to 
FATLyF, which negotiated a single agreement for the whole company. By this 
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delegation of power, the weaker unions benefited from the aggregate strength 
of the national Federation. 
Thus, the division of ESEBA in five companies multiplied the instances of 
negotiation from the point of view of FATLyF. However, it simultaneously meant 
the reduction of the number of regional trade unions in each of the would-be 
private companies. Moreover, the division implied that LyF MDP became the 
only union organising the workforce of the most important of these new 
companies, and hence, the traditional reasons for delegating the bargaining 
power to the Federation evaporated. Consequently, the fragmentation of the 
company was an opportunity for LyF MDP to take over the process of 
bargaining and fight back the counter-mobilisation wave and its outcomes, 
including the illegitimate company agreement imposed on the union by ESEBA 
with the connivance of FATLyF. 
As in the previous case, counter-mobilisation against collective bargaining 
unfolded in two phases: first, the replacement of the CCT 36/75; second, the 
managerial attempt to undermine workers' collectivism through anti-union 
practices. But in this case, there is an additional element, which coloured the 
context in which counter-mobilisation developed: the intransigent character of 
the union leadership with regards privatisation. Faced by a determined 
opposition, the Provincial Government, ESEBA and since 1997 the private 
company EDEA, besieged the union through multiples strategies. 
The first step in the counter-mobilisation against collective 
bargaining: the replacement of the CCT 36175 
Like the privatisation of SEGBA, the sale of ESEBA required to annul the 
collective agreement to attract the attention of private capitals. Unlike SEGBA, 
managers in ESEBA could not count on the national decree 1757/90 to 
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dismantle the CCT. According to an interviewee, there were also financial 
reasons behind this assault: 
The only ch. ance to privatise ESEBA, I repeat, was by giving absolute 
power to management through a new CCT. According to confession of an 
interested part, ESEBA with the historic CCT, the 36/75, had 30 % less 
value than the final price at which it was finally sold off. It was the key to sell 
ESEBA. There is no other explanation. If not, why was it privatised in 1996- 
97 when the idea was already in place in 1993? (Union Official - LyF MDP). 
The way to achieve the objective was to obtain the support of FATLyF to 
bargain a flexible CCT. FATLyF and LyF MDP had had continuous clashes 
since privatisation invaded the public agenda. Already in 1990, they dissented 
when the ownership status of ESEBA's precursor company DEBA, was 
restructured to prepare its privatisation. This time, FATLyF supported the official 
project and ignored the alternative one elaborated by the regional trade unions 
under the leadership of LyF MDP. In 1991 Federation Conference, their 
antagonistic standpoints regarding privatisation blow up. LyF IVIDP accused 
FATLyF of giving consent to the sale of ESEBA; the latter accused the former of 
political extremism (FATLyF 1991). In 1992, LyF MDP was excluded temporally 
from the Federation; in 1997 its expulsion was finally formalised (FATLyF 1997). 
In between, FATLyF deployed a battery of resources to vanquish the leadership 
of LyF MDP. 
Thus, ESEBA found in FATLyF an ally to displace LyF MDP from the bargaining 
process. This was legally possible because FATLyF had represented the 
workforce in the negotiation of the CCT 36/75 with DEBA, on behalf of the 14 
trade unions operating in the company. Thus, the Federation had the legal right 
to decide about future changes to that agreement. Hence, the separation of LyF 
MDP from FATLyF coloured the process of illegitimacy, since the local union 
called to a halt the traditional delegation of bargaining rights. However, as 
ESEBA was still undivided in 1994, it was easy for FATLyF to legally justify its 
right to sign a company agreement to replace the CCT 36/75, despite the 
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opposition of LyF MDP. Nine out of the other thirteen unions voted in favour of 
the agreement; four voted against. Thus, the Federation obtained the majority to 
close in 1994 the CCT E 1052/94. 
LyF MDP went to court to present a formal complaint against the deal, whereas 
the Ministry of Labour gave formal recognition to the CCT E 1052/94 to replace 
in ESEBA the CCT 36/75. The leadership of LyF MDP refused to accept it, and 
denounced its illegitimate and legally debatable character; however, the union 
was forced to abide by this agreement. 
So, to publicly refer to the agreements closed by FATLyF as an Act, to call 
it 'Act' instead of CCT, is to put it beneath the whole legal edifice of the 
collective bargaining process. And I understand why Rigane [the General 
Secretary of the Union], politically, do not want to accept the agreement as 
a CCT and will never accept it, and talk about it as a simple Act. Now, 1, as 
a lawyer, when I'm writing to a Jury, have no chance but to accept the 
agreement (Union Lawyer - LyF MDP). 
When ESEBA was finally privatised the union sought to recover the old CCT. 
The argument was that given that the new CCT was a company agreement, it 
could not extend its coverage beyond ESEBA. Thus, according to the union, the 
fragmentation of ESEBA meant that the CCT 36/75, which covered the 
electricity industry nationally, had to be applied in the new companies. Once 
more, the Ministry of Labour rejected the argument of LyF MDP. Far from 
acceptance of defeat, the union continued looking for the recognition of the CCT 
36/75 whenever it could. Presently, for instance, the union argues that this is 
the agreement that should be applied to contractors, which provide services to 
EDEA. The argument is the same as before, as the CCT E 1052/94 is a 
company agreement, it cannot be applied to other companies, therefore, the 
national CCT should be automatically applied to new entrants to the industry. 
Public authorities have yet to decide. 
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Thus, the process of counter-mobilisation rested upon a tacit alliance between 
managers, FATLyF's officials and Labour authorities, which, initially, succeeded 
in stopping LyF MDP from taking full responsibility in collective bargaining. 
By opening the door to labour flexibility, the CCT E 1052/94 was crucial to 
introduce the type of changes in terms and conditions demanded by private 
businesses: 
This [the CCT E 1052/94] was the main weapon. It launched flexibilisation; 
it legalised flexibilisation. In ESI the agreement of 1994 was the 
inauguration of a set of policies, it was not just the confirmation of changes 
already achieved in practice, as it would be the case in other industries 
from the private sector (Union Official - LyF MDP). 
The agreement meant to lose job stability; to shorten maternity leaves, sickness 
leaves, and holidays; to eliminate overwork and other cash benefits; to 
introduce PRIP, multi-skilling and the unilateral redesign of tasks; to flatten 
categories damaging promotions; among others. According to a comparative 
study carried out for LyF MDP, the agreement implied the loss of 60 % of the 
benefits of the CCT 36/75 (LyF MDP 1994b). 
The second step: deepening counter-mobilisation against workers 
collectivism 
Not satisfied with the removal of the CCT 36/75, public and private managers 
assailed workers collectivism to weaken the joint regulation of industrial 
relations further. 
Chapter 8 pointed to the combination of repression and money to persuade 
workers to join voluntary redundancy programmes; in this analytical context, it 
should be said that ESEBA and EDEA were also paradigmatic cases of the 
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combination of anti-unionism and the politics of money to avoid bargaining and 
achieve decollectivisation. 
For instance, ESEBA discriminated between union members and non-union 
members, favouring the latter with the payment of food tickets over 1994-96. 
The workers, who left the union received automatically 120 $ monthly in food 
tickets, when the average wage, at the time, was of 700 $. 
EDEA, in turn, pursued a policy of marginalisation of LyF MDP, whose core 
elements were the restriction of issues under negotiation. Thus, as a rule, the 
company attempted to sidestep the union to negotiate face to face with the 
workforce. The aim of this tactic has been to ease the exchange of money for 
benefits to narrow the field of trade union's interference. This is the reason why 
the company was often ready to pay off workers to drop collective benefits. In 
reply to this policy, the union persisted with campaigns to warn workers against 
the risks of losing spaces of negotiation and representation. 
The individualisation of wages has been another common practice followed by 
EDEA's management, offering different pay rates to the same category of 
workers or workers doing the same job, most of the time discriminating against 
LyC MDP's members. 
Being the basic idea to break solidarity, these practices were accompanied by 
others, often with the aim of undermining collective bargaining. Since 1997, 
EDEA has established direct communication channels with employees at the 
workplace, even sending letters to their homes in which the company criticised 
union's policies; it has implemented credit lines for workers to compete with 
those of the union, while refusing to deposit in trade union's account the amount 
of money deducted from wages, which corresponds to union mortgage's 
instalments; it has disciplined workers who take industrial action and discounted 
their wages; and it has frequently violated the CCT in weakened sections. 
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Overall, the company put the workforce, particularly, union activists, under the 
threat of redundancy, which was used, politically, in every labour conflict. 
Yet, workers' collectivism had already been challenged from within the labour 
ranks as well. In 1994, FATLyF not only closed an agreement against the will of 
LyF MDP and its members to replace the CCT 36175 as explained above, but 
also provided support and resources to a breakaway group of workers, who 
created a parallel union. It was born, initially, as a sister organisation of LyF 
Mercedes, the biggest regional union who operated in ESEBA before 
privatisation. Later on, it became an independent organisation - named LyF 
Pueyrred6n. FATLyF incorporated the union into the Federation, despite its lack 
of personeria gremiaL It also offered to its affiliates health coverage while 
cutting out any type of service to members of LyF MIDP. EDEA worked upon 
this division. Management acceded to pay time off to the lay representatives of 
the parallel organisation, whom nobody had elected, while it did not treat the 
same the democratically elected representatives of LyF MDP. Besides, to fulfil 
the requirements stemming from the PPP, the company gave a place in the 
Board to an official of the parallel union, and member of FATLyF, who was not 
elected by EDEA's workers. Anyway, presently, LyF Pueyrred6n is still an 
empty shell. 
Briefly, counter-mobilisation did not stop at replacing the CCT but targeted 
workers collectivism to undermine the joint regulation of labour issues. 
However, if harassment was important, the main weapon against collective 
bargaining was, as in SEGBA, the development of outsourcing. 
The irruption of the unknown: inter-union competition 
In Argentina, where the system of industrial relations precludes competition, 
outsourcing became the prevailing strategy to weaken collective bargaining 
institutions. Outsourcing permitted companies to open the door to other unions; 
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this practice was paramount in privatised companies. As in the previous case, 
this was an entirely new challenge for LyF MDP. 
LyF MDP has denounced that EDEA presently subcontracts 357 workers out of 
922 workers, whose tasks correspond to those covered by the CCT E 1052/94. 
According to the law by which ESEBA was privatised, EDEA should have a 
minimum of 683 of this type of workers. In fact, the company has much more, 
but only 570 workers are covered by the CCT negotiated by LyF MDP due to 
outsourcing. LyF IVIDP demands the right to represent all these workers. 
Outsourcing has affected mainly metering, meter readers, installation, wiring, 
and construction. Most of the outsourced workers are under the CCT of 
UOCRA, which organises construction workers. Despite they are concentrated 
in some particular areas, there are always working together at the shop-floor, 
members of LyF MDP and outsourced workers, unionised or not, who carry out 
equal or similar tasks but with different pay. Workers under the CCT of UOCRA 
earn significantly less than those under the CCT of LyF MDP- 
You have to compare both groups of workers over one year. Because a 
LyF worker earns approximately 18 month wages a year against 13, which 
is the average in other unions ( ... ) If I compare a LyF craft worker 
to a 
UOCRA craft worker, say, the higher UOCRA category, the worker from 
UOCRA gets 8,9 thousands a year; the worker from LyF gets 20 or 22 
thousands a years. There is one more detail: it is more difficult to dismiss a 
unionised worker in ESI. Instead, workers under the CCT of UOCRA have a 
fund to cover unemployment, and this makes much easier to get rid of them 
(Union Officer - LyF MDP). 
This is a source of clashes between workers and unions, which hurts 
collectivism. Electricity workers see in outsourcing a threat to their terms and 
conditions of employment; union officials consider that the attitude of UOCRA is 
disloyal to LyF MDP. This feeling is rein 
' 
forced by the, fact that UOCRA lent 
initially their premises to establish the headquarters of the parallel union. 
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Besides, the point is that industrial action in certain areas faces difficulties, for 
the LyF MDP officials certainly know that outsourced workers will not take 
action. Lastly, as in the case of LyF CF, the counter-mobilising meaning of 
outsourcing should be evaluated by its success in diminishing the scope of 
representation of the union, which undermines the process of collective 
bargaining. In the case of EDEA, while before privatisation LyF MDP organised 
over the 90 % workers, today, 38 % of them are out of its ranks. 
Conclusion 
The comparative approach illuminates the association in both countries 
between privatisation and changes in collective bargaining; fragmentation, 
devolution and other changes in the negotiating structures manifested as 
important counter-mobilising forces. Yet, comparison reveals certain ambiguity, 
as to whether or not, these initiatives were part of a deliberate counter- 
mobilising strategy. The suspension of clauses of the LyF CF's CCT as part of 
the pre-privatisation legal changes, or the attack upon the CCT of LyF MDP, 
before and after privatisation, were clear components of a counter-mobilisation 
strategy against trade unions in Argentina. In UK, the counter-mobilising 
component of several managerial decisions seemed to have been the effect of 
actions taken for other motives, for instance, cost reduction or organisational 
efficiency. Yet, the effective achievement of those aims has rested, partly, in the 
managerial capacity to prevent trade unions' opposition to change. In this 
sense, fragmentation, devolution and changes in bargaining procedures, even 
when they may not have any inevitable consequences by themselves, 
contributed to weaken unions' aggregate strength. Indeed, that changes in 
bargaining procedures were required to further industrial restructuring meant 
that management needed to weaken the position of ESI unions. And devolution 
of bargaining was key in this regards. Finally, comparison reveals diversity, at 
the same time, in the forms taken by these processes, due to the intervention of 
country specific variables. 
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Then, while the British Government left the introduction of change in collective 
bargaining to private capitals, the Argentinean counterpart assumed this task as 
a condition for the success of privatisation. The features of their respective 
systems of industrial relations seem to explain this initial difference. Particularly, 
the place of law in the Argentinean system of industrial relations forced public 
authorities to act in order to shape the legal dimensions of the opportunity 
structure. As in other initiatives, they counted on the support of international 
actors, who provided financial and human resources to put through the 
privatising agenda. Thus, LyF CF was victim of a national counter-mobilisation 
strategy, which affected as well, gas, railway, communications, water, postal, 
sailors and oil workers, employed in national public companies. At provincial 
level, the combination of a different opportunity structure with an intransigent 
union leadership, determined forms of counter-mobilisation, which involved, in 
greater degree, illegal and unfair procedures to dismantle previous agreements. 
LyF MDP was victim of a tacit alliance of employers, trade union leaders and 
public authorities, who connived to force change despite workers' resistance. By 
the contrary, public authorities did not occupy in UK a similar role in the process 
of counter-mobilisation; the initiative in this country was left to the industrial 
actors. 
Yet, despite the involvement of the political power in the Argentinean case, the 
process of counter-mobilisation against collective bargaining did not bring about 
the extent of changes, which hit the institutional framework of collective 
bargaining in UK. In fact, there was less fragmentation of negotiating structures, 
and fewer changes in the procedures, than those of UK. British trade union 
structure and the dynamic of the electricity markets seem responsible for this 
diversity. 
On the one side, British multi-unionism emerges as a key variable to explain the 
possibility of inter-union competition and tensions, as decentralisation ended 
with the bargaining structure that had entrenched the respective spheres of 
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influence of ESI unions. Still, even then, there had always been some friction 
between the AEEU and EPEA/EMA around the interface question - also 
between NALGO and the industrial unions due to pay and labour conditions 
differentials, though much more muted. The fragmentation of the bargaining 
machinery post privatisation freed management to transform those frictions into 
opportunities to introduce change and undermine unions' ability to mobilise their 
constituencies. Although the growing power of engineers was the main target of 
managerial counter-mobilisation, the trend has had consequences for the whole 
range of unions representing ESI workers. 
In Argentina, where multi-unionism coexists with clear recruiting demarcations, 
competition and tensions emerged as well, but took different forms. In its 
general form was spurred by outsourcing, in which competition expressed as 
inter-union conflict for official recognition at the administrative level of the 
Ministry of Labour. Yet, there was too a political dimension of inter-union 
conflict, particular to one of the cases under study. Privatisation divided the 
labour movement leading to internal confrontations, which debilitated the 
intransigent leadership. The latter was prevented from exercising a fruitful 
defence of the bargaining institutions, due to a pro-company union leadership, 
who supported managerial policies. This episode opens the door to consider the 
counter-mobilising role of certain union officialdoms. LyF MDP kept, however, 
the ability to mobilise the rank-and-file all over the period, but undoubtedly, 
these divisions reduced union's effectiveness. 
On the other side, the process of mergers and takeovers, which took place in 
UK, might contribute to explain the eagerness of private managers to bargain 
pay, terms and conditions, at the lower possible level to counteract competitive 
pressures. This feature was absent from the industry in Argentina, where the 
risk of a takeover was almost non-existent, and companies neither sold nor 
bought business units, nor integrated industrial structures after privatisation. 
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Particularly in this chapter, the combination of mobilisation theory, micro-, 
meso- and macro-analytical levels, and the comparative method enhance the 
need to incorporate intermediate variables to account for the particular forms 
adopted by the process of counter-mobilisation and its effects. This need seems 
to be proportional to the analytical scope. The broader the scope, the more 
compelling seems to be the demands for taking into account industrial, 
institutional and political intermediate variables. 
As well, in every case, the sequence of changes under analysis highlighted the 
importance to approach counter-mobilisation in historical perspective. Changes 
in bargaining formats and procedures modified gradually the opportunity 
structure and organisational capabilities of trade unions; trade unions evaluated 
the new conditions and essayed various organisational and political responses, 
which in turn, compelled managers to act accordingly when needed. But the 
organisational and strategic responses of trade unions cannot be isolated from 
their internal capabilities, in themselves under constrained by the continuing 
process of change in UK or the adoption of hard line managerial tactics in 
Argentina. 
Nevertheless, what appears as a common feature in both experiences is the 
growing diversity in institutional arrangements, terms, conditions and wages that 
trade unions have had to face as a result of privatisation and the concomitant 
counter-mobilising forces analysed in this chapter. It is possible to argue that 
this diversity impacted upon the organisational structures of trade unions. And 
in so doing, that it has affected as well, the organisational process by which 
workers shape their interests, define concrete demands, and choose actions to 
achieve their aims. Thus, from the point of view of mobilisation theory, these 
phenomena are related to the categories organisation and interest, which are 
vital aspects to analyse the fate of workers' collectivism. Hence, the next and 
last chapter is to be devoted to explore those dimensions. 
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Chapter 10 
Organisational Change, Leadership Styles and Decision- 
making 
According to mobilisation theory, workers' collectivism depends on a 
conglomerate of factors, which include workers' organisation and interest 
definition. Indeed, scattered references have already been made about the 
impact on those variables of the counter-mobilising forces embedded in the 
politics of money and the fragmentation of collective bargaining. This chapter 
addresses qualitative findings related to organisational change, workers' 
participation in decision-making and leadership styles. 
The comparison will illuminate two scenarios regarding the category 
organisation: profuse change in UK and relative stability in Argentina, within a 
shared field of membership loss. This is to be explained by variability in the 
evolution of the industrial structures and the bargaining arrangements of each 
country. Concerning interest definition, comparison will point to how agency 
variables such as decision-making, union strategy and leadership style 
intertwined with structural variables to condition, differently, workers 
mobilisation. 
United Kingdom 
Organisational change 
Interviewees share the view that both membership and union density have had 
negative developments in ESI since privatisation. Indirectly, TUC's statistics 
support, broadly, this, impression. Only 14 trade unions had membership totals 
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in 1996 above their 1979 levels; none of the ESI unions appeared among them 
(TUC 1980; 1997). Scattered figures also support this view. The EETPU was 
the biggest ESI union at the time of privatisation with 40000 members, being its 
union density over 90%. Currently, Amicus has slightly over 20000 members in 
the energy sector (Amicus 2005). During 1980s, NALGO's density oscillated 
around 80 %. By the beginning of 1992, the union had 33000 members in ESI, 
that is, a loss of 6712 members since 1981. Restructuring following privatisation 
affected the union severely; membership barely reached 20000 in 1996 (Unison 
1996). According to interviews they now have no more than 15000 members 
"across the whole lot, water, gas and electricity" (National Officer - Unison). 
Union density in the case of EPEA, was of 95 % for engineers and 80 % for 
managers when privatisation was announced (EPE May 1991). Data from the 
certification office shows that the organisation counted on 33127 members in 
1991 (Certification Office 1992). Prospect officials affirm to have today 
approximately 17000 members in the utility sector. Yet, lack of data prevents 
the analysis to go beyond tentative descriptions. 
On the contrary, qualitative findings point to important changes in the 
organisational sophistication of ESI unions (Batstone 1988). As intermediary 
organisations (Muller-Jentsch 1985; Offe & Wiesenthal 1985), unions' 
representative and negotiating bodies could not isolate from changes in 
ownership and industrial structures. Nor could they, from changes in bargaining 
structures. Thus, trade unions anticipated privatisation by embarking in their 
own internal restructuring, which experienced continuous pressures as private 
managers were ready to exploit the counter-mobilising sides of the never 
ending process of change in ESI. On the whole, findings show, on the one side, 
trade unions resilience, on the other, their failure to counteract workers 
demobilisation and sectionalism through organisational adaptation. 
In all cases, trade unions' reorganisation was constrained by the same factors: 
organisational mergers and amalgamations, massive redundancies, the 
devolution of bargaining, and company mergers and takeovers. Previous 
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chapters already discussed the counter-mobilising meaning of most of these 
phenomena, but their organisational consequences were seldom referred to. 
Yet, the latter is relevant for the study of privatisation as counter-mobilisation. 
Overall, the response of trade unions to the organisational challenges posed by 
privatisation was led by the pragmatic ideology of adaptation, which might be 
considered as an expression of trade union resilience in the face of an 
unfavourable opportunity structure and negative power relations: 
We had to accept the way companies merge and employers change. We 
couldn't stop that, although our members would have liked to do it. So, we 
had to adapt our role, and basically, be ready to bargain with the new 
employer, or new management team. We change much more rapidly now 
(Regional Officer - Prospect). 
What we had to accept was that privatisation was something we were not 
going to stop, so we had, therefore, to be prepared to adapt (National 
Officer - NALGO). 
We don't have a national structure that was broken upon geographical 
basis. We have to change that, to a national structure that was broken up in 
a company basis. And we have to adapt over the years because companies 
have merged, and changed again, and changed again, so we have just 
been able to control them by adapting to the change. It was difficult 
(National Officer - Amicus). 
The core of the adaptation was the devolution of power to lower organisational 
levels. 
EPEA 1989 Annual Conference instructed the NEC to review the organisation 
of the union upon regional basis, tomake possible a mixture of members from 
distribution, generation, and transmission companies in each section (EPEA 
1989b). The Conference also concluded that the negotiating functions of the 
EPEA had to be organised on the basis of matching the new management 
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structures. The plan included the incorporation to the NEC of representatives 
from each of the future private companies (EPEA 1989b, 1989d). Additionally, 
in 1990, the NEC organised a seminar to consider the unification with EMA to 
anticipate the financial, staffing and organisational challenges, which 
privatisation would pose. EPEA expected a loss in membership after 
privatisation (1989d). As union density among NJB staff was over 95 %, the 
NEC concluded that the area of expansion to counteract this trend had to be in 
the EMA field with the committed co-operation of EPEA (EPEA 1990,1991). 
There were also acute financial reasons. A single organisation would yield 
economies in administration, structure and the utilisation of staff, for it would cut 
out the unnecessary duplication of effort and resources involved in the 
existence of separate NECs, FTOs, Annual Conferences, and so forth. Hence, 
the unification was approved in the 1991 EPEA Annual Conference (EPEA 
1991). Besides, EPEA foresaw a gradual demise of centralised negotiations, 
which would shift the focus to the regions; thus, a reorganisation of the regional 
offices was carried out. After that, branch structures were also revised to ensure 
the devolution of authority to local levels. By 1994,34 new company branches 
and 15 new section boundaries were established, together with the election of 
Branch Executive Committees (BEC) for every company and the creation of 
annual branch conferences to debate pay and conditions. Since then, the 
National Conference adopted a biennial frequency. Then, seven regional teams 
were established, composed by a national officer called national secretary as a 
leader, and one or two negotiator officers. The national secretary is responsible 
for the larger companies, while the negotiator officers are responsible for the 
smaller companies. In every case, it is the BEC that determines the policies to 
be pursued at company level. In the national companies, there are usually side 
committees, which fit into the BEC. The basic idea underlying this 
reorganisation was to have a representative structure at each industrial and 
bargaining level. The decentralisation of authority was accompanied by the 
provision of additional resources to counterbalance the increased workload of 
regional officers. As explained by a FTO: 
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Whereas before we had one central pay bargaining in the NJB that was 
dealt by one person at head office... and there would be some executive 
members present as well... with 22 separate companies you can't expect 
one person to do that. So, you have to give your authority to officers, 
locally, in the regions, to deal with those companies. What we did was ( ... ) if 
we use the football analogy, man for man marking. We have identified each 
company with one officer. And that officer, then, has responsibility for all the 
pay and conditions, which was previously part of central bargaining 
(National Officer - Prospect). 
In the case of NALGO, the 1988 Annual Group Meeting concluded that 
fragmentation, particularly, of the CEGB, would render ineffective their branch 
organisation, and that the likely devolution of bargaining would demand 
strengthening local skills and the provision of new resources by full-time officers 
(NALGO 1988b). The large number of small branches covering the industry was 
recognised as a weakness, only hidden, by the nature of the national 
machinery; so was, that many branches relied on just one or two over-worked 
individuals. It was finally decided in 1989, that branch restructuring would 
maintain an employer base, in agreement with NALGO's general rule, and with 
the ultimate aim of establishing one-company branches (NALGO News, 374, 
28/4/89; 402,10/10/89; 409,12/1/90). Between 1989 and 1991 the number of 
branches fell from around 100 to approximate 70. As mergers and takeovers 
develop, by mid-1990s company based branches were replaced for multi- 
employer branches on regional basis supported by regional FTOs. Ironically, 
Unison is today considering reversing branch structure: 
Now, in the electricity industry, companies tend to be on a bigger scale. 
And the interesting thing is, because the electricity market is being 
dominated again by the 3 or 4 big companies, we are thinking about 
whether it makes more sense to organise our branches on a company 
basis than in an area basis, or a geographical basis, but that's to be still 
going on... It is a nightmarell (National Officer - Unison). 
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Like EPEA, NALGO decided in 1990 to reorganise the National Electricity 
Committee to adapt its structure to a company based system of representation 
(NALGO 1990a). It was decided too, the abolition of the generation and 
transmission committees, which were replaced by specific advisory committees 
for National Power, PowerGen, Nuclear Electric and NGC. The system of 
representation was changed again with the creation of Unison, as electricity and 
gas workers formed the Energy Service Group. Then, as company mergers and 
takeovers blurred business boundaries, Unison ended up gathering the energy, 
water and transport workers under a single forum, the Business and 
Environment Service Group. 
In the case of the EETPU, the organisational response to privatisation and the 
amalgamation with the AEU run almost simultaneously. The line adopted was to 
devolve power to shop stewards within a horizon of minimum trade union 
reorganisation (EETPU 1989; AEEU 1993). In 1988, the EETPU had already 
set three working parties to inform on the needs of distribution, generation and 
transmission, within a context of privatisation (EETPU 1988). The conclusion 
was to emphasise the need of stronger workplace organisations, a topic 
neglected for years by the Executive Council, but raised in the 1989 Annual 
Conference (EETPU 1989). By 1990, this preoccupation continued with 
proposals to reconstitute any work's committees into shop stewards committees 
to cope with more localised discussions, as the union predicted by that time, a 
move, after privatisation, towards company rather than national bargaining 
(Contact, several issues). 
The official decision to reinforce shop steward structures had to confront many 
years of branch life deterioration. From 1971 to 1983, every biennial delegate 
conference witnessed hotly contests around the problem of the gradual demise 
of EETPU branches (EETPU 1971,1977,1979,1981,1983). Since 1977, 
complaints had increased focusing on the closure of branches, compulsory 
amalgamations and the appointment of full-time officials to replace elected ones 
in branch management. At that time, the Executive Council refused the claims, 
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emphasising that massive industrial conferences, divisional shop stewards 
meetings, the appointment of area officials to service individuals, check-off 
systems, and the like, had rendered branches a thing of the past. Yet, a Policy 
and Rules Revision Conference hold in 1983, ended the disputes with the 
triumph of the leadership over the opposition, who was demanding changes to 
bind the Executive Council to Conference decisions and to elect officials 
(EETPU 1983). In brief, the EETPU's policy together with the dynamic of the 
bargaining machinery weakened workplace organisations in the industry. 
Therefore, it was needed that the AEEU EETPU section reinforced the new 
orientation by launching in 1993 Policy Conference a campaign, which included 
a working party with the aim of restoring active branch life (AEEU 1993). 
Besides, the conference urged to organise special and occasional conferences 
for shop stewards of newly formed companies, which merged from the 
privatisation of the ESI to deal with issues peculiar to them. 
It was only after the amalgamation with the AEU, that proposals for limited 
structural change arose, first, to ensure that the two electricity sections work in 
unison, second, to match developments in ESI, brought about by the eventual 
end of the national machinery. In the main, changes were to make principle 
FTOs responsible for PowerGen, National Power, Nuclear Electric and NGC, 
and to put the 12 RECs under the responsibility of the Executive Councillors, in 
their respective geographical areas. The coordination of the activities was left to 
an EETPU Section Committee, chaired by an Executive Councillor member. 
The creation of Amicus did not change the basic tenet: the development of shop 
stewards skills and structures to establish a narrow working relationship 
between elected senior shop stewards and FTOs' responsible for the 
companies. Regarding representative bodies within the union, energy and 
utilities companies were gathered in a single unit, the Energy & Utilities Sector. 
Energy and utilities workers elect an Energy National Sector Committee, 
composed of 28 people, which organises its own annual conferences (Amicus 
2005). 
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In sum, privatisation forced unions to look inwards. In all cases, trade union 
introspection began as soon as privatisation was announced. Overall, the 
shared line was the devolution of power, though the emphasis varied. 
Restructuring due to privatisation mixed with restructuring due to union mergers 
and amalgamations, both leading to continuous organisational changes. As a 
result, new systems of workers representation emerged, in which ESI 
constituencies lost prominence compared to previous arrangements. Still, 
variability among trade unions would demand some qualifications. For instance, 
in relation to EPEA and NALGO, EETPU structural reorganisation was small. 
Moreover, it was often linked to union's merges. In general, change located 
chiefly in the devolution of responsibility and authority along unchanged 
hierarchical bodies. Another example: ESI engineers and managers have kept a 
more prominent representative position in Prospect, than that of ESI blue-collar 
workers in Amicus, or white-collars in Unison. 
Organisational readjustment and union resources 
Union reorganisation brought about uneven results, as regards the opportunity 
for workers to mobilise collective resources of power over a period of 
readjustment. 
In this respect, the case of NALGO would be paradigmatic. This organisation 
approached the privatisation as an opportunity to empower workplace and 
branch structures; however, union resources stretched due to redundancies and 
fragmentation, slowing the building up of local capacity. Indeed, many branches 
were left without their most experience individuals; some of its branches, even 
extinguished. Besides, the lack of voluntary people, though not an entirely new 
phenomenon, became a critical point, as interviewees agree how hard has been 
to persuade members to take on branch and steward positions since 
privatisation. For instance, the West Midlands Region Branch of PowerGen was 
seriously stretched, even though, this was the area, where the majority of 
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NALGO's membership was located at the moment. Similarly, to find lay 
representatives in certain activities, for example, in call centres, is often 
hazardous according to interviewees. 
Scarce resources are critical too, due to cultural features. ESI white-collar 
workers, as compared to other white-collars organised by Unison, appear to 
have a greater reliance in FTOs. While some branches have many activists and 
keep FTOs at a distance, most are heavily dependent on the full-time officials: 
You know, too dependant than anything that comes up, they are on the 
phone and say: "Look can you come in and sort this out? " (National Officer 
- Unison). 
So deeply rooted is this attitude among white-collar workers, that changes in the 
negotiating dynamics brought tensions between branch members and FTOs, as 
the latter have not been able to deliver the expectation of the formers. 
Nowadays, Unison's FTOs have agreed to train and develop lay representatives 
to take on the first line work. They encourage membership involvement: 
I get involved up to a certain level. The things that we [FTOs] used to do, 
we now say to them: "No, you need to do it. You've got the ability". And the 
distinction I make is that if there are issues to do with redundancies or 
changes in paying and conditions in a significant way, I will get involved in 
those negotiations. Others than that, no more (National Officer - Unison). 
Well, I can't do everything. They [branch reps] expect to be able to 
demanding from you, without actually taking any responsibility. They expect 
you to do it all. You know... if it is a big company, it got locations all over 
the country. if you got your full-time officer to be in all of them... It's just 
impossible! But, in fact, with the other full-time officer, we are actually trying 
to'change that. We are moving towards... to try to rely on people to do a lot 
of things that we can't do efficiently (Regional Officer - Unison). 
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In addition to cultural attitudes, employers' preferences and tactics put also 
greater pressures upon union scarce resources: 
In energy, companies prefer to deal with union officials, full-time officials 
rather than lay workers representatives. So, it is much more difficult to get 
lay membership activity in the energy side, as compared with the water side 
(National Officer - Unison). 
The employer encourages that [members reliance in FTOs], I think, the 
employer wants that ... The employers will be quite 
happy if they just meet 
me all the time, and don't meet members, so I get to make sure that, you 
know, if you want to meet me, fine, but I'm going to be bringing with me, 
you know, the representatives (Regional Officer - Unison). 
In the case of Amicus, officials have stressed that, initially, there were frictions 
within the union, as FTOs, who were accustomed to operate in full control of the 
negotiating agenda and union-management interactions, were reluctant to 
change. In their new role, FTOs should support shop stewards, whereas before, 
they had kept them at arm's length. As privatisation unfolded, FTOs had to learn 
to operate in an environment where things change quicker. Moreover, FTOs 
incorporated new responsibilities. For instance, they have to write their own 
reports about what happens in their companies to communicate with members, 
when previous to privatisation the whole communication was channelled 
through one structure at national level full-time. Besides, FTOs had to establish 
closer relationships with the rank-and-file through meetings and discussions to 
run company bargaining together with senior shop stewards. All that generated 
resistances: 
Before, the bureaucratic system operated in the industry uniformly, and 
slowly, and pedestrian. Well, FTOs had to adapt. So, they had to change in 
many ways. Before, the officers, under the old set up, had had complete 
control. They had to delegate that control to the stewards... And a number 
of people did not want to give up that control (National Officer - Amicus). 
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Moreover, the change of the organisational focus towards workplace structures 
demanded by privatisation increased union logistical problems. While Amicus 
has too many shop stewards in some companies, it does not have enough in 
others. IFTOs have stressed in the interviews that changes in working practices 
are used by managers as counter-mobilising devises, for certain working 
practices can make more difficult for the union to gather members. In many 
distribution companies, where the workforce is scattered, the union needs more 
shop stewards to sort out communication and logistical difficulties. In most 
power stations, where it is usually easier to identify the constituency, shop 
stewards structures are stronger; however, the union has remained weak in a 
number of power stations too. 
Thus, variability appears as the rule: 
So, it varies, it varies, it depends in each situation, how many stewards you 
have and how many you need. Some companies support you, and some 
don't... and then, it is hard to organise structures that work... And you need 
good shop stewards to make you strong (Regional Officer - Amicus). 
The rise of sectionalism 
The most critical finding is that union reorganisation has spurred the growth of 
sectionalism. The cause of this unintended outcome seems to be clear: while 
the national union is still relevant for members on issues like pensions, energy 
policy and regulation matters, it is at lower levels where negotiations on pay, 
and terms and conditions are conducted. 
For instance, in Prospect, each BEC determines the bargaining agenda; 
whereas, previously, the NEC decided the priorities and policies to be 
negotiated, which were applied uniformly to everybody in the industry. 
The branch executive committee decided the policies that they would 
follow. So then, the PowerGen branch committee may have a different 
philosophy, and a different aim to the company next door, because the 
company next door may want to go in a different direction, may have a 
different philosophy, may have a different concern, so, that is the way we 
deal with (National Officer - Prospect). 
Still, the NEC can exercise control if there is a particular branch going in 
opposite direction to union policy. However, as this principle is often loosely 
interpreted, only extreme and unlikely cases of lay representatives agreeing on 
compulsory, or massive redundancies, would push the NEC to intervene. 
Consequently, Prospect members have, today, much greater identification with 
their BECs than with the national union. 
NALGO's FTOs points similar problems. The problem is not only that company 
bargaining agendas are quite different, but also that shop stewards lack more 
comprehensive views: 
Some shop stewards can look beyond, but most, in my experience, only 
look at their own company. And in fact, you probably find that you got 
someone who works for that bit of the company, and he can't even think 
beyond that bit, he can't even see his own company (National Officer - 
Unison). 
Consequently, the exacerbation of sectionalism attaches workers' immediate 
interests to the business unit, spoiling branch life: 
What happens is that the branch secretaries concentrate in the unit that 
they come from, and not always appreciate such a fact, that you are 
actually representing everybody across the whole of the company 
(Regional Office - Unison). 
In this sense, privatisation changed the role of the national officer, who has to 
assume the coordination of policy as to avoid that the profusion of local 
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bargaining agendas serves managers to play different groups of workers off. As 
sectionalism has grown, national FTOs appear to have met the challenge with 
difficulty: 
Well, one of the things that had to change was the role of the national 
officer. Because you have to co-ordinate policy. But, it has been very 
difficult to avoid a FTO, or a group of workers, considering something that 
then, it is imposed on another company (National Officer -Amicus). 
Parallel to the growth of sectionalism, there has been a debilitation of a national 
focus, which increased the need of coordination. Prospect have attempted to 
overcome these problems by two ways: setting up coordinating committees for 
distribution and generation, and reinforcing the coordinating role of the NEC. 
While useful for gathering and sharing information, these initiatives seem to 
have failed to raise effective actions so far: 
We set up coordinating committees for various distribution companies, for 
generation and so on, to make sure there is a crossed flow of information 
and exchange of experiences (Regional Officer - Prospect). 
We try to counter the trend towards sectionalism through coordination. And 
the other thing to remember is that we have the NEC, who receives monthly 
reports, and the NEC was restructured to make sure that it was 
representative, as far as we can make it, of the whole industry. In that way, 
the reports were channelled into the NEC, and they can see what is going 
on. So, we have this exchange of information (National Officer - Prospect). 
NALGO's officers manifested identical worries: 
The reality is that it's a struggle to cope with so many different companies, 
all with their own identity and priorities... it isn't easy. What we are trying to 
do from the centre, here, is to co-ordinate activities. So, we will co-ordinate 
our full-time officers working in regions, so, we keep them informed, we 
keep them advised of developments, we bring them together, so, they can 
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learn form each other experiences, generally, trying to maintain a national 
focus (National Officer -Unison). 
This shift in bargaining responsibilities changed the role of the NEC, which it is, 
essentially now, about administering policy and managing the union. This has 
brought about a new emphasis on union services, strong in Prospect, 
overlapped with an organising discourse in Unison, and recently changing to a 
more organising profile in Amicus. 
Paradoxically, then, while the national machinery was thought as a barrier to the 
militant outlook associated to workplace unionism, the latter has shown within 
the privatisin'g context, a greater readiness in ESI to compromise. This 
inclination to compromise manifested in a growth of sectionalism. This has been 
the case because privatisation increased, as compared to the past, the 
dependence of the staff upon the fate of the particular companies where they 
are employed. Thus, the new structure brought about a deeper understanding 
among the staff of unfavourable market circumstances, and hence, this fact 
ended up, eventually, softening workers demands. 
Leadership styles and decision-making 
Many scholars emphasise the role of mediating factors such as the style of 
leadership, or the dynamics of decisio n-m akin g, in the definition of workers' 
interests, demands and actions. So does the analytical framework of this thesis 
built upon mobilisation theory, which pays attention, especially, to the knotty 
relationship between leadership styles and participation, as the latter is deemed 
to be essential for workers to engage in the type of dialogical interactions, which 
enable workers collectivism. 
Chapter 7 broadly defined the various leadership styles, which were 
predominant among ESI unions at the time of privatisation. Although, they 
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varied in a number of aspects, a common feature underwent all of them: a dose 
of paternalism. As summarised by a FTO from Unison: 
The older paternalistic style, acting according to the idea that they [FTOs] 
come in, and do everything ... The male full-time officer, a sort of who is the 
one who does everything for everybody, and all members, willingly or not, 
subordinate to his decision. I think this is the way just most unions used to 
be, and that is slowly changing right now (Regional Officer - Unison). 
By replacing membership involvement by FTO expertise, paternalism tended to 
substitute workers participation. Nevertheless, neither paternalism is a function 
of FTO's values, nor participation is, simply, an outcome of the leadership style. 
On the one hand, paternalism emanated partly, at least in ESI, from the 
centralised dynamics of bargaining. Thus, by breaking down the national 
machinery, privatisation challenged its rationality. On the other hand, patterns of 
participation often fluctuate following the impact of events, like privatisation, 
which disturb the context of industrial relations through changes in 
management-union relations, the wider political situation, or the union itself 
(Fosh 1993). 
For instance, it is an established fact the right-wing orientation of the leadership 
of the EETPU (Hyman 1983; Kelly & Heery 1994). Indeed, most of its FTOs and 
shop stewards expressed also centre-right political views, a feature explained 
by the tight central control of appointments within the union (Kelly & Heery 
1994). Concrete manifestations of this centre-right standpoint were the policy 
towards branches and the promotion of the principles of liberal democracy by 
which participation was limited to the right to vote. Moreover, the EETPU 
leadership downplayed conflicting interests, at least in ESI, and avoided 
industrial action, whenever possible. However, the EETPU used to mobilise 
workers to put pressure over reluctant managers when the opportunity structure 
was favourable as far as the demands were deemed achievable, the crucial 
defining criteria for action of EETPO's FTOs and shop stewards in the industry 
(Kelly & Heery 1994). 
Yet, privatisation distorted this landscape. After the announcement of the sale of 
the industry, there were signs of an increment in workers participation in 
meetings related to privatisation, as workers were eager for information (EETPU 
1988; Flashlight n" 47, September 1988). Within the same context, demands to 
the NEC to improve communication were raised (Contact v. 17, n" 4 August 
1987; EETPU 1988). Lastly, there were, if not pervasive, at least repeated and 
noticeable calls for industrial action to defend the national machinery of 
negotiations (EETPU 1987; Contact v. 17, n" 6, December 1987). This incipient 
movement was channelled by union leadership through the formal procedures 
of the ESTUC, the establishment of working parties and the organisation of 
FUSE - the anti-privatisation campaign. The remoteness of the activities of 
union leaders and the lack of enthusiasm with the characteristics of the 
campaign, translated into demoralisation and apathy among the rank-and-file 
(see chapter 7). 
Nevertheless, the end of the national machinery obliged the union to develop 
workplace structures to match the gradual devolution of power to first line 
managers. Thus, the union started to promote rank-and-file participation and 
shop stewards involvement in negotiations. Although this move was resisted 
among FTOs, new structures ended up encouraging new practices. The 
likelihood of a revitalisation of workplace activity has been, however, severely 
limited by a set of countertendencies: tradition, restrictive laws, increased 
market competition, an unfavourable opportunity structure, and a type of 
leadership, which prefer the stability and predictability of interactions with 
management. 
Kelly and Heery (1994) also state that NALGO's FTOs had a greater disposition 
than those of EETPU to attend member wishes and rank-and-file support. 
Additionally, during 1980s, NALGO advocated the values of participatory 
democracy embedded in the workplace voting system, while fighting back the 
introduction of postal ballots (NALGO 1986; NALGO News, no 271,27/3/87; n" 
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277,8/5/87). Yet, Unison FTOs have stressed all along the interviews, the 
particularities of ESI members as compared with members from water or local 
government, especially, their lower levels of participation and their stronger 
dependence on them. Additionally, as workplace organisation had been 
established only recently in NALGO, these cultural attitudes remained strong by 
the time of privatisation. Thus, the latter opened a window of opportunity for 
FTOs to deepen workplace structures, but lack of local leaders, cultural 
attitudes and massive redundancies conspired against participatory policies. 
Findings show that even when FTOs express an organising conception of 
unionism, that is, that members should be making the decisions rather than 
their representatives, in practice, they have failed to motivate the rank-and-file. 
The problem has manifested, most clearly, in the lack of volunteers to run union 
activities: 
Very few of our branches have elections, because we don't get more than 
one person standing. Actually, in a lot of cases, people are elected 
unopposed. So, some branches have elections but some don't. Because you 
don't have enough voluntary people (National Officer - Unison). 
It is a problem. I got 6 branches and we are really short of representatives in 
almost all of them, it is a real problem. In some areas there are no 
representatives (Regional Officer - Unison). 
Moreover, problems of communication aggravate the lack of participation 
locally, therefore, preventing the extension of collective discussions. FTOs 
complained that neither branches communicate each other, nor do members 
from different business units, nor branches with their own members. Hence, 
information does not circulate as FTOs believe it should: 
So, even if all members in Unison are at one branch, they don't have any 
contacts, there are limited contacts with other business units, with other 
members (Lay Representative - Unison). ' 
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What we got is a branch structure, but I think that where branches are poor 
is in communicating across (National Officer - Unison). 
Branch reps must communicate with their members ... You should put 
information down to your members. But, also, how do you know what needs 
to be done? What needs to be negotiated? How do you know there is a 
problem if the branch doesn't talk with the members? How do I find out that 
there is a problem in that area, and negotiate with tfie employers to make it 
better? You can't. If you don't communicate with your members, you may 
never know about it (Regional Officer - Unison). 
Consequently, low levels of participation and poor communication conspire 
against extended democratic interactions. This situation promotes workers' 
attachment to their immediate environment. Astonishing manifestations of this 
problem emerge, for instance, over the process of integration launched by Eon. 
Most Unison members from the retail unit, which is still operating under the 
brand name PowerGen, did not even recognise that they were working for Eon. 
Although, less acutely, similar misunderstandings came out in other units. The 
union had to make important efforts to get members to understand they were all 
part of one company. 
The distinctiveness of EPEA among ESI unions was underlined also in Chapter 
7. It stemmed from the features of its constituency, whose role in the industry 
boosted a pragmatic ideology, which embodied the ethos of meritocracy and 
moderation. In EPEA, the distance between leaders and members seems to 
have been narrower than that of other ESI unions. Concurrently, findings point 
to a strong identification between members and leaders. Both factors would 
have contributed to moderate tendencies towards the divergence between the 
objectives of members and union leaders. As a result, the leadership of EPEA 
corresponded to the representative outlook as understood by Batstone et al. 
(1977), that is, a leadership that is ready to take independent initiatives as well 
as to execute policies according to membership's wishes. Given those features, 
workers' participation was often subordinated to pragmatic considerations and 
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seniority, but the union could be fairly rated as members-led. A similar picture 
has continued to characterise the union after privatisation. 
If, initially, members expressed in EPEA Annual Conferences their disposition to 
fight back privatisation and, possibly, its effects, as soon as the consequences 
of privatisation became apparent, member showed signs of demoralisation, and 
thus, participation declined. However, the reorganisation carried out by EPEA in 
1994, with regards to their branch structure, had ambiguous consequences. If it 
contributed to consolidate the trend towards sectionalism, it had positive effects 
upon participation, as the new structure increased rank-and-file's involvement in 
the decision-making over matters related to their immediate environment. EMA 
own evaluation on members participation concluded that the new company 
branch organisation - the new basic unit of organisation formed around 
members working for a specific company or, under appropriate, group of 
companies, increased the number of people involved in the decision-making 
process to 90 over 1000 (EMA 1994). 
Apart from breaking down collective bargaining, privatisation distorted EPEA's 
internal life, through the introduction of new communicational strategies for 
technical and managerial ranks and the spread of personal contracts. The 
response of EPEA was, then, to improve internal procedures and consultation. 
Additionally, the union put special care to better the communication channels 
with members: 
One thing the employer did was to improve their communication with the 
staff. They started introducing leaflets, magazines, newsletters, whereas 
before they had done nothing. They started to tell employees about terms 
of employment; previously, it was left to the unions. They took on board all 
these measures and we had to match it. So, we, have improved our 
communications, not only the content but the style, their appeal, and the 
breadth of the appeal (National Officer - Prospect). 
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As with personal contracts, they segmented the immediate interests of EPEA's 
members. Those members who were taken out from collective bargaining 
began to appreciate the union, mainly, by its ability to represent them in issues 
like pensions, safety organisation and professional responsibility (NOP 1991). 
But also, by the quality of union services. Thus, the NEC sought to enhance 
union servicing profile. 
In short, the previous analysis shows that, in each case, structural 
(fragmentation of the industry and collective bargaining), organisational and 
agency variables (mainly, strategic choices and leadership styles) intertwined to 
shape trade unions' organisational responses to privatisation. 
Argentina 
Organisational stability 
As with previous topics, findings point to relevant differences between LyF CF 
and LyF MDP, within a common context of scant organisational restructuring. 
As for LyF CF, the first thing to be noted is that its membership has declined 
dramatically, whereas union density has remained within acceptable 
boundaries. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the latter contributed 
to conceal the meaning of the former. On the contrary, the decline in 
membership from 22000 to 4000 workers was the main structural determinant 
of union's strategic shift towards entrepreneurial initiatives. Additionally, it 
offered union leadership a convincing rationale for this policy. 
In turn, union's scope of representation received the impact of two different 
sources. On the one side, the Governmental decision to take out managerial 
ranks from collective bargaining, a policy that was followed later by private 
investors. If not numerically relevant, this situation was important qualitatively, 
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as those members used to be whom had access to company information. FTOs 
have complained during the interviews about the chronic lack of bargaining 
information since privatisation. On the other side, outsourcing has impacted 
upon the ability of the union to organise ESI workers. Due to this challenge, 
union leadership has adopted policies to organise outsourced workers with 
unequal results. 
On the main, however, findings show that organisational change limited to the 
downsizing of existing structures, namely, that privatisation brought adjustment 
but not proper restructuring. By the beginning of 1990s, the union owned a large 
infrastructure with which it serviced more than 20000 members in areas like 
health, personal loans, culture, education and tourism. Yet, massive 
redundancies caused massive losses in membership, which translated, directly, 
into financial hardship for the union. 
At the time of privatisation, the union employed 1114 people, whose 
employment relationships were regulated by five different CCTs. As a 
consequence of the organisational adjustment, during the first year after the 
privatisation, the reduction of trade union's employees was of 23 %. By 1998, 
downsizing had affected 53 % of union's own workforce, being 497 the number 
of employees who remained employed by LyF CF. To achieve this, the union 
implemented their own programmes of voluntary redundancy; for instance, only 
between 1997 and 1998, a total of 120 people left the organisation this way 
(LyF CF 1997,1998,1999). 
In short, the union confronted the challenges posed by privatisation with a 
leaner structure, but without adapting it in any meaningful way. 
But financial hardship boosted not only adjustment but also union's 
entrepreneurial policy. As ironically stated by a shop steward, while speaking of 
the commercial exploitation of organisational assets by the union: 
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As we lost members, we had to privatise our own capital, which was built 
over 40 years with the effort of everyone of us. You see, on the one side, 
we criticised privatisation; on the other side, we also pdvatised (Lay 
Representative - LyF CF). 
To give an example, LyF CF opened their hotels to members of other unions; in 
1993,35 % of the accommodation capacity was booked by no union members. 
Additionally, the adjustment affected union's services for members: the obra 
social started to charge fees for medical practices. But also affected union 
assets: the organisation, for instance, sold out all their cars. 
Whether these figures relates mainly with the impact of the financial losses 
upon union's social services, the most important sign of the deterioration of 
resources with regards union's ability to defend members, was the decline of 
permisos gremiales. The latter are formal authorisations by which union reps 
are paid their wages by the company to carry out full-time union activities. Since 
privatisation, they fell from 200 to 98. Private owners, first, downsized their 
workforces; then, made unions accept the reduction of the perTnisos gremiales. 
Moreover, the union currently pays 17 out of 98 them. Still, the crucial decision 
taken by LyF CIF was to modify union's rule book in order to reduce from 32 to 
21 the number of members of the CGA (Comisi6n Directiva) - whose wages are 
paid by the union too. 
If the composition of the CGA was traditionally a source of tensions among 
different groups of workers within the industry, the reduction of the number of 
CGA's members, together with the fragmentation of the industry, increased the 
likelihood of conflicts. 
I'm speaking of conflicts between companies and sections. Because each 
section has lay reps... and when there are elections, every section chooses, 
often among the shop stewards, candidates for CGNs posts. If you reduce 
them, then, there are more disputes among sections around which section 
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gets people to be elected for the CGA. So, as companies multiplied, this 
has been the great battle since privatisation (Union Official - LyF CF). 
The union has not imposed a quota of representation to prevent disputes by 
agreed procedures. Indeed, the problem has been sorted out through political 
struggles over electoral periods. Thus, as there have been unopposed general 
elections since privatisation, the hegemony of the union leadership has been 
consolidated through political clientelism, while the opposition is displaced by 
various methods, sometimes in connivance with the employers. 
Regarding LyF MDP, union membership also declined due to the job loss 
caused by privatisation. Yet, it should be stressed that privatisation affected 
only 30 % of LyF MDP's constituency. Thus, the rate of the decline was not 
equivalent to that of redundancies; and then, as a whole, the proportion of the 
impact was lesser than in other unions. 
In this case, outsourcing has been the main factor undermining union's density 
and scope of representation. It is debatable whether outsourcing meant a 
reduction of the former or a narrowing of the latter; but, the concrete outcome is 
that LyF IVIDP organises less company workers today, than it did before 
privatisation. Thus, the union organises 62 % of company workforce, whereas 
before it covered around 90 %. This troubled the effectiveness of union's 
collective actions. 
As with LyF CF the organisational sophistication of the union has remained 
essentially unchanged. Yet, the union did have, however, organisational 
problems due to the decision of FATLyF to expel LyF MDP from the national 
Federation, and therefore, to halt the provision of social services like health 
coverage and tourism. Although these problems were not in the area of 
collective bargaining, they are worth mentioning because the provision of social 
services is crucial in Argentina for union leaders to maintain their legitimacy. 
However, difficulties were not directly produced by privatisation policies in 
255 
themselves, but by inter-union conflicts brought about by privatisation and the 
strategies of the would-be private company to get rid of LyF MDP. To tackle this 
problem, the union leadership requested workers to pay a special and voluntary 
contribution to create their own services, through a political discourse based on 
the notion of class solidarity against individualism. An astonishing 99 % of 
union's members joined the call. 
Although the union did not change its internal structures, there were very 
important novelties at higher organisational levels. These novelties related to 
union's global response to privatisation, particularly, and to market reforms, 
more generally. Briefly, LyF MDP founded, together with other unions, mainly 
public ones, a new national federation: the CTA. This was one of the reasons, 
which led to its expulsion from FATLyF, which was enrolled in the rival CGT. 
After that, once inside the CTA, LyF MDP created FeTERA, an umbrella 
organisation for energy workers based on different principles than those of the 
traditional unions in Argentina, which began to be organised around 1995, and 
presently has around 12000 workers. From this platform, it was built too, a huge 
arch of international relations with diverse organisations. This organisational 
umbrella was used every time the union engaged in bitter conflicts to ask 
international solidarity to put pressure upon the company and the provincial 
government. Also, LyF MIDP joined the International Federation of Chemical, 
Energy, Mine & General Workers' Unions and founded the Coordinadora de 
Sindicatos del Sector Energ6tico del MERCOSUR with ESI unions from 
Paraguay, Brazil and Uruguay. International solidarity have to be understood as 
a replacement of missing power resources at national level since LyF MDP was 
expulsed from FATLyF. - 
The rise of sectionalism 
As in UK, fragmentation of the industry brought about the rise of sectionalism. In 
LyF CF, rivalry between lay representatives reps from the distribution 
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companies EDENOR and EDESUR has been noticeable, as they compete for 
declining union resources. Additionally, while generation workers have been 
better off to negotiate acceptable terms and conditions, distribution workers 
engaged in bitter conflicts, which led in occasions to industrial action. However, 
the union has never coordinated common actions, though EDENOR and 
EDESUR underwent simultaneous periods of conflict. Findings show that, 
overall, differences in working conditions have caused tensions within the union. 
Workforces experiencing worse conditions of employment tended to attribute 
blame to FTOs: 
The division of the public company broke workers solidarity. People know 
nothing about what is going on in other companies. Yet, if lads hear about 
better conditions in other companies, they complain to us, as if we were 
responsible for their lack of ability, or strength, or whatever, to back the 
negotiation of better agreements (Union Officials - LyF CF). 
Generation workers have inclined to isolate themselves from the wider picture, 
every time they achieve favourable terms and conditions; this was particularly 
marked between 1993 and 1998, a period of major conflicts in the distribution 
area: 
The companies divided everything and everybody; they advanced as far as 
they could. They broke down companies' structures. Before privatisation, 
we were a family. Things improved something between 1996 and 1998, but 
anyway, what they got is a change in mentality. Workers arrange something 
with a company... Others arrange a different thing in a different way in 
another one... Nobody cares for fellow workers next door, especially, 
generation workers (Lay Representatives - LyF CF). 
However, attempts to co-ordinate policies are often circumstantial. Indeed, 
union leaders seem to have assumed sectionalism as an inevitable outcome of 
industry fragmentation, a new feature of the landscape to which they should 
accommodate. 
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Instead, as explained in previous chapters, the fragmentation of ESEBA 
benefited LyF MDP, as the union bargains with a single private company. This, 
partly, explains why sectionalism, a common finding so far when analysing the 
organisational impact of privatisation, was not a problem. Still, pressures to 
devolve managerial decisions to lower levels were present. This, obviously, 
impacted upon the workplace as shop stewards had to deal with issues 
previously bargained at higher levels. But most crucial bargaining decisions, 
pay for instance, have remained still centralised in CGA's hands. 
Leadership styles and decision-making 
Chapter 7 sketched the contours of LyF CF's style of leadership, whose 
ideologica. 1 pillars have been the notions of 'multiple trade unionism' and 
participation. Based on them, a highly concentrated and pragmatic bureaucracy, 
historically sustained, on one side, trade union's accumulation of assets, on the 
other side, the disposition to establish channels of dialogue with public 
authorities to open the door to political exchange. Thus, these notions have, 
eventually, backed union involvement in co-management during 1970s, various 
forms of political exchange, disposition to negotiate with democratic as well as 
authoritarian governments, and even direct participation in the apparatus of the 
state (Palomino 2005; Pozzi & Schneider 1994). Traditionally, policy making 
concentrated in few people, who have controlled the process of decision- 
making, through a vertical and bureaucratic leadership: 
Our union was always ready to take a sit at the negotiating table. We have 
a different sort of outlook than other organisations. For us, industrial action 
is a sign of failure. We have always tried to deliver the goods by negotiation 
and participation in industrial and political spheres. And look, the union has 
always trained people, and created small elites - 5,10 blokes - who run the 
organisation this way (Union Officer - LyF CF). 
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However, workers participation in the comisiones intemas had often balanced, 
somewhat, this tendency, at least, until the last dictatorship. After the latter, the 
internal life of the union never recovered fully. 
I'm not going to lie to you, the deals are often, more or less, what the CGA 
wants them to be. It is very difficult for a lay rep to reverse something that 
you have negotiated with the company. If not, you wouldn't have 
leadership. It is sad, but it's the way. The union is a vertical organisation, 
head, body, and a political line goes down, and that's it (Union Official - 
LyF CF). 
OK, lay reps may influence to certain extent the policy, they can disagree 
with something and oppose it, but to be honest, the CGA has a mandate, it 
defines general policies, and communicates them upside-down. Otherwise, 
there is no authority (Union Officer - LyF CF). 
Representative democracy predominates over participatory democracy. Lay 
representatives are elected every 2 years by fellow workers, while CGA posts 
and the General Secretary of the union, are elected every 4 years in general 
elections. Despite the lack of opposition, the high level of workers' turnout 
legitimises the authority of the leadership. Indeed, the exercise of the 
representative democracy, in fact, has served the leadership to hide the 
absence of true collective definitions about crucial decisions. In 1992, when the 
companies already began to be transferred to the new owners, the union 
leadership brought forward the general election to back, ex-post, their decision 
to support privatisation. 
The union has kept the requirement for lay representatives to approve every 
CCT dealt by the union, as they have to endorse annually the Memoria y 
Balance, that is, the reports of the annual activities of each union department, 
and the official report of the detail of union expenses. But, given the absence of 
truly workers' participation beyond the elections, these meetings have become 
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a kind of automatic approval of the leadership. Additionally, the CGA maintains, 
when necessary, informative meetings with shop stewards of each firm about 
specific company problems. Also, FTOs usually participates in the sectional 
meetings of the Comit6s de Lugar (Site Committees), where problems related to 
a particular area of production, are discussed. Lastly, there are informal 
communication channels activated by FTOs, often embedded of profuse doses 
of paternalism. But, all these instances are mostly informative or, at best, 
informally consultative. Thus, workers' involvement in the process of decision- 
making seems to be constrained by the extended prerogatives of union 
leadership: 
Shop stewards meetings have no regularity. The union calls an assembly 
only when a big problem comes out. Otherwise, most meetings are 
sectional meetings, just informative ones, for instance, meetings of the 
ComM de Lugar, or meetings with company's shop stewards, but often 
without mandate. It is the leadership who truly decides (Lay Representative 
- LyF CF). 
This panorama is, partly, an outcome of privatisation, which came to renew the 
obstacles to participatory democracy. Shop stewards emphasised, time and 
again, the low level of workers' participation as a result of fear, demoralisation 
and disbelief, mentioning as the main evidence the lack of volunteers to assume 
responsibilities as lay representatives. During the worse period (11991-1997), the 
union hardly covered shop stewards positions; indeed, the union at that time 
had neither second shop stewards, nor militant representatives - the old union 
posts to back activities of the principal shop stewards at firm level. 
Fear to retaliation rated high among the reasons that would explain this 
development: 
A lot of people refused to be shop steward. You know, the managers 
saying: "Be careful my friend, you are shop steward today, but tomorrow... 
(Lay Representative - LyF CF). 
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Nobody wanted to be shop steward. There was fear because the shop 
stewards are always in the eye of the storm. Managers look first for them 
when there are problems (Union Officer - LyF CF). 
Workers' clemoralisation and disbelief, in turn, have a two-fold reason. On the 
one side, shop stewards recognise that most lay reps did not oppose voluntary 
redundancy programmes; quite the contrary, they accompanied the process. 
This is not surprising as the trade union dealt some of these programmes with 
the company and the Ministry of Labour (homoldgaci6n) (LyF CF 1992,1993, 
1994). Even worse, a few shop stewards made blacklists of combative activists 
and negotiated voluntary redundancies for themselves over the normal rate. 
Let us be honest, lads, all we learnt about colleagues, who made blacklists 
at the time. And even worse, they are still reps... (Lay Representative - LyF 
CF) 
It is true. There were people in the union who connived with the bosses. 
Just a few, don't think, please, that this was common. Most were good 
fellows. But, you know, for money, I guess. Although, I wouldn't be able to 
prove that they got money from the companies. But, everybody know they 
did (Lay Representative - LyF CF). 
On the other side, many others joined redundancy programmes due to their 
own demoralisation, as the union lacked initiative to oppose the privatisation. In 
fact, union discourse explicitly assumed a demobilising content, which 
contributed to feed the exodus. By 1992, unions' slogans stressed that the role 
of leaders was to preserve the organisation and to avoid pointless struggles, 
which might dishearten militants and activists. 
Three other aspects are significant in this respect. First, the lack of new entrants 
to the industry has made difficult for the union to train new lay representatives. 
According to interviewees, this conspires against the renewal of the union 
leadership. Second, lay representatives complained that their workload has 
increased and, consequently, it is more difficult to deliver. Companies neither 
consult nor communicate to them about change; hence, shop stewards have to 
be continuously dealing with managers and fighting back their unilateral 
decisions. As a FTO put it: "Today, to be a shop steward is much more costly in 
terms of time, money, and hours of rest" (National Officer - LyF CF). Third, the 
divide between union officials and the rank-and-file has widened since 
privatisation. Yet, the reason for this separation is broadly attribute to the 
general factors. 
It is within this context of declining participation that union leadership could 
develop an entrepreneurial unionism. This style was characterised by union 
leaders as a twofold strategy: the reinforcement of workers solidarity around the 
organisation and an entrepreneurial project to produce new resources to 
increase and strengthen union' social services. But, findings have shown that 
the union neglected the former, developing, only, the latter aspect. 
In the case of LyF MDP, instead, the leadership has framed union actions 
through a political discourse, which stresses workers democracy, autonomy and 
activism in opposition to the exercise of formal democracy. Indeed, the latter is 
blamed to be empty of any social content. 
The promotion of workers' participation was deemed by union leaders to be 
essential to develop a powerful organisation. Thus, from the beginning, the 
union attempted to root the confrontation to privatisation on mass meetings, 
shop stewards assemblies and rank-and-file gatherings at the workplace. 
Workers participation, then, grew over the long-lasting anti-privatisation 
campaign, despite obstacles. Only the determination of the leadership to punish 
the lack of commitment by applying union's rules made participation grow. For 
instance, shop stewards who failed to take on their responsibilities were 
sanctioned, and occasionally replaced. Also, in the face of insufficient 
attendance to meetings, suspensions of those who were absent were applied 
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through members' ballots, a prerogative rarely used by other trade unions. 
Thus, privatisation faced a mobilised union used to engage in collective actions 
ratified often collectively. Union's efforts to communicate with workers were 
crucial for workers' mobilisation: 
People, firstly, were very well informed, though it has been shown that it is 
not enough to give information. It is necessary to discuss it with the lads. 
Also, people saw that we have full dedication to the organisation. Things 
can be done better or worse (... ) But workers did not doubt about our 
dedication to workers' cause. The other thing is that everything we said 
about privatisation was gradually proved by facts (Union Official - LyF 
MDP). 
The capacity of the union leadership to foresee privatisation policies and explain 
to members its meaning and its consequences was vital to create a platform of 
trust between the rank-and-file and them. 
There is trust. People do not necessarily share the ideology of the CGA ( ... ) 
I would say that the vast majority does not have a Leftist orientation. But, 
there is mutual respect and trust. The CGA does not go beyond where, the 
rank-and-file is ready to go. And the latter know that the CGA will not betray 
or negotiate for themselves ( ... ) Mutual respect and trust translate 
into 
discipline. Neither the CGA is for wild strikes, nor workers cross picket lines 
(Union Lawyer - LyF MDP). 
Trust, in turn, allowed the union to overcome critical events. For instance, when 
a group of CGA members and shop stewards joined a redundancy programme 
in 1995, the leadership called mass meetings to discuss, politically, the 
situation. When individual members began to accept food tickets against a 
general assembly decision, the union leadership decided, once more, to discuss 
the situation openly in mass meetings, reversing earlier decisions by the mass 
vote of workers. 
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Despite the profusion of mass mechanism of decision-making, the style of LyF 
MDP's leadership corresponds to that defined by Batstone as representative, 
that is, a leadership with capacity to take decisions independently (Batstone et 
al. 1977). Furthermore, general assemblies are, mostly, called by union leaders 
to debate and vote concrete tactics and forms of action. The absence of an 
organised opposition after the breakaway, facilitated the hegemony of the 
current leadership. A fact deemed for several interviewees to be damaging for 
the leadership as it contributes to relax self-discipline and increase the risk of 
bureaucratisation: 
We need opposition... It would help us to have better reflexes against our 
own bureaucratic tendencies (Lay Representatives - LyF MDP). 
Actually, it was harmful for our internal life the disappearance of the 
opposition. If this were not the case, who knows, we wouldn't be still 
managing the union. And I'm not speaking of the opposition, but of fellow 
workers who have lost the enthusiasm to participate as they have complete 
confidence in the CGA. But the renewal of leaders would be good for the 
organisation (Union Official - LyF MDP). 
Tý this comes out as a common weakness with LyF CF. There has not been hus, 
renewal of leaders, though, for different reasons. In the case of LyF MDP, the 
demarcation between active and passive groups of workers seems to have 
gradually crystallised after the breakaway. Besides this, a degree of 
demoralisation after privatisation, due to company aggressive human resources 
policies debilitated participation. Thus, whether workers still respond positively 
to calls for industrial action by union leaders, their engagement in the process of 
decision-making seems to have decreased. The latter would explain why the 
union has given up the strict application of the rule book to punish the lack of 
participation in mass meetings. 
The key aspect to be underlined is the ability of the leadership to complement, 
and even replace, traditional union resources by new ones based on external 
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solidarity and the politics of social unionism. The former manifested in its 
engagement in organisational building at higher national and international 
levels. But, the union early understood as well, the power of communitarian 
alliances to fight back privatisation. Chapter 7 already described how this 
orientation translated into a widening of union's repertoire of collective actions. 
But it also, by this way, the union has widened its representation by linking their 
own demands with communitarian demands. In this manner, the union forged 
relationships with organisations of neighbours, students, small owners and 
other social movements to compromise common policies. Thus, for instance, 
while workers' participation decreased, the union was able to mobilise 
unemployed and neighbourhood organisations in demonstrations and rallies 
against the firm. An outstanding outcome of this strategy was the campaign for 
the TEIS. After a long campaign led by LyF MDP, an agreement reached 
between the Government, EDEA and a coalition of diverse organisations 
secured, in 2000, the cheap provision of electricity for poor neighbourhoods, 
thanks to a 40 % reduction in the price afforded by the company, and a 15 % 
and 6% reduction of taxes afforded by the Provincial and Municipal 
administrations respectively. For the consumers, this meant a final reduction of 
50 %. Needless to say, that this achievement increased the appeal of the union 
in the community. Today, the same alliance, again under the leadership of the 
union, is campaigning for the re-nationalisation of the company; and recently, 
the union has pushed FeTERA to campaign for the re-nationalisation of the oil 
and energy industry. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to shed some light on the relationships between 
privatisation and changes in the organisational sophistication of ESI unions and 
the dynamics of decision-making. The aim has been to add new elements to 
judge trade unions' ability to mobilise workers in the context of privatisation. As 
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with previous chapters, the comparative analysis has made possible to identify 
similarities and differences, both nationally and internationally. 
The first thing to stress is that, to some extent, union mergers and 
amalgamations obscured in UK the impact of privatisation on trade union 
resources. In contrast, in LyF CF, the steady decline of union's resources due to 
dramatic losses in membership appears as the chief organisational aspect to be 
underlined by the analysis. While neither union density nor the scope of 
representation was seriously affected by job loss, the extent of the latter 
obviously distorted the organisational life of trade unions. Chapter 9 shows that 
its main manifestation in UK was the proliferation of recruiting campaigns. 
Occasionally in this country, union leaders expressed as well misgivings about 
the financial impact of downsizing. Yet, unions' mergers and amalgamations 
ended up softening the financial consequences of job loss. In Argentina, 
instead, the whole policy drive of LyF CF should be analysed taking into 
account the huge financial implications of membership loss. It reinforced 
workers' demobilisation as the strategic focus was to safeguard the union 
against the consequences of labour conflicts, as the opportunity-to-act was 
deemed to be unfavourable. LyF MDP, in turn, benefited from an organisational 
structure, which depended only partially on the privatised company; thus, the 
impact was lesser. In this case, the leadership chose from the beginning to 
oppose privatisation through a diverse repertoire of action, which rested upon 
the wide-ranging mobilisation not only of the rank-and-file but also of the 
affected community. 
Certainly, variability in the extent of the organisational restructuring of British 
and Argentinean trade unions proved to be salient. The former engaged in a 
never ending process of change to adapt their structures to the development of 
the industry. Inevitably, the gap between the decision to devolve power to lower 
organisational levels and the effective settlement of the new structures 
weakened in between workers' collective capacities. Mainly, the lack of strong 
workplace organisations was a crucial deficit. Companies took advantage of the 
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situation pushing through change before the eyes of a disconcerted workforce, 
who expected to negotiate concessions for job security. However, unions did 
their best to resource shop stewards through training programmes and FTOs' 
support, and readapted their organisations to counteract changes in bargaining 
and industrial structures. On the contrary, Argentinean unions kept their 
organisational structures unchanged; though, LyF CF, launched a severe 
programme of adjustment to equate action to resources. This variance is 
explained by the combination of the particularities of the institutions of industrial 
relations and the evolution of the electricity industry as privatisation unfolded. 
Both factors contributed in Argentina to the maintenance of a centralised control 
of bargaining. Although, lay representatives gained prominence, the unions 
were able to form a sole negotiating team to bargain with ESI companies. 
Obviously, company's shop stewards have played an outstanding role in the 
definition of the contents of the dealings. In this respect, LyF IVIDP stands out 
due to its relative stability as the company was not divided and the structure did 
not suffer as much as the other unions from job loss. Thus, a different structural 
context facilitated a different strategic choice by union leadership, who followed 
traditional patterns of mobilisation, though enriched by the adoption of the 
orientation of the social unionism. 
It is worth mentioning that both trade unions analysed in Argentina had to face 
acute problems to maintain their social services to members, though for 
different reasons; this was the only area where change has been considerable. 
But, different strategies choices led to different outcomes. In the case of LyF 
MDP, it served to reinforce the notion of workers' collective solidarity, whereas 
in LyF CF, it was the platform from which an entrepreneurial style of unionism 
developed. Still, problems regarding the provision of social services became a 
potential threat for the legitimacy of both union leaderships. 
Nonetheless, from the point of view of mobilisation theory, the hallmarks of 
privatisation regarding organisational developments were the growth of 
sectionalism and the decline of workers' participation in decision-making. Since 
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privatisation, sectional interests have spread across companies undermining 
solidarity. Additionally, the uncertainties provoked in UK by the hectic evolution 
of the industry have conspired against inclusive forms of collectivism. Yet 
workers' mobilisation has not been absent, as short localised actions have 
come out all over the industry. In Argentina, sectionalism affected LyF CF too, 
due to industry fragmentation. Besides, differences in bargaining power 
between generation and distribution militated against unified policies. 
Distribution workers failed to mobilise in their support fellows workers employed 
in generation; in fact, even employees from distribution failed to coordinate 
policies, despite sharing similar problems. LyF IVIDP is, once more, the 
exception, for the very reason that the division of ESEBA did not affect the 
representational reach of the union, quite the contrary, it consolidated its 
autonomy. 
Additionally, in both countries, most respondents have stressed that workers' 
participation was sooner or later affected by the demoralisation brought about 
by the process of privatisation. Massive job losses and voluntary severance 
packages, the deterioration of terms and conditions of employment, aggressive 
human resources policies and so forth - and findings show that it would be 
necessary to add to that list trade unions' own strategic choices, would have 
produced a general debilitation of workers' disposition to participate, actively, in 
decision-making. Certain qualifications are necessary, however. Whether it is 
true that British unions have faced problems to recruit lay representatives and 
organise workplaces, it is also true that there have been plenty of successful 
stories. Besides, before privatisation, the traditional bargaining arrangements 
tended to hide workers' lack of participation as centralisation rendered it 
superfluous; it was enough for union leaders at the time, to count on workers' 
support when needed. The general picture, then, stands out for its variability. In 
Argentina, in turn, brutal evidences of a declining participation dated back to 
mid-1970s as a result of massive repression of working-class politics. If the 
1980s witnessed a recovery in workers mobilisation, the costs of the 
dictatorship were strongly felt. In this period, a bureaucratic leadership 
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consolidated in LyF CF. It faced privatisation through a policy, which explicitly 
praised workers demobilisation, in search of the preservation of the 
organisation. LyF MDP, instead, was able to mobilise not only ESI workers, but 
also community interests and external solidarity behind a policy of total 
confrontation. Nevertheless, after privatisation, workers' participation decreased 
also in LyF MDP putting at risk the lively dynamic of the process of decision- 
making, and damaging the commitment of many shop stewards. If this 
phenomenon have not developed as to affect the ability of the union to engage 
in collective actions, the decision now, concentrated more than before, in union 
leaders, whose combative outlook has ensured the survival of workers' 
mobilisation. Additionally, communitarian alliances and external solidarity are, 
tr, day, important resources, which compensate, partly, the deterioration of union 
internal dynamics. 
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Chapter 11 
Closing Remarks 
This thesis opened stressing two main objectives: the exploration of the 
relationships between privatisation and workers' collectivism and the insight of 
mobilisation theory for such a task. In this sense, the most elemental and 
general conclusions to be drawn are that ESI privatisation did make workers' 
collective action more difficult and that the research did prove the potential of 
mobilisation theory to analyse the effects of counter-mobilisation on labour and 
how trade unions respond to that challenge. 
Chapter 1 specifically posed a set of empirical and theoretical research 
questions, which are, at this stage, worth restating. 
A broad empirical question was the reconstruction of the counter-mobilising 
content of privatisation and trade unions' defensive actions. In this regard, the 
research intended, on the one side, to identify sources of variability in the forms 
taken by the counter-mobilisation and workers' strategic choices as well as the 
type, of resources mobilised by the actors. On the other side, it aimed to 
illuminate how the forces unleashed by the process of privatisation targeted 
workers' collectivism. At theoretical level, the main questions related to the 
contribution of a cross-national comparison and meso- and macro-analytical 
levels to the development of mobilisation theory, and the place of agency type 
variables in the conceptual framework. 
Thus, the thesis was grounded in a discussion of mobilisation theory, which laid 
the conceptual foundations of the research: the postulate about the counter- 
mobilising character of privatisation; the expectation of privatisation 
undermining the mobilising capacity of trade unions; and the conclusion that the 
categories opportunity-to-act, organisation and interest were appropriate tools 
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to carry out the empirical investigation into that problematic. The methodological 
discussion, in turn, justified the adoption of a comparative approach to identify 
and evaluate the intermediate variables, which impinged on the categories of 
mobilisation theory, as far as the comparison be properly contextualised (Locke 
& Thelen 1995). Mobilisation theory allows for the different stages of 
mobilisation to be understood and studied within a specific context; then, this 
was an additional reason for adopting this theoretical framework. 
Then, after exploring the diverse meanings and complexities of the term 
privatisation, chapter 4 developed four sorts of arguments in order to 
substantiate the postulate about the counter-mobilising content of privatisation 
against labour. It began by providing historical evidence about the long-term 
orientation of organised labour towards public ownership in both countries, and 
finished by reviewing empirical evidence to show the positive association 
between privatisation and unfavourable developments for labour. In between, it 
offered theoretical arguments taken from Marxist political economy and 
mobilisation perspectives. Yet, the essential point of the chapter was that 
privatisation enhances market discipline. 
By a cross-national comparison, chapters 5 and 6 intended to identify various 
mediating variables, which intervened to shape the opportunity structure and 
the forms and prospects of the counter-mobilising forces. Thus, these chapters 
surveyed similarities and differences with regards international pressures over 
the process of privatisation, the speed of the programmes, the evolution of the 
industrial structures, the role of the labour law in the respective systems of 
industrial relations, and so forth. In this sense, while public ownership and the 
type of industry pointed towards similarities between case-studies, differences 
in the national systems of industrial relations and in the evolution of the 
industrial structures after privatisation called the attention to variability in trade 
unions' (re-)sources of power, and hence, in the opportunity structure, and in 
the timing and forms of the process of counter-mobilisation. Basically, it was 
argued that in Argentina, given the legal underpinnings of the system of 
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industrial relations, and concomitantly, of trade union power, the role of the 
government was crucial to undermine workers' collectivism and pave the way to 
privatisation. In UK, instead, that task was left to private capitals and industrial 
restructuring after privatisation. 
Chapters 7 to 10 testified to that by providing an empirical reconstruction of key 
aspects of both, the counter-mobilisation process associated to the privatisation 
programme and the trade unions' defensive responses. Together, these four 
chapters constitute a sort of kaleidoscopic approach, which illuminated different 
sides of the counter-mobilising wave and their impact upon workers' 
organisational strength and interest definition. Their different starting-points 
allowed the thesis to inquire about the various conceptual connections between 
the categories. In this sense, these chapters also gave evidence about the 
importance of union internal capabilities and agency to mediate the opportunity 
structure and the process of counter-mobilisation. Moreover, they showed that 
the organisational features and developments as well as the agency factors and 
social interactions, which facilitate the collective definition of interests, may 
impinge back positively on the opportunity structure. 
Let us summanse the main arguments and findings offered by these chapters 
as they will serve as a useful platform to present some theoretical conclusions. 
The empirical focus of chapter 7 was the reconstruction of the anti-privatisation 
campaigns of ESI unions in both countries; the theoretical aim was to test the 
explanatory power of the conceptual sequence laid down in chapter 2. The 
chapter showed that in UK, in the run-up to privatisation, ESI unions maintained 
quite unchanged their industrial (re-)sources of power, and hence, industrial 
latent power., This would help them to obtain defensive political influence within 
a context of political retreat. This defensive influence was mobilised to obtain 
concessions regarding pension schemes, health and safety procedures, and 
provisionally, the industrial relations machinery. In Argentina, instead, the 
industrial power of national public unions was legally undermined by the 
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government to prevent workers from mobilising industrial resources against 
privatisation. In this context, LyF CF inclined to reformulate its strategy at the 
expense of organising and workers' collectivism, and towards an 
entrepreneurial unionism to underpin the financial strength of the organisation. 
The case of LyF MDP, in turn, expressed the significance of agency type 
variables to account for workers' collectivism. A determined anti-privatisation 
leadership was able to delay privatisation for years by combining the 
mobilisation of political, industrial and legal resources through collective and 
participatory mechanisms. Theoretically, the chapter demonstrates the utility of 
the sequence opportunity-to-act, organisation and interest definition to account 
for the strategic choices and forms of collective action of well-established labour, 
organisations in the face of a counter-mobilising event. 
Chapter 8 addressed an obvious but often neglected aspect of counter- 
mobilisation, that is, the mobilisation of money resources to prevent opposition, 
at both individual and collective levels, and further loyalty to new private firms. 
Concomitantly, the chapter explored the connections between counter- 
mobilisation and the categories offered by mobilisation theory for the analysis of 
collective action in the medium- and short-run (opportunity-to-act, organisation, 
interest), particularly, the effects of specific counter-mobilising forces upon the 
aforementioned categories. The chapter pointed, first, to the influence of various 
intermediate variables on the fate of the politics of money. The active 
involvement of the government before privatisation was prominent in Argentina, 
backed and resourced by international financial institutions, mainly, the IMF, and 
the WB. In UK, the bulk of the process took place after privatisation. 
Employment law too, explained diversity in the form and outcomes of the 
politics of money, for instance, the importance of personal contracts in UK or 
the chance for Argentinean unions to assume the representation of workers as 
share owners in Company Boards. Most important to explain country specific 
outcomes, however, was the growing rate of unemployment, which paralleled in 
Argentina the implementation of voluntary redundancy programmes, the axis of 
the politics of money. It had two consequences: it precluded the indulgent 
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attitude toward voluntary redundancies policies found among the British ESI 
workforce and it caused workers' resistance. Since then, voluntary severance 
packages hided in Argentina the development of managerial harassment and 
repression to achieve downsizing. Finally, agency type variables come to the 
fore, once more, to explain variability between unions in Argentina. From the 
beginning, LyF MDP leadership framed voluntary programmes as hidden 
dismissals, took industrial action against them, and expulsed from the 
organisation those members, who accepted severance packages. The union 
was not immune from the politics of money: dozens of workers were seduced 
and, even worse, four CGA' officers and eight union' representatives were 
corrupted by the company ESEBA. But, the leadership could mobilise the 
collective power of workers all along the process against the different 
manifestations of the politics of money, and reduced its consequences. At the 
level of theory, the diffuse effects of the various forms adopted by the politics of 
money seem to warn against any simple relationship between counter- 
mobilisation and its consequences on the empirical manifestation of the 
categories of mobilisation theory. Nevertheless, the analysis puts in evidence, 
that the organisational domain is often a main target. 
Chapter 9, in turn, researched another side of the counter-mobilising wave 
associated to privatisation: the process of fragmentation of collective bargaining 
and devolution. It substantiated the central role of the Argentinean government 
backed by the international financial institutions, in this case, in dismantling 
collective agreements before privatisation. It differentiated this, from the case of 
UK, where the prospects of competition compelled managers from privatised 
firms to push the devolution of bargaining structures to achieve change in 
working practices and pay structures. But, in this case, it is necessary to refer 
also to industrial variables, mainly, the hectic process of mergers and takeovers 
experienced by ESI since denationalisation, which explains the profuse change 
in collective arrangements in UK; and to multi-unionism, which explains why this 
change further inter-union competition. In Argentina, instead, where industrial 
structures remained almost untouched after privatisation, bargaining structures 
274 
stabilised quickly; concurrently, a different union structure limited as well, 
competition between ESI unions, though, it appeared for the first time in the 
landscape of the industry. In turn, the chapter related fragmentation and 
devolution to workers demobilisation by addressing tensions and conflicts within 
trade union ranks, which weakened unions' aggregate strength; but also by 
exposing differences in bargaining power that managers exploited in their 
favour. Again, the particular side of the process of counter-mobilisation under 
analysis proved to have wider effects upon the categories opportunity-to-act, 
interest and organisation, specifically, upon the latter. 
Finally, chapter 10 turned the theoretical kaleidoscope towards the analysis of 
organisational and agency type variables like organisational sophistication, 
union leadership, participation and decision-making. The aim was to shed light 
on the ways by which unions mediated the opportunity-to-act and the state and 
capital's counter-mobilising policies they faced over the process of privatisation, 
and after. Findings revealed the impact of privatisation upon these ý dimensions 
of workers' collectivism, too. In this realm, it was again the evolution of ESI 
structures the chief intermediate variable, now, to understand unions' 
organisational change. Thus, the pict ure presented was one of never ending 
organisational change in UK, and relative stability in Argentina as far as 
workplace structures and other representative levels are concerned; although 
Argentinean trade unions have reduced their size since privatisation, mainly due 
to job loss, in the case of LyF CF, dramatically. Additionally, in UK, trade unions' 
mergers added complexity to this picture. This process of union reorganisation, 
which ran parallel to privatisation, at times intertwined and often overlapped with 
it. Thus, financial consequences due to membership loss were softened as a 
whole by unions' mergers, although, from the point of view of ESI lay 
representatives, mergers meant at the same time fewer resources. To some 
extent too, the new systems of workers representation that emerged with the 
creation of the new unions, implied, comparatively to the past, that ESI 
constituencies lose prominence. Nonetheless, from the point of view of 
mobilisation theory, the main findings with regards the relationship between 
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privatisation and workers' collectivism were the growth of sectionalism and the 
decline of workers' participation. 
After this summary, the first general conclusion to be drawn regarding theory, is 
that the cross-national comparison and the scope of the analysis contributed to 
put in evidence the relevance of various mediating factors in the explanation of 
variability in the opportunity-to-act, trade union's organisational change and the 
empirical forms taken by the counter-mobilisation wave. 
Concerning the role of mediating factors in the understanding of variability 
between countries, the use of mobilisation theory confirmed the relevance of 
alternative institutional arrangements as has been widely shown by 
conventional approaches and other competing models (Clegg 1976; Ferner 
1997; Ferner & Hyman 1998; Katz & Kochan 2004; Kochan, Katz & McKersie 
1987; Locke & Thelen 1995). It showed as well, that political economy 
variables, which were in part determined by different international trends in 
capital investment, played an important mediating role too, as they contributed 
to explain differences in industrial restructuring in UK and Argentina, and 
consequently, variability in trade union's organisational change. This is an 
important finding, for it puts in evidence the capability of mobilisation theory to 
illuminate aspects, which were rather neglected by conventional approaches 
mostly focused on institutional factors. 
Also different from the conventional approaches, mobilisation theory has proved 
to be a powerful devise to study the kind of political and agency factors that set 
in motion the various counter-mobilising forces unleashed by privatisation and 
the dynamics of trade union responses to them. Moreover, it manifested 
appealing, in particular, for researching the strategic interactions between 
capital and labour over processes of counter-mobilisation. 
This is the case, partly, because the basic understandings, which underpin 
Kelly's conceptual framework, direct the analyses towards the detail of the 
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demobilising dimensions of processes, which might go, otherwise, unnoticed. In 
this latter sense, and to put it simply, the theory proved to be empirically 
productive. 
For example, a mobilising standpoint, as illustrated in chapter 8, allows the 
researcher to gather a diverse set of policies, whose negative effects for 
workers' collectivism are usually taken for granted, but hardly ever explicitly 
incorporated into academic explanations of workers demobilisation. Indeed, it 
encouraged the research to approach well-established facts, like fragmentation 
of industrial structures and collective bargaining, which scholars had often listed 
among the threats posed by privatisation for organised labour, but not 
scrutinised in detail as to establish why and how fragmentation and 
decentralisation brought about division, competition and sectionalism. 
Nevertheless, the distinctive character of mobilisation theory must be assessed 
by its sensitivity to variability in the (re-)sources of power mobilised by unions, 
and hence, by its power to question and explain how trade unions face all those 
counter-mobilising challenges posed by privatisation. In this regards, and, more 
specifically, the second theoretical conclusion is that agency type factors were 
paramount to explain variability between unions facing similar- opportunity, 
structures and counter-mobilising policies at national level. 
The research substantiates this conclusion, mainly, through the comparison 
between the cases of LyF MDP and LyF CF. In the former, a determined 
leadership engaged in fierce fighting against privatisation for years. A case that 
underlined the relevance of participatory and dialogical processes of interest 
definition to sustain workers' collectivism and mobilisation, particularly, in a 
context of an increasingly negative opportunity structure. On the contrary, the 
leadership of LyF CF, ready to compromise without involving the rank-and-file in 
the decis ion-m akin g, feinted to oppose the sale of ESI, and then, supported the 
privatisation process in a desperate attempt to maintain its organisational 
power, though, at the expense of the terms, conditions and levels of 
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employment. This latter case pointed to the problem of the demobilising role of 
trade union officials in the face of a counter-mobilisation wave, an issue not 
addressed in this study. Similarly, the English case studies illustrated as well, 
although, less dramatically, how different responses and inclinations in the face 
of similar opportunity structures, depended on agency type variables, but also 
upon organisational developments, a topic to which this concluding chapter will 
return later. To give just an example, Unison's inclination towards coalition 
building seems to have been seriously restricted by multi-unionism and the 
characteristics of ESTUC, features that ended up leading the union towards 
compromise with blue-collar and technical unions. 
As regards the place of agency factors in the explanation of variability, the 
methodological design was key. By complementing the cross-national 
comparison with the comparative study of union responses within the same 
country, the study was able to make a better evaluation of the role played by 
agency type variables in those cases in which unions faced similar counter- 
mobilising dynamics and similar opportunity structures. Conventional 
approaches usually set the comparison within a country-by-country research 
design, and therefore, show difficulties to account for union internal variables, 
as different union responses are usually understood as the outcomes of the 
alternative institutional arrangements in which workers make their strategic 
choices. Then, in such conceptual and methodological models, the specific role 
of agency type variables is more difficult to address. 
This second general conclusion points towards the need for mobilisation theory 
to be even more sensitive to internal questions of union politics, structure and 
leadership. Both, the discussion of the analytical framework developed in 
chapter 2, and the final findings of the study, suggest that a focus on the social 
mediations of interest definition is a fruitful approach. Most studies using 
mobilisation theory, however, have not dealt with these important aspects 
systematically (Baccaro, Harman & Turner 2003; Frege & Kelly 2003,2004; 
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Heery, Kelly & Waddington 2003; Heery et aL 2003; Kelly & Bacligannavar 
2003; Moore 2004). 
In fact, the investigation into the styles of leadership, the level of workers' 
participation and the process of decision-making proved to be essential to 
explain how trade unions acted defensively back upon the opportunity structure. 
Yet, findings also show that these processes of social mediation cannot be 
analysed in isolation from the category organisation. Indeed, they are 
inextricably intertwined with organisational features. And this is, perhaps, the 
most relevant conclusion to be drawn as far as the interaction among the 
analytical variables is concerned, though, this was an unexpected finding of the 
research, and therefore, the issue could not be explored in its full extension in 
this thesis. Thus, this is a dimension that needs further research, as this 
empirical finding has important theoretical consequences for the future 
development of mobilisation theory. 
In certain sense, and to continue with the metaphor, the category organisation 
seems to occupy the centre-stage of the conceptual kaleidoscope of 
mobilisation theory. This category pertains to workers' main armour to face a 
given opportunity structure - and to certain extent it is a component of it, and for 
that reason, it is the main target of any counter-mobilising move as shown by 
chapters 8 and 9. Indeed, given its dependant status (Muller-Jentsch 1985; Offe 
& Wiesenthal 1985), it is a category constrained by the type of industrial and 
institutional variables analysed in chapter 6. But, and this is crucial, it is also 
both an enabler and a limit to dialogical leaderships, workers' participation and 
democratic decision-making as explored in chapter 7 and 10. Moreover, 
organisational change is the outcome of workers' strategic choices, usually, in 
the face of a changing environment - as in this, thesis, for instance - but often 
according to a certain set of political aims. Thus, it is an analytical arena, which 
serves as a liaison within mobilisation theory between structural and agency 
type categories. 
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In turn, as already suggested, the theoretical perspective advanced by Kelly is 
useful to study the strategic confrontations of the various actors involved in the 
struggles around counter-mobilisation events. This positive aspect was again 
enhanced by the methodological design. 
In this regards, it was the scope and multiple levels of analysis what permitted 
the research to pay attention, on the one side, to the strategic interaction of the 
contenders, and on the other side, to the aforementioned ability of the actors to 
modify through their strategic choices the opportunity structure, and by this way, 
to open or foreclose specific paths of action. For instance, the sequence of 
change in collective bargaining was illuminating. In both countries, although by 
different means, the fragmentation of the bargaining machinery transformed the 
field of interactions, and forced unions to accommodate their organisational 
structures and mobilise their power resources accordingly. And this 
mobilisation, in turn, brought about new scenarios for contenders. Similar 
dynamics were typical of other counter-mobilising events addressed in this 
thesis; for instance, the fate of the politics of voluntary redundancies in 
Argentina when unemployment rose. The latter discouraged workers from 
signing up redundancy agreements, and then, changed the social context in 
which the policy had been accepted by trade unions. After that, opposition from 
workers brought about repression and harassment, and the latter, brought 
about industrial action. From that point, the content of the politics of money 
changed. Another example: the analysis of the anti-privatisation campaigns 
made clear that the initial responses of workers faded away with the evolution of 
the events and the changes in the socio-political context. In UK, FUSE 
campaign stopped with the announcement of the Parliamentary election. In 
Argentina, in the case of LyF CF, latent resistance metamorphosed into active 
support as the Government menaced to resort to violence; in the case of LyF 
MDP, the repertoire of collective action evolved according, not only, to the the 
type of policies implemented by managers and public authorities, but also to the 
changes in the (re-)sources of power of the union. 
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In sum, and to put it theoretically, the development of mobilisation theory within 
a comparative framework proved to match the methodological requirements of 
comparative historical researchers, that is, "to explicitly analyze historical 
sequences and take seriously the unfolding processes over time" (Mahoney & 
Ruescherneyer 2003: 12). This means that, following a mobilising perspective, 
the comparison of trade union responses to change should take into account 
the temporal structures of processes and events in the explanation. To put it 
mildly: history matters. 
As a consequence, it implies, empirically, that the study was able to address not 
only how trade unions mobilised but also how their strategies evolved over time. 
Moreover, the thesis explains both dimensions according to a contextualised 
study of the changes in the opportunity-to-act, the timing of those changes and 
the, dynamics of interest definition by which the opportunity structure was 
interpreted by workers and certain ways of action decided by their 
organisations. 
Hence, once more, the potential of the theory was enhanced by a. 
methodological decision: the scope and the multi-analytical levels of the 
research. Thus, methodology proves to be essential for mobilisation theory to 
show its explanatory potential, and this constitutes, in itself, another meaningful 
conclusion of this thesis. In support of this conclusion, it is important to add that 
a methodological warning is also necessary in relation to the number of case- 
studies: the bigger the number, the more difficult to engage in systematic and 
contextualised comparisons following mobilisation theory. This is so, because 
this conceptual framework, as discussed in chapter 2, entails the exploration of 
the connections among several variables, which may have different causal- 
effects across heterogeneous contexts. Besides, a close inspection of particular 
cases requires detailed historical and contextual knowledge, which is only 
possible to achieve when the number of cases is limited. Thus, the application 
of mobilisation theory to large number of cases seems to be only possible as 
the outcome of a collective academic work. 
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So far, the examination of the pros and cons of mobilisation theory has 
underlined the positives; what, then, about its weaknesses? 
In this regards, it is important to stress that the process of research uncovered 
weak spots in mobilisation theory, too. Basically, that the causal relationship 
among its categories appeared, at times, ambiguous and unstable; moreover, 
that the categories, in occasions, even overlap. Therefore, the success of 
mobilisation theory seems to highly depend on its concrete ope ratio na I isation, 
as shown by the previous studies, which have drawn on Kelly's framework 
(Atzeni 2005; Brown Johnson & Jarley 2004; Darlington 2001; Kelly & 
Badigannavar 2003; Metochi 2002; Moore 2004). And at this point, it is 
essential to reiterate that the operationalisation should be sensitive to internal 
questions of union politics, structure and leadership in order to account for the 
social processes of interest definition, for this contributes to a better 
understanding of union choices. 
This remark may sound disturbing for those who conceive theory as a rigid 
model of causation. However, this is acknowledged too by the champions of 
mobilisation theory (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001). For them, mobilisation 
studies should not look for explanations that rest upon low-level empirical 
generalisations, in turn, subsumed under higher-level empirical genera lisations, 
which refer at the end to covering laws. That is, the type of explanations, which 
better fit the construction of rigid theoretical models. Instead, for these scholars, 
explanations following mobilisation theory are to be conceived as the 
identification of causal chains consisting of mechanism and variables that 
reappear in a variety of social contexts under diverse combinations and 
sequences (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001). 
For the view that underpins this thesis, this is the most fruitful understanding of 
mobilisation theory, for it is a perspective that posits a flexible framework, in 
which a set of factors and categories, critical to the presence or absence of 
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collective action, interacts. Mobilisation theory, then, should be conceptualised 
as a sort of middle-range theory to analyse, empirically, workers' collectivism (or 
its absence); a middle-range theory, which needs to be complemented by other 
theoretical insights, the definition of intermediate variables, the establishment of 
empirical causations, and fundamentally, a historical perspective. And in this 
sense, the comparative approach facilitates all those methodological and 
theoretical definitions. 
Still, mobilisation theory, at least as developed here, does posit analytical 
hierarchies, which are conceived appropriate to approach workers' collectivism. 
For the study of the strategic choices and collective actions taken by organised 
labour, it prioritises the analysis of the opportunity structure as the starting point, 
thus, of given power relations, and the structural variables upon which the latter 
rest. In short, it gives certain privilege to structural determinants over agency 
type variables like interest definition, and obviously over (secondary) variables 
like (union) organisation (as in chapter 7). For the analysis of the effects of 
counter-mobilisation upon organised labour, it emphasises its diffuse character 
but prioritises effects upon organisational variables, which, in turn, distort the 
process of decision-making (as in chapters 8 and 9). 
At first sight, this might appear as contradictory with the emphasis put by this 
concluding chapter in agency type factors. However, there is no contradiction. 
On the contrary, this accent explains why a mobilising perspective is able to 
bring to the fore trade union agency and strategic choices to grasp the meaning 
of the concrete responses of trade unions to events of counter-mobilisation (like 
privatisations, for instance), but through a contextualised and comprehensive 
analysis that is able to avoid both deterministic structural causation and over- 
politicised and voluntaristic accounts of workers' collective action. 
Needless to say, however, that this thesis is far from exhausting the empirical 
and theoretical issues involved in the application of mobilisation theory to a 
process of counter-mobilisation, in this case, to the privatisation of ESI. To 
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mention just an important one: it seems to be plenty of room for a closer 
examination of the ideological processes, which intervened in shaping the 
opportunity-to-act during the privatisation of ESI. Several references have been 
done to the ideological consequences of the counter-mobilising forces at play, 
and the role of union leaderships in disputing meaning. Indeed, Lukes' (2005) 
framework proved to be useful to treat them in their more general aspects (see 
Edwards 2006, however, for a recent critique). But, the Gramscian notion of 
hegemony could have been of prime importance to carry out this task, for 
instance. This is another pending matter for further research. For the time 
being, if this thesis helps to a better understanding of why privatisation 
conspired against the power of organised labour and sheds light on the 
perspectives opened by Kelly's theoretical proposal, its most basic aims will 
have been fulfilled. 
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